Intellectual Property
February 2001 Vol. 40, No. 2
Statements or expressions of opinion or comments appearing herein are those of the editors or contributors, and not necessarily those of the association or section.
Contents
* Illinois appellate court embraces "inevitable disclosure" doctrine in trade secrets case
* From ink to e-sign: a conceptual history of the electronic signature
Illinois appellate court embraces "inevitable
disclosure" doctrine in trade secrets case
By Steven L. Baron, D'Ancona & Pflaum LLC <sbaron@dancona.com>
On December 6, 2000, the Illinois Appellate Court, First District, issued an opinion in the case of Strata Marketing, Inc. v. Murphy, No. 1-99-2749, ___ Ill.App.3d ___, ___ N.E.2d ___ (1st Dist. 2000), in which the court embraced the "inevitable disclosure" doctrine.
In Strata Marketing, the plaintiff, Strata, sued one of its former sales representatives, Gail Murphy ("Murphy"), and Murphy's prospective employer, VNU Marketing Information Services, Inc. ("VNU"), for breach of an employment agreement and for misappropriation of trade secrets. Strata develops software programs that analyze and enhance market data provided by radio and television programs and then leases the software to customers around the United States. As a sales representative, it was Murphy's job to service existing customers and solicit prospective customers.
Murphy signed an Employee Confidentiality Agreement ("Agreement") which provided, among other things, that during her employment and for one year following her termination, she would not render any services "of an advisory or consulting nature or as an employee or otherwise to any business which is a competitor of Strata, including but not limited to MMP [a division of VNU]." The Agreement also set forth a lengthy list of confidential information that Murphy was not to disclose, including: "all information not generally known in the relevant trade or industry which was obtained from Strata, or which was learned, discovered, developed, conceived, originated or prepared by [Murphy] in the scope of her employment." The information fell into the following categories: existing products and products under development; business plans; product development plans, including progress, targeted marketing dates, and anticipated costs; sales or marketing methods; internal business procedures, including Strata's techniques for servicing customers, formulas for computing the reach and frequency of radio and television stations, methods used to compute ratings, and strategies and techniques to sell against competitors; customer lists, existing and prospective; customer contracts, including dates, terms, prices and discounts; specific requirements of Strata's customers; form contracts; supply services; contracts with suppliers; various price structures for different locations and different customers; range of prices within which the sales representatives could negotiate; plans for upgrades and enhancements based on customer-identified problems and requests; and any other information Strata advised was to be kept confidential.
VNU's MMP Division was a "fierce" competitor with Strata. Murphy resigned from Strata effective May 28, 1999 and was to begin employment with MMP on July 19, 1999. Strata filed a two-count complaint against both Murphy and Strata for breach of the Agreement and for misappropriation of trade secrets under the Illinois Trade Secrets Act. Strata sought an emergency TRO, and the defendants responded with a 2-0615 motion to dismiss. The trial court summarily denied the TRO and granted the defendants' motion to dismiss. The trial court found the Agreement to be unenforceable because it contained no geographic limitation.
Strata appealed. On appeal, Justice Burke, writing for the Court, first found that, even though the denial of the TRO and the granting of defendants' motion to dismiss would typically necessitate separate appeals, here, the trial court's ruling occurred virtually simultaneously. Under these circumstances, the appellate court had jurisdiction over the dismissal of the complaint. In a strange procedural twist, however, the court found that the trial court's ruling on the TRO became the law of the case. Thus, the court upheld the trial court's dismissal of Strata's claim against Murphy for breach of Agreement based on the doctrine of res judicata.
The appellate court did, however, analyze the trade secrets claim on the merits, and reversed and remanded the claim for further proceeding in the trial court. In its analysis, the court reviewed the federal cases of PepsiCo. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262 (7th Cir. 1995) and Teradyne, Inc. v. Clear Communications Corp., 707 F.Supp. 353 (N.D. Ill. 1989). The court asserted its belief that "PepsiCo correctly interprets Illinois law and agree[d] that inevitable disclosure is a theory upon which a plaintiff in Illinois can proceed under the [Trade Secrets] Act." The court then examined the allegations of Strata's complaint and recited verbatim the following paragraph from the pleading:
Murphy's employment by MRP necessarily creates the likelihood of the inevitable disclosure of confidential information .... Murphy cannot help but employ, in her new capacity as a salesperson for MRP's products which directly competes with Strata's products, her knowledge of the pricing structure of Strata's products, her knowledge of particular customer needs, her knowledge of customer identified problems with Strata's software, her knowledge of planned product upgrades and enhancements, and her knowledge of existing customer contracts. Even were Murphy to agree not to disclose any of this information, such agreement would be completely ineffective, because the confidential information acquired by Murphy during her employment by Strata is exactly the type of information that any salesperson needs and must use to effectively compete for customers against Strata and on behalf of a competitor such as MRP.
