The newsletter of the ISBA’s Section on Civil Practice & Procedure
Browse articles by year: 2014 (23)
Newsletter articles from 2007
Practice in the Central District of Illinois
The important thing that civil practitioners need to understand about federal court is that, unlike state court, their assigned district court judge has both a civil and criminal docket, which means that the Speedy Trial Act causes criminal trials to take priority over trial dates in civil cases.
Re-direct examination, the right to rehabilitate an expert
In Shaheen v Advantage Moving and Storage, Inc., 369 Ill. App.3d 535, 860 N.E.2d 375, 307 Ill.Dec. 721 (1st Dist.2006), the appellate court examines the plaintiff’s right to rehabilitate his expert, a treating physician who is offering expert testimony in the case.
Recent developments under Batson
In the matter of Mack v. Anderson, 371 Ill.App.3d 36, 861 N.E.2d 280 (1st Dist. 2006), the appellate court addressed the seminal case on the prohibition against racial discrimination in jury selection, Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712 (1986), and reversed the trial court’s denial of plaintiffs’ Batson motion.
Supreme Court finds patient privacy violation outside scope of employment
The issue in Bagent v. Blessing Care Corp., 224 Ill.2d 154, 862 N.E.2d 985, (Jan. 19, 2007), was whether Illini Community Hospital (Illini) could be held vicariously liable under a theory of respondeat superior for a phlebotomist’s disclosure of a patient’s confidential medical information to a third party at a tavern while off duty.
Vision Point v. Haas: Breathing room For litigants on Requests to Admit
On September 20, 2007, the Illinois Supreme Court issued its long awaited decision in Vision Point of Sale, Inc. v. Haas, providing what many in the legal community perceive as a merciful relaxation of the overly strict interpretation of Rule 216’s requirements and the near-draconian effects which can result.
When is an expert not really an expert?
In the case of Somers v. Quinn, the plaintiff appealed the trial court’s granting of defendant’s motion in limine to bar plaintiff’s expert’s testimony and the court’s refusal to grant plaintiff a continuance to find another expert.