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Now every article is the start of a discussion. If you're a member of the Illinois State Bar Association, you can comment on any of the articles that appear below.
In re Megan G.
Petition asserted a claim under Section 3-600 of Mental Health Code, alleging that Respondent is subject to involuntary admission to a mental health facility and is in need of immediate hospitalization. As petition sets forth the required allegations, on its face, the petition alleges existence of a justiciable matter, and thus the court had subject matter jurisdiction. As court was procedurally limited from hearing matter while felony charges were pending, it properly dismissed petition for involuntarily admission. Respondent did not contest personal jurisdiction, and received proper notice, and her appointed counsel was present at the hearing on her motion to dismiss. Thus, the trial court had personal jurisdiction over Respondent. (SPENCE, concurring; JORGENSEN, specially concurring.)
In re Benny M.
Court granted State's petition to subject him to involuntary treatment with psychotropic medication. Respondent was denied a fair trial when court denied his request to remove his shackles during the hearing, without making any findings that such shackling was necessary. Court did not explicitly make any findings supporting shackling, and court conducted almost no independent assessment of factors involved in shackling decision; thus, court abused its discretion in ordering continued shackling of Respondent. Appeal falls within exceptions to mootness doctrine, as it is capable of repetition yet evades review, public interest exception applies, and there is uncertainty as to whether same factors must be considered when proceeding is a civil proceeding in which fundamental rights of Respondent are at issue. (ZENOFF and SPENCE, concurring.)
Bocock v. O'Leary
Plaintiff filed 21-count petition for mandamus to enforce provisions of Illinois DOC County Jail Standards which Plaintiff alleged that Will County Detention Facility violated. Only the DOC Director is statutorily authorized to petition a court to order compliance with county jail standards. Thus, Plaintiff lacks standing for his mandamus petition. DOC regulations do not create private cause of action to inmate seeking to remedy a county jail’s alleged noncompliance with regulations. (HOLDRIDGE and SCHMIDT, concurring.)
Whirl v. Clague
Court erred in dismissing inmates's pro se mandamus petition alleging that sheriff, county clerk, and correctional center warden violated his right to marry by frustrating his ability to acquire a marriage license and ultimately to marry.Inmate requested that Defendants follow through with correctional center's structured written procedural step of furloughing him to county clerk's office on a scheduled day and time to acquire his marriage license. Correctional center's memo describing procedure affords no discretion as to step involving furloughing of an inmate to get marriage license. Petition seeks to compel Sheriff, clerk, and warden to desist from actions that frustrate his constitutional right to marry and do what is necessary for him to secure a marriage license, and thus is a proper request for mandamus relief. (CARTER, concurring; SCHMIDT, dissenting.)
Windsor Clothing Store v. Castro
Petitioner filed complaint with Illinois Department of Human Rights (IDHR), alleging denial of full and equal enjoyment of public accommodation based on race, as a sales associate followed her during the entire time she was in the Respondent clothing store. Respondent did not submit verified response to charge, and Illinois Human Rights Commission entered default order against it. Respondent failed to show that it acted with diligence, as it failed to show cause why it could not file verified response, and failed to file request for review of default order, and showed deliberate disregard for IDHR's authority. Commission properly adopted ALJ's recommendations and awarded $25,000 in compensation for emotional distress, and Commission properly denied untimely request to vacate default order.(HYMAN and PUCINSKI, concurring.)
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