|Home||About||Membership||CLE||Publications||Member Groups||Events||Career||Practice Tools||Store||Public||Contact|
Now every article is the start of a discussion. If you're a member of the Illinois State Bar Association, you can comment on either of the articles that appear below.
Plaintiff applied to Illinois State Police (ISP) for a FOID card but was denied based on his criminal history, which included misdemeanor conviction for domestic battery. Court granted ISP's request to intervene, and denied Plaintiff's petition. Plaintiff failed to meet his burden to prove his entitlement to relief under Section 10 of FOID Act, including that relief would not be contrary to federal law. Record is sufficient to support ISP's claim that Plaintiff did not serve time in jail after his conviction and sentence for domestic battery; he was granted credit for days served, which was length of his sentence. Thus, he did not lose his civil rights, and thus he could have no civil rights restored. Thus, Plaintiff cannot take advantage of Section 921(a)(33)(B)(ii) of federal Gun Control Act's "civil rights restored" exemption, and thus remains under a federal firearm disability. (STEIGMANN and APPLETON, concurring.)
People ex rel. Madigan v. Wildermuth
(Court opinion corrected 4/12/16.) Attorney General filed a complaint alleging that Defendants (attorney and realtor) violated Section 3-102(B) of the Illinois Human Rights Act by intentionally targeting predatory practices, in loan modifications for real estate, against minorities by aiming their advertising at African-Americans and Latinos. The State may claim a violation under the Illinois Human Rights Act pursuant to a reverse redlining theory where it did not allege that the defendant acted as a mortgage lender. (REYES and GORDON, concurring.)
Cebertowicz v. Madigan
Plaintiff, an inmate at DOC, filed pro se complaint for mandamus relief, demanding that the AG investigate his claims his civil rights were being violated by DOC employees who refused to provide him with his "constitutional right to a religious diet". Illinois Civil and Equal Rights Enforcement Act contains no consequence for noncompliance, and thus the statute is discretionary, not mandatory. AG has no clear duty to act, and Plaintiff has no clear right to requested relief. Thus, court properly dismissed Plaintiff's mandamus complaint. (STEIGMANN and APPLETON, concurring.)
Steidl v. Madigan
Plaintiff was convicted of two 1986 murders, and sentenced to death (later reduced to life imprisonment). Federal district court then granted Plaintiff's habeas corpus petition, vacated convictions, and ordered retrial within 120 days or release. State did not appeal, and Plaintiff was then released from prison. Plaintiff then filed civil rights action in district court against several persons involved in his prosecution, including elected State's Attorney. Court entered a "Consent Judgment" for $2 million plus interest, finding that State's Attorney had acted within scope of his employment. County and its insurers agreed to pay $375,000 in partial satisfaction; Plaintiff made formal demand on State and Attorney General per Section 2 of State Employee Indemnification Act for full payment of outstanding judgment with interest. Court properly dismissed mandamus action, as Plaintiff failed to allege that terms of Consent Judgment were approved by Attorney General; thus, State has no obligation to indemnify State's Attorney.(ROCHFORD and DELORT, concurring.)
In re Megan G.
Petition asserted a claim under Section 3-600 of Mental Health Code, alleging that Respondent is subject to involuntary admission to a mental health facility and is in need of immediate hospitalization. As petition sets forth the required allegations, on its face, the petition alleges existence of a justiciable matter, and thus the court had subject matter jurisdiction. As court was procedurally limited from hearing matter while felony charges were pending, it properly dismissed petition for involuntarily admission. Respondent did not contest personal jurisdiction, and received proper notice, and her appointed counsel was present at the hearing on her motion to dismiss. Thus, the trial court had personal jurisdiction over Respondent. (SPENCE, concurring; JORGENSEN, specially concurring.)
Disclaimer: This newsletter is for subscribers’ personal use only; redistribution is prohibited. Copyright Illinois State Bar Association. Statements or expressions of opinion appearing herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Association or Editors, and likewise the publication of any advertisement is not to be construed as an endorsement of the product or service offered unless it is specifically stated in the ad that there is such approval or endorsement.