Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s habeas petition challenging his drug conviction on grounds that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to assert constitutional speedy trial violation in addition to successful Speedy Trial Act violation that resulted in dismissal without prejudice of first indictment, and for failing to argue on grounds of collateral estoppel that trial court’s granting of defendant’s motion to suppress statements in first proceeding precluded trial court from denying defendant’s similar motion in second proceeding. While doctrine of collateral estoppel applies in criminal cases, said doctrine did not apply in instant case where: (1) govt. did not oppose defendant’s motion to suppress in first proceeding; (2) trial court, in granting motion to suppress, did not decide whether defendant’s statements should have been suppressed; and (3) dismissal of first indictment was not based on result of defendant’s motion to suppress. Moreover, defendant’s counsel was not ineffective for failing to assert constitutional speedy trial violation in first proceeding, so as to make any dismissal with prejudice, where defendant failed to show prejudice in 19-month delay at issue in first proceeding, and where defendant failed to show existence of invidious reason attributable to govt. that was cause of delay.