The court concluded that these allegations, and similar allegations in other sections of the complaint, were sufficient to meet the threshold set forth in the PepsiCo case. Namely, the court believed that Strata had demonstrated in its pleading that "Murphy could not operate or function without relying on Strata's alleged trade secrets." Therefore, the court returned the case to the trial court for further proceeding on the trade secrets claim.
Practice tip: When relying on the theory that a defendant will inevitably disclose trade secrets, a plaintiff must plead and prove that the defendant cannot help but rely on the trade secrets in his/her new employment. At the pleading stage, it is best to state facts to support the allegations of inevitable disclosure and not merely rely on a conclusory allegation.
From ink to e-sign: a conceptual history of the electronic
signature
By Aaron Brooks <abrooks@holmstrom-kenneyd.com>
I. Introduction
Amidst the Information Age and the electronic commerce revolution, it is a wonderful time to be a lawyer. Much like Thomas Augustus Watson receiving the first telephone communication in 1876, so too, we stand at the precipice of fundamental change. However, with change comes responsibility. We as lawyers must do more than understand the e-commerce revolution; we must lead it.
The core power of e-commerce is its ability to unite buyers and sellers of goods across any geographic distance. Likewise, long distance contracting issues will arise exponentially, for both transactional and litigation attorneys, as our clients race to become part of the e-commerce revolution. Unfortunately, the recipe for a simple, predictable method of forming a long distance contract has eluded courts and legislators. Yet recently, several groundbreaking cases and statutes have come to bear which may begin the process of settling this crucial commercial issue.
This article identifies four basic methods of forming long distance contracts and summarizes the fundamental issues and problems found in each. In doing so, the author intends to illustrate a fascinating cycle. The cycle begins with most written contracts having been executed with pen and ink, followed by a period of pseudo-contracting which attempted to evade the limitations of pen and ink, followed yet by a return of contract execution by pen (albeit an electronic pen).
II. The four methods of long distance contracting
Ideally, all parties to a contract for the sale of goods would negotiate in person and execute the resulting contract with an ink pen. Such a method would allow the law to remain unchanged; however, it would forego the vast benefits of long distance commerce, such as mail order sales and the awesome power of the Internet. Over time, four basic methods have been developed to reap the benefits of long distance commerce: (1) The "battle of the forms"; (2) the "shrinkwrap agreement"; (3) the "clickwrap agreement"; and (4) the "electronic signature." The goal of each method is to easily achieve a contract that manifests the parties' agreement and satisfies the statute of frauds, without requiring the parties to physically interact with one another.
Prior to a detailed look at the differences between each method of long distance contracting, one should take a moment to note the encompassing similarity. Since each contracting method deals with the purchase and sale of goods, each method exists within the penumbra of Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC).1 Thus, analysis of each method must begin with the basic rule of Article 2:
A contract for sale of goods may be made in any manner sufficient to show agreement, including conduct by both parties which recognizes the existence of such a contract.2
From there, the success or failure of any contracting method depends upon the application of this general rule to the unique characteristics of the long distance relationship.
A. The battle of the forms
At this point in time, the most widely used method of long distance contracting is undoubtedly the exchange of purchase orders and written confirmations. This method is colloquially known as the "battle of the forms."3 In a typical battle of the forms scenario. a purchaser initiates the sales transaction by faxing the seller a written purchase order. In response, the seller will typically send the purchaser a written confirmation of the purchase order. Most likely, the purchase order and confirmation will contain different and inconsistent terms, and the question becomes "was a contract formed and, if so, what are its terms?"
The tenuous answer to this question lies in the UCC's battle of the forms provisions.4 The general rule under these provisions is that a written confirmation operates as an acceptance of the purchase order, even if it contains different or additional terms, unless the written confirmation is expressly made conditional on asset to the different or additional terms.5 If the written confirmation is expressly conditional on asset to the different or additional terms, then the written confirmation does not act as an acceptance and no contract is formed. Nonetheless, if the seller ships the goods anyway and the purchaser pays for them, then a contract will be deemed to have formed under the battle of the forms "catch all" provision.6 In such a case, the terms of the contract will only be the terms that the two forms have in common. The default provisions of the UCC will govern any remaining issues.
