Bd. erred in affirming IJ’s removal order, where IJ found that petitioner-lawful permanent resident’s Indiana conviction on charge of criminal neglect that arose out of petitioner’s locking her 6-year-old son in closet was crime of moral turpitude. Record showed that during pendency of removal proceedings, petitioner successfully moved Indiana trial court to modify her one-year sentence to sentence of 179 days for purposes of bringing herself within petty offense exception to inadmissibility under section 1182(a)(2)(A)(ii)(II). While Bd. found that petitioner’s sentence-modification was not effective to establish petitioner’s eligibility for petty-offense exception based on recent decision in Thomas 27 I & N Dec. 674 (2019), Ct. of Appeals, while finding that Indiana statute qualified as crime of moral turpitude, held that holding in Thomas was impermissibly retroactive as to petitioner, where, at time petitioner obtained sentence modification, case law indicated that petitioner had complete defense to removal, and where retroactive application of Thomas would work manifest injustice to petitioner.
Federal 7th Circuit Court
Civil Court
Immigration