Hearsay

Over in Torino, the games have begun. The Olympic luge contests have been completed. Today, the shorthanded U.S. Skeleton Team enters competition, with the added degree of difficulty invoked by the summary banishment of its coach and the surgery of its star for a busted leg.

An old sport for kids of all ages, but somewhat new as an Olympic event, skeleton amounts to a belly-flop on a basic sled, down a tricky, slick slope, without a steering device or brakes.

This feeling of extreme vertigo resembles the qualmish terror that may be gripping overseers of the impending primary election – another pageant of olympian consequence that recurs at two-year intervals.

For this is the year when “Early Voting” begins, albeit without fanfare or explication. It seems simple enough. Registered voters can cast ballots, at designated sites in 102 counties, during business hours seven days a week, from February 27 through March 16 – five days before the primary.

This unfunded legislative caprice came out of the House in May, by a 61-55 margin that indicates some concerns, and was endorsed by the Senate eight days later, 31 to 26 with two abstentions. The governor signed it August 22.

The suggestion that election officials may be ill-prepared for this reflects any reading of the appropriate new sections of 10 ILCS 5/19A. The election community shall have become prepared for this in early February – completed ballots, lists of eligible voters, voting mechanisms in working order, election judges, poll watchers, etc., etc.

The act stipulates that polling places be open for eight hours each weekday, plus 9 'til noon Saturdays and Sundays, fully supervised, and at locations listed in legal notices that must be published in local newspapers at least once during the preceding week (February 20-26).

The laudable goals are to stimulate a greater turnout of voters and to alleviate the waiting at polling places on March 21. Cynics fear, however, that Early Voting will provide more opportunities for political shenanigans in a murky environment with less vigorous scrutiny.

In a letter to the Chicago Tribune on Jan. 31, the chair of the Chicago Board of Elections observed (ha, ha): “One can now vote early ... but can't vote often.”

The portion of this historic Windy City canard, which also referred to votes cast by dead people may have been alleviated by the legislation. In case of the intervening death of an early voter, his or her ballot “shall be returned in the same manner provided for rejected ballots.”

Just to be safe, however, “the casting of the ballot of a deceased voter shall not invalidate the election.” Let these games begin.

One of the casualties of Early Voting will be the inability of bar associations to complete judicial evaluations in time for ample discernment by editorial writers who endorse candidates. An important source of voter education will not be available to those who begin balloting on February 27.

At this writing, questions linger as to whether three retention candidates in Cook County who filed after December 5 will be reinstated for the November ballot, or whether that decision will be secure in time to delete the names of nine candidates for their “vacancies” in the primary.

The portion of the Election Code (section 7A-1) that seems inconsistent with Article VI, section 12(d) of the Illinois Constitution was struck by a Cook County judge as unconstitutionally beyond the authority of the legislature.

Although this is a challenge to the Election Code, and not specifically to the Constitution, some anticipation exists for review by the Illinois Supreme Court, which is not back in session until March.

Those nine hopefuls await the Nordic ski jump in which the length and style of their leaps will be judged. Meanwhile, they are part of the mass biathlon of 94 Cook County candidates for 26 judicial vacancies who are being plumbed by bar evaluators in an Alpine slalom of stamina and finesse.

Senior federal Judge Ruggero Aldisert told the Appellate Lawyers Association a few years ago that “You talk too much, and your briefs are too long.” The Illinois Supreme Court told the bar last month that its amicus briefs may be too many.

The unsigned order denying an amicus opined that “Briefs which essentially restate arguments advanced by the litigants are of no benefit to the court or the adversarial process.” That's in line with a recent amendment to Rule 345: the court expects to be informed whether an amicus “will assist the court” and not just burden it.

A friend of a litigant, in the future, may not necessarily be a friend of the court.