If the written confirmation is not made expressly conditional on assent to the different or additional terms, then the disposition of the different or additional terms depends upon whether or not the parties are merchants.7 If they are not merchants, then the different or additional terms become "proposals" to the contract and drop out.8 If they are merchants, then the different or additional terms become part of the contract unless a specific exception applies.9 From a transactional point of view, the significant exception to the "between merchants" rule is when "the offer expressly limits acceptance to the terms of the offer."10
In short, the purchase order can either limit acceptance to the terms of the offer (a conditional purchase order), or not (an unconditional purchase order). So too, the written confirmation can either be expressly conditional upon assent to the different or additional terms (a conditional confirmation) or not (an unconditional confirmation). Thus, section 2-207 of the UCC creates four possible scenarios for the exchange of sales forms, illustrated by the following chart:
As one can see, a merchant has little chance of controlling the terms of a contract with a consumer when a long distance contract is formed using competing purchase forms. Thus, in order to facilitate predictable and efficient e-commerce, merchants need a better long distance contracting method. Over the past few years, two similar methods have developed to overcome this problem: The "shrinkwrap agreement" and the "clickwrap agreement." These methods are discussed in more detail below.
B. The shrinkwrap agreement
The term "shrinkwrap agreement" comes from a relatively recent practice of licensing mass-market software by placing the terms of the license between the software box and the surrounding plastic wrapping.11 In this manner, the consumer is allowed to view the terms of the license before purchasing the product. Typically, the shrinkwrapped license would caution the consumer to not purchase the product if he or she could not agree to the terms of the license agreement.
Over time, the shrinkwrap agreement has evolved beyond its name. Now, many merchants include the terms of their agreement inside the box which contains the goods. Instead of cautioning the consumer not to purchase the product, the packaged agreement cautions the consumer to return the product within a certain time period if the agreement is unacceptable. If enforceable, this method of long distance contracting would permit merchants to quickly make a sales transaction by telephone or e-mail, while allowing the consumer to review the terms of the agreement in the privacy of his own home or office over a period of several days. However, courts are split on the enforceability of such agreements.
The first case to pass on the shrinkwrap agreement appears to be Vault Corporation v. Quaid Software, Ltd.,12 in which the Fifth Circuit held that such an agreement was simply unenforceable because it was a contract of adhesion. Since Quaid, however, courts have judged shrinkwrap agreements under the light of the UCC battle of the forms provisions discussed above. Two early and widely discussed cases began the development of this analysis;13 however, in the author's opinion, the clearest demonstration of the salient issues is demonstrated by the stark dichotomy between Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc.14 and Klocek v. Gateway, Inc., et al.15
In both Hill and Klocek, the facts are virtually identical. The purchasers each ordered a Gateway computer by telephone. Each party received a computer, packaged along with a shrinkwrap agreement that stated that the parties would arbitrate their disputes. Each party sued Gateway for warranty performance, and Gateway moved to dismiss each case based on the arbitration clause.
In Hill, the Seventh Circuit takes a very practical, pro-e-commerce approach. The court's fundamental premise is "the vendor is the master of the offer."16 From this premise, the court deduces that it is the vendor who may propose limitations on the kind of conduct that will constitute acceptance, and it is for the buyer to accept or reject the vendor's proposal by performing or abstaining from acts which the vendor proposes to treat as acceptance. In short, a seller has the exclusive right to begin the contracting process by making the offer; the buyer may only accept or reject the seller's offer. Essentially, the rule of Hill is that a purchaser who fails to return goods within the period specified by the shrinkwrap agreement is bound by the terms of that agreement.
In sharp contrast, Klocek's fundamental premise is "the buyer is the master of the offer." The court argues that the buyer is the one who initiates the contracting process, because the buyer is the one to make initial contact and propose an offer to purchase. Thus, when Gateway shipped its goods to the Kloceks, the enclosed shrinkwrap agreement was a written confirmation containing different or additional terms from the offer under UCC §2-207. Because the parties were not merchants, the different or additional terms, including the arbitration clause, dropped out of the contract.
One distinction between Hill and Klocek is that the Gateway agreement in the former case permitted the buyers thirty days to return the goods, while the agreement in the latter case permitted only five days. Both courts highlighted the length of time a consumer was allotted to reject the contract. From a planning perspective, attorneys drafting shrinkwrap agreements might infer that a longer period may result in a higher probability of enforcement. Aside from this distinction, the split between Hill and Klocek illustrates the unpredictability of the shrinkwrap agreement and the need for a better contracting method to standardize ecommerce. One attempt at improving the shrinkwrap agreement is the so called "clickwrap agreement."
