Serving a dissolved company: Isfan v. Longwood TowerBy Hon. Daniel T. Gillespie & Daniel BurleyCivil Practice and Procedure, September 2016How does a party serve a dissolved entity? It depends on whether the company is a limited liability entity or a corporation. The distinction is important, as improperly serving a dissolved entity can scuttle a case.
McVey v. M.L.K. Enterprises: Proper calculation of the hospital lienBy Hon. Daniel T. Gillespie & Jonathan P. KuhnCivil Practice and Procedure, August 2015In McVey v. M.L.K. Enterprises the Illinois Supreme Court overruled Stanton v. Rea and found, unequivocally, that the plain text of the Healthcare Services Lien Act requires that neither attorney’s fees nor costs be deducted before calculating the statutory maximum lien on plaintiff’s award.
Navigating the choppy waters of foreign trade—Chraca v. U.S. Battery Manufacturing CompanyBy Hon. Daniel T. Gillespie & Aaron McKerryCivil Practice and Procedure, March 2015In this recent case, the appellate court held that, under section 2-621, subsection (b)(3) of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-621(b)(3)), a plaintiff is entitled to reinstate an action against a product distributor where he can show the product manufacturer is not subject to the personal jurisdiction of the court.
The distraction exception explained: Virginia Bruns v. the City of CentraliaBy Hon. Daniel T. Gillespie & Greg ConnerCivil Practice and Procedure, October 2014The Illinois Supreme Court clarified when the distraction exception applies to the open and obvious rule in slip and fall cases in Bruns v. City of Centralia.
All that snow: Barber v. G.J. Partners, Inc.By Hon. Daniel T. Gillespie & Rachel FugettCivil Practice and Procedure, September 2013Premise liability for a fall with injuries after snow was shoveled was at the heart of the case of Barber v. G.J. Partners, Inc.
Frezados v. Ingalls Memorial Hospital: A clear case of apparent agencyBy Hon. Daniel T. Gillespie & Emily LaskowskiCivil Practice and Procedure, August 2013One area of frequent litigation in medical malpractice cases, particularly at the summary judgment stage, is the question of whether or not a physician can be considered the apparent agent of the hospital at which he or she is authorized to practice.
Hanks v. Cotler: An example of the “apogee of disingenuousness”By Hon. Daniel T. Gillespie & Daniel J. BishopBench and Bar, June 2012Justice Terry Lavin’s opinion in Hanks v. Cotler constitutes an excellent play-by-play analysis of the intersection of the statutes of limitations and the statutes of repose with the common-law discovery rule.
Hanks v. Cotler: An example of the “apogee of disingenuousness”By Hon. Daniel T. Gillespie & Daniel J. BishopCivil Practice and Procedure, May 2012Justice Terry Lavin’s opinion in Hanks v. Cotler constitutes an excellent play-by-play analysis of the intersection of the statutes of limitations and the statutes of repose with the common-law discovery rule.
E-discovery: Not as easy as it may soundBy Hon. Daniel T. GillespieCivil Practice and Procedure, August 2011What exactly is electronic discovery? Can this help attorneys and their clients? What if the attorney or party makes a mistake and sends out confidential information inadvertently? Can that be retrieved?
Brookbank v. Olson: Can a judge excuse a party from signing requests to admit?By Hon. Daniel T. GillespieBench and Bar, May 2011The courts are divided on the question of whether a trial judge can allow a party’s attorney to sign and verify a response to a Supreme Court Rule 216 request to admit facts when the attorney cannot locate his client.
Brookbank v. Olson: Can a Judge excuse a party from signing requests to admit?By Hon. Daniel T. GillespieCivil Practice and Procedure, March 2011The Third District Appellate Court recently ruled that a party’s attorney may not sign and verify a response to a Supreme Court Rule 216 request to admit facts when the attorney cannot locate his client.
Stapleton v. Moore: Cross-examination of a medical expert with a learned treatiseBy Hon. Daniel T. GillespieCivil Practice and Procedure, October 2010In Stapleton, the trial judge allowed defense counsel to cross-examine plaintiff’s expert with a medical article that was not disclosed in discovery. The appellate court affirmed.
