On January 24, 2003, the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court, and held that section 9-3(b) of the Criminal Code of 1961, 720 ILCS 5/9-3(b).

On December 13, 2002, the Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, reversed the order of the Circuit Court of Cook County and held that a village of Midlothian ordinance violated the due process clauses of the United States and Illinois Constitutions.

On December 5, 2002, the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court and held that section 6-16(c) of the Liquor Control Act of 1934, 235 ILCS 5/6-16(c), was unconstitutionally vague on its face.

On November 21, 2002, the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the trial court and concluded that, as applied to this juvenile defendant, the multiple-murder sentencing statute violated the proportionate penalties clause in article I, §11 of the Illinois Constitution.

On October 3, 2002, the Illinois Supreme Court held section 110-4(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 725 ILCS 5/110-4(b), unconstitutional because it violated the guarantee of due process in article I, section 9 of the Illinois Constitution.

On October 18, 2002, the Illinois Supreme Court held that the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights were violated when the police stopped him at a roadblock created to gather information about a hit and run accident .

On October 18, 2002, the Illinois Supreme Court held that interested parties had the due process right to cross-examine adverse witnesses at a joint hearing involving a special use permit.

On September 19, 2002, the Illinois Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs, a private citizen and a watchdog group, did not have standing to recover funds for Illinois taxpayers that were illegally received by employees of the Secretary of State's Office.

On September 19, 2002, the Illinois Supreme Court held that the provisions of section 2-28(3) of the Juvenile Court Act, which gives parties an immediate right to appeal permanency orders.

On August 29, 2002, the Illinois Supreme Court addressed whether a circuit court could summarily dismiss as untimely a defendant's post-conviction petition at the first stage of post-conviction proceedings.

On June 6, 2002, the Appellate Court of Illinois, Second District, reversed the decision of the Circuit Court of Lake County and concluded that the prosecution violated double jeopardy when it charged the defendant with reckless homicide after he previously pled guilty to reckless driving.

On May 24, 2002, the Appellate Court of Illinois, Second District, affirmed the decision of the Circuit Court of DuPage County and held that certain statements the defendant made as to ownership of items in his vehicle were properly suppressed by the trial court.

On May 28, 2002, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the holding of the United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois and the defendant's conviction.

On April 18, 2002, the Supreme Court of Illinois reversed the decision of the appellate court and reinstated the defendant's drug conviction.

On January 25, 2002, the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court and held that the separation of powers doctrine is not violated when, in a case concerning the fitness of a parent, the county is required to pay for an indigent mother's appellate counsel fees.

On November 21, 2001, the Illinois Supreme Court reversed the appellate court's decision to grant a defendant's interlocutory appeal, holding that the Illinois Constitution does not provide a witness with a privilege against self-incrimination because of a potential criminal prosecution against him by a foreign sovereign.

On November 21, 2001, the Illinois Supreme Court reversed the appellate court and held that the Solicitation for Charity Act, 225 ILCS 460/0.01, is not unconstitutional.

On October 18, 2001, the Illinois Supreme Court, on direct appeal, reversed the circuit court, holding that the Hospital Licensing Act, 210 ILCS 85/6.17, did not violate the separation of powers doctrine, did not unreasonably violate a patient's right to privacy, and did not constitute impermissible special legislation.

On June 21, 2001, the Illinois Supreme Court reversed the lower court's holding that the common-law "corrupt or malicious motives" exception limited the immunity granted by the Tort Immunity Act, 745 ILCS 10/1-101 et seq, and that the village could be held liable in quasi-contract.