C. The clickwrap agreement
A clickwrap agreement occurs where a software program displays a set of contract terms to a consumer and requires the consumer to push a button labeled "I agree," or something to that effect prior to consummating the sales transaction. Clickwrap agreements seem to overcome the two basic objections to shrinkwrap agreements. First, a clickwrap agreement satisfies objections similar to that in Vault Corporation v. Quaid Software, Ltd.,17 because the purchaser is forced to see the agreement and affirmatively react to it before the transaction becomes complete. Second, it avoids a battle of the forms analysis similar to that in Klocek v. Gateway, Inc., et al.,18 because it allows the vendor to propose terms before the purchaser has a chance to make an offer to purchase.
Although there are others,19 the most important clickwrap agreement case for Illinois practitioners is probably ProCD, Incorporated v. Zeidenberg.20 In that case, Matthew Zeidenberg purchased a copy of a computer database compiled by ProCD. When he installed the program on his computer, a license agreement appeared on the screen. In order to complete the installation, he had to affirmatively indicate his acceptance of the license agreement. He subsequently breached the agreement and defended the suit on the grounds that the license agreement was unenforceable. The Seventh Circuit, again operating under the premise that the "vendor is the master of the offer," held that the agreement was enforceable.
While it is a strong case for the clickwrap agreement, ProCD has two basic problems. First, it was over-expanded in Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc.,21 which chronologically was decided later. In Hill, the court stated:
ProCD holds that terms inside a box of software bind consumers who use the software after an opportunity to read the terms and to reject them by returning the product.22
Unfortunately, this language seems to broaden ProCD into a shrinkwrap case so that it falls into the quagmire of inconsistent federal court decisions dealing with that issue. Without such expansion, ProCD is distinguishable from the shrinkwrap cases, and so to might be future vendors who use clickwrap agreements. Second, ProCD stems from a bad set of facts. One's gut reaction is to hold against defendants like Zeidenburg, because it seems fundamentally wrong to allow someone to purchase a single copy of software and then freely distribute that software in a manner that deprives the seller of future sales, as Zeidenburg attempted to do.
To summarize, the clickwrap agreement offers more predictability and control for the vendor in an e-commerce relationship. Nonetheless, it is not the stable, standard platform that a sturdy e-commerce system requires. Nay, the future of e-commerce lies in the fourth method of long distance contracting: The electronic signature.
D. The electronic signature
Generally speaking, an electronic signature is any electronic process initiated by a person with the intent of manifesting agreement to a set of terms.23 An electronic signature might be a biometric retinal scan, an electronically measured fingerprint, the clicking of a button, or typing of one's name. When applying the law to electronic signatures, four basic issues must be addressed: (1) does the electronic signature satisfy the statute of frauds and other statutes that require a document to be "signed"; (2) does the underlying electronic document satisfy statutes that require a "writing"; (3) how does the vendor know that the purchaser is actually the one who produced the electronic signature; and (4) how do the parties know that the electronic contract has not been tampered with after being signed? In addressing these four points, Illinois practitioners should be aware of three important bodies of law dealing with electronic signatures: The Electronic Signatures in National and Global Commerce Act ("E-Sign"),24 the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act ("UETA"), 25 and the Illinois Electronic Commerce Security Act ("ECSA").26 1. The Electronic Signatures in National and Global Commerce Act.
E-Sign was signed by President Clinton on June 30, 2000 and became effective on October 1, 2000. Like all electronic signature legislation, E-Sign answers the first two questions posed above: An electronic signature and an electronic document satisfy requirements that a document be "signed" and "in writing." In order to benefit from E-Sign, however, the vendor must comply with a complicated set of disclosure and consent provisions designed to protect consumers. For example, in order for the electronic signature to be effective, the consumer must consent to its use, and the consumer has the right to withdraw such consent in certain circumstances. Prior to consenting, the consumer must be provided with clear and conspicuous notice of certain rights he or she may have, including the right to have the electronic record produced in paper form and the right to access the electronic record at a later time.