Forum non Conveniens clarified: Glass v. DOT Transportation, Inc.By Hon. Daniel T. Gillespie & Matthew FriedlanderCivil Practice and Procedure, February 2010For many judges and lawyers in Illinois, the doctrine of forum non conveniens appears to be a convoluted discretionary tool. Unlike a motion to transfer venue, which is a purely procedural matter, the doctrine offorum non conveniens allows the judge to transfer a case if he or she decides that hearing a case in the plaintiff’s choice of forum is unfair to the defendant or the public. The doctrine itself applies on an interstate and intrastate basis so long as venue is proper in both forums.
When is a credit card agreement an oral contract? Portfolio Acquisitions LLC v. FeltmanBy Hon. Daniel T. Gillespie & Kathilynne GrotelueschenCivil Practice and Procedure, November 2009 In Illinois, where the statute of limitations is ten years for a written contract and five years for an oral contract, one might well think that a credit card agreement would qualify as a written contract because credit cards are generally issued pursuant to a written card member agreement.
Book reviewBy Hon. E. Kenneth Wright, Jr. & Hon. Daniel T. GillespieBench and Bar, June 2009Lincoln scholar Douglas L. Wilson has penned a fascinating account of our sixteenth President’s extraordinary ability to communicate with the written word.
Relation-back doctrine: Stevanovic v. City of ChicagoBy Hon. Daniel T. GillespieCivil Practice and Procedure, April 2009The relation-back doctrine is one interesting legal principle that most attorneys do not come across very often.
Can an unlicensed law firm recover in a suit for attorney fees?By Hon. Daniel T. GillespieCivil Practice and Procedure, May 2007One interesting aspect of contract law is that, if a contracting party is not properly licensed, the party may not be able to recover in a contract action for nonpayment of fees earned.
Can an unlicensed law firm recover in a suit for attorney fees?By Hon. Daniel T. GillespieCivil Practice and Procedure, January 2007One interesting aspect of contract law is that, if a contracting party is not properly licensed, the party may not be able to recover in a contract action for nonpayment of fees earned.
Ruminations on Rule 216 and considerations of substantial justiceBy Hon. Daniel T. GillespieCivil Practice and Procedure, October 2006This rule is to be liberally construed to do substantial justice between or among the parties. —Illinois Supreme Court Rule 213(k) on written interrogatories.
Some deadlines really are finalBy Daniel T. GillespieCivil Practice and Procedure, May 2004As Justice Smith wrote in this unanimous In re Estate of Lucy J. Kunsch opinion, "Rule 216 is not a suggestion, but rather a rule that must be strictly obeyed and enforced." Some deadlines must be met. Some final dates really are final.
People v. Reggie Smith: The proper foundation for admission of a videotapeBy Daniel T. GillespieTraffic Laws and Courts, December 2002In People v. Reggie Smith, 321 Ill. App. 3d 669, 749 N. E. 2d 986, 255 Ill. Dec. 504 (1st Dist. 2001), the appellate court set forth the proper foundation requirements for the introduction of a videotape.
What is the proper standard for a motion for a directed finding? People v. ConnollyBy Daniel T. GillespieTraffic Laws and Courts, February 2002In People v. Connolly, 322 Ill. App. 3d 905, 751 N.E. 2d 1219 (2d Dist. 2001), the Illinois Appellate Court articulated the proper standard for ruling on what has, among trial practitioners, been commonly known as a motion for a directed finding at the close of the State's case.
People v. Jung: constitutionality of 11-501.4-1 upheldBy Daniel T. GillespieTraffic Laws and Courts, January 2001Does the provision of the Illinois Motor Vehicle Code which allows the results of physician-ordered blood or urine tests conducted in the course of emergency treatment for injuries resulting from a motor vehicle accident to be reported to state or local law enforcement officials violate a patient's right to privacy in his medical records under the Illinois Constitution?
In the absence of probable cause, can police search a vehicle after a traffic stop?By Daniel T. GillespieTraffic Laws and Courts, July 2000Assume that a police officer on routine patrol has stopped a motorist for a traffic violation. Absent probable cause, can the officer search the vehicle? The United States Supreme Court decided that question in Knowles v. Iowa, 119 S. Ct 484 (1998).
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