2. The Uniform Electronic Transactions Act.
UETA also answers the first two questions posed above: An electronic signature and an electronic document satisfy requirements that a document be "signed" and "in writing." However, unlike E-Sign, UETA's notice and consent requirements are less rigid and leave room for interpretation by state courts. For example, the issues of whether the parties agreed to use electronic signatures and whether an electronic signature may be attributed to a party are determined "from the context and surrounding circumstances."27
E-Sign generally preempts state electronic signature statues, unless the state has adopted UETA.28 Thus, states essentially have the opportunity to opt out of the federal notice and consent requirements by adopting UETA unchanged. In fact, nearly half of the states have already done so.29
3. What is missing?
Neither E-Sign nor UETA effectively address the third and fourth questions posed above: How does the vendor know that the purchaser is actually the one who produced the electronic signature, and how do the parties know that the electronic contract has not been tampered with after being signed? These questions go to the authenticity of electronic signatures and documents, which is addressed only in the Illinois ECSA, discussed in more detail below.
III. Electronic authenticity and the Illinois Electronic Commerce Security Act
The Illinois Electronic Commerce Security Act became effective on July 1, 1999. Like E-Sign and UETA, it requires electronic signatures and documents to be given the same effect as their paper counterparts. Unlike these statutes, however, the ECSA also addresses the authenticity of both electronic signatures and documents. It does so by encouraging the use of a particular kind of electronic signature, called a "digital signature." Prior to discussing the ECSA in any detail, one should have a basic understanding of the technology that underlies digital signatures.
A. The basics of a digital signature
Digital signatures are based on a technology called public key infrastructure, or "PKI." In a PKI system, each party to a contract has two "keys," which can be thought of as passwords or ID numbers. One key is called a "public key" and it is posted on the Internet where everyone in the world can see it. The other key is called a "private key" and it is kept secret, much like we safeguard our ATM PIN numbers. In order to endorse PKI technology, one must make two basic assumptions: (1) the public and private key have a relationship which is so unique that no other matching keys can possibly be generated; and (2) the unique relationship between the public and private key is so complicated that no hacker, no matter how talented, can crack it.
Public and private keys can be used to encrypt electronic messages in two ways. To illustrate the encryption methods, picture two fictitious parties, "Bob" and "Alice." First, Bob can send a message to Alice by scrambling the message using the algorithm in her public key, which Bob can easily access because it is a public record. When Alice receives the scrambled message, she can then decode it using her private key. If the message decodes properly, then she knows it has not been tampered with since Bob sent it, since no one but her knows her private key and her private key will only open messages scrambled using her public key.
On the other hand, Bob might scramble the message using his own private key. When Alice receives the message, she should decode it using Bob's public key, which is available to her since it is a public document. If the message decodes properly, then Alice knows that only Bob could have sent it, because Bob's public key will only decode messages that were scrambled using Bob's private key (which only Bob knows).
The first type of encoding, where Bob scrambles a message using Alice's public key, is the PKI method for authenticating documents. Alice knows the document she received is the same one Bob sent because, if it had been tampered with en route, then her private key would not have opened it. As discussed below, the ECSA calls this kind of encrypted document a "secure electronic record."
The second type of encoding, where Bob scrambles a message using his own private key, is the PKI method for authenticating signatures. Alice knows that Bob signed the message she received, because Alice used Bob's public key to open the message, Bob's public key can only open messages encrypted with Bob's private key, and only Bob knows his private key. As discussed below, the ECSA calls this kind of encrypted document a "secure electronic signature."
B. The burden shifting provisions of the ECSA
The Illinois ECSA provides an important procedural benefit to contracting parties who use technology similar to PKI. First, ECSA §10-120(a) provides that "in resolving a civil dispute involving a secure electronic record, it shall be irrebutably presumed that the electronic record has not been altered since the specific point in time to which the status relates." In other words, if a contract was encrypted using the public key of the recipient, the recipient cannot offer evidence to show that the document was changed en route. Second, ECSA §10-120(b) provides that "in resolving a civil dispute involving a secure electronic signature, it shall be rebuttably presumed that the secure electronic signature is the signature of the person to whom it correlates." In other words, if the contract was encrypted using the private key of the sender, the sender must work against the presumption that he or she signed the document. Such a presumption might be thwarted, for example, by evidence that one had lost his private key and a third party was using it to make contracts in his name.
C. Likely preemption of the ECSA
As noted above, E-Sign preempts state law, unless the state has adopted UETA. Obviously, the ECSA goes far beyond UETA in creating burden shifting presumptions based upon one's use of technology similar to PKI. Thus, it is likely that the ECSA's provisions have been preempted by E-Sign and are not currently enforceable.30
Nonetheless, ECSA is an important statute, in that it recognizes and clarifies how one might garner protection using commercially reasonable means, such as PKI techniques. Even though the presumptions may be preempted, the burden one carries in proving up an electronic signature or document will surely be lighter if the electronic contract is structured according to the principles set forth in the ECSA. For these reasons, practitioners are urged to become familiar with the ECSA and the technology concepts it embraces.
IV. Conclusion
In summary, one can see that the elusive long distance contract has evolved along a twisted path. Prior to long distance commerce, parties were privileged to conduct face-to-face negotiations and sign their resulting agreement together. As commerce became national and global, the privilege of locality was eviscerated and the search for new contracting methods ensued. For years, the UCC provided some guidance to resolve long distance contracting disputes; however, the UCC's solution has become unwieldy and cumbersome. Pseudo-contracting methods, such as the shrinkwrap and clickwrap agreements have enjoyed some success, but not the stable predictability required to support a robust e-commerce economy. In the long run, the ironic solution seems to now be upon us: A return to the days where we negotiate and sign the contract together. Electronic signatures and the laws which facilitate them are the clear path to a vibrant e-commerce system. In time, these statutes will evolve into a cohesive and predictable body of commercial law based upon aged principles of face-to-face negotiation and individual execution of contracts. In essence, the advances of technology have finally enabled us to return to basic principals of contract law, albeit, with an electronic twist.
_______________
1 810 ILCS 5/2-101, et.seq.
2 810 ILCS 5/2-204(a).
3 Northrop Corporation v. Litronic Industries, 29 F.3d 1173 (7th Cir. 1994).
4 810 ILCS 5/2-207.
5 810 ILCS 5/2-207(1).
6 810 ILCS 5/2-207(3).
7 The UCC defines the term "merchant" as "a person who deals in goods of the kind or otherwise by his occupation holds himself out as having knowledge or skill peculiar to the practices or goods involved in the transaction or to whom such knowledge or skill may be attributed by his employment of an agent or broker or other intermediary who by his occupation holds himself out as having such knowledge or skill." 810 ILCS 5/2-104(1).
8 810 ILCS 5/2-207(2); See also, 810 ILCS 5/2-207, Comment 3.
9 id.
10 810 ILCS 5/2-207(2)(a).
11 Richard Raysman and Peter Brown, Computer Law: Drafting and Negotiating Forms and Agreements, §1A.05[2][a] (2000).
12 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988).
13 See, Step-Saver Data Systems v. Wyse Technology, 939 F.2d 91 (3d Cir. 1991), and Arizona Retail Systems, Inc. v. The Software Link, Inc. 831 F.Supp. 759 (D. Ariz. 1993).
14 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997).
15 www.ksd.uscourts/gov/opinions/99-2499-26.htm (D. Kan. 2000).
16 Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d at 1149.
17 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988).
18 www.ksd.uscourts/gov/opinions/99-2499-26.htm (D. Kan. 2000).
19 See, Hotmail v. Van$ Money Pie, Inc., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d 1020 (N.D. Cal. 1998), and Storm Impact v. Software of the Month Club, 13 F.Supp. 2d 782 (N.D. Ill. 1998).
20 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
21 105 F.3d 1147.
22 105 F.3d at 1148.
23 See, e.g., Uniform Electronic Transactions Act, §2(8) (1999).
24 2000 Senate Bill 761, enacted June 30, 2000.
25 www.uetaonline.com/uetaoc.html
26 5 ILCS 175/1-101 et. seq.
27 Uniform Electronic Transactions Act, §§5(b) and 9(b) (1999).
28 S.761 §102.
29 The law firm of McBride, Baker and Coles maintains a table showing the status of UETA adoption on a state by state basis. It is located at http://www.mbc.com/ecommerce/ legis/table09.htm.
30 For a more detailed examination of the preemptive effect of E-Sign, see Raymond T. Nimmer, Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act of 2000: Effect on State Laws, www.bmck.com/ecommerce/ueta-esign-2.doc.
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Civil
Administrative law sovereign immunity
1st Dist. Alden Nursing Center-Lakeland, Inc., v. Patla No. 1-99-3268
(October 23, 2000) 1st div. (MCNULTY) .
<http://www.state.il.us/court/2000/1993268.htm>
Trial court and administrative hearing officer lacked jurisdiction to hear claims by nursing homes that claimed underpayments for public aid patients should be offset against overpayments made by State. Only Court of Claims has jurisdiction to hear issue of claimed underpayments by virtue of sovereign immunity.
<A HREF="http://www.state.il.us/court/2000/1993268.htm"> Alden Nursing Center-Lakeland, Inc., v. Patla</A>
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