Quick Takes from Thursday's Illinois Supreme Court opinions
Our panel of leading appellate attorneys review Thursday’s Supreme Court opinions from Civil cases Williams v. The Board of Review, Goodman v. Ward, Barber v. American Airlines, Inc., Wendling v. Southern Illinois Hospital Services, Vincent v. Alden-Park Strathmoor, and Criminal cases People v. Bartlet, People v. Alcozer, People v. Phillips, People v. Almore, People v. Madrigal and Hill v. Walker.
CIVIL
Williams v. The Board of Review
By Karen Kies DeGrand, Donohue Brown Mathewson & Smyth LLC Unbeknownst to Regina Williams, after she lost her job due to the closing of Chicago Castings Company, Williams was eligible for “trade readjustment allowance” (“TRA”) benefits under the Federal Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2101, et seq. (2006). The Act, which reduces trade barriers to foreign businesses, has a provision that assists American workers who lose their jobs as a result of import competition. The Department of Labor’s failure to notify Williams that she was entitled to additional employment benefits led the Illinois Supreme Court to apply equitable tolling of the deadline for seeking the benefits, which include training and placement services and cash to supplement state unemployment benefits. Here the Department of Labor determined that the company’s workers were eligible for TRA benefits after Chicago Castings’ doors shut; somehow, the company omitted Williams -- a nine-year employee -- from the list it provided to the Department. Williams undisputedly had no idea she was entitled to the additional benefits until she learned about it from a co-worker, but only after the application deadline had passed. In administrative proceedings and in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Williams’ claim was rejected as untimely. The supreme court determined that the sparingly-applied concept of equitable tolling, which allows a court to excuse a plaintiff’s unwitting failure to comply with a statute of limitations, was applicable to the federal statutory and administrative deadline in question. The supreme court found no Congressional intent to exclude the equitable tolling doctrine from this particular statutory scheme. The factual record left the court with the “definite and firm conviction that a mistake had been committed” in denying Williams TRA benefits.Goodman v. Ward
By Michael T. Reagan, The Law Offices of Michael T. Reagan Goodman v. Ward affirms the decisions of the circuit and appellate courts that a candidate for a judicial subcircuit election must be a resident of the subcircuit at the time of the submission of the Statement of Candidacy which must accompany the Nomination Petition. The electoral board took the contrary view that the residency requirement need only have been satisfied at the time of the election. The Supreme Court holds that the Election Code requirements for the Nomination Petition and Statement of Candidacy are not ambiguous and are completely consistent with the judicial eligibility requirements set out in Article VI, Section 11 of the Illinois Constitution of 1970. The court stated that its conclusion is consistent with its 2008 opinion in Cinkus v. Village of Stickney Municipal Officers Electoral Board, in which it was said that the nomination papers must affirm that "the candidate is eligible to run for office and not merely to hold office." The court held that the electoral board had no authority to declare statutes unconstitutional or even to question their validity, and any action in that regard is a nullity. The court applied the "public interest" exception to mootness in order to consider this appeal after the election had already taken place.Barber v. American Airlines, Inc.
By: Alyssa M. Reiter, Williams Montgomery & John Ltd. The old adage that “timing is everything” proved true in this case. The plaintiff filed a class action complaint for breach of contract relating to the airline’s refusal to refund a checked baggage fee after cancelling a flight. Two weeks after being served with the complaint, and before plaintiff filed a motion for class certification, defendant offered to refund the fee. About two weeks later, it refunded the fee to plaintiff’s credit card. The trial court dismissed the class action suit as moot. On appeal, a divided appellate court reversed. It held that the defendant could not “pick off” the named class representative by refunding her money and thereby evade a class action. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed the appellate court and affirmed the circuit court dismissal. It held that Wheatley v. Bd. Of Educ. Of Township High School Dist. 205, 99 Ill.2d 481 (1984) controlled. Wheatley held that if a tender of remedy is made before a motion for class certification is filed, the named representative can not meet the class action requirement of having a valid claim against the defendant. However, if the named representative had moved for class certification before the time the defendant makes its tender, the case is not moot because the motion brings the interests of the other class members before the court. In those cases, the trial court should hear and decide the motion for class certification before deciding whether the tender moots the case. The Supreme Court majority concluded that “[w]e hereby reject this ‘pick off’ exception.” In a special concurrence, Justice Kilbride opined that the majority’s holding actually meant that “the pick-off exception survives but is limited to circumstances when a motion for certification has been filed, or is otherwise pending, prior to the tender of relief.”Wendling v. Southern Illinois Hospital Services
By: Alyssa M. Reiter, Williams Montgomery & John Ltd. Reaffirming 40 years of precedent, the Court held that the common fund doctrine does not apply to a hospital holding a lien pursuant to the Health Care Services Lien Act. The Act provides that a health care provider who renders treatment to an injured plaintiff “shall have a lien upon all…causes of action of the injured person for the amount of the…reasonable charges.” The plaintiffs (in consolidated cases) settled their personal injury cases. They filed petitions to adjudicate the hospitals’ liens and argued that the liens should be subject to the common fund doctrine. The common fund doctrine is an exception to the general rule that, absent a statutory provision or agreement of the parties, each party to litigation bears its own attorney fees. The doctrine is premised on the equitable concept that the beneficiaries of the “common fund” will be unjustly enriched by the attorney’s services unless they contribute to the litigation costs by paying a portion of the attorney’s fees. The Court noted that Illinois courts have never applied this doctrine to a creditor-debtor relationship. It also pointed to case law that has expressly rejected applying the doctrine to a hospital holding a statutory lien. The Court further noted that the decision was in line with the majority of other states. Also, the Act expressly allows a hospital to pursue collection of reasonable charges remaining unpaid after satisfaction of the lien so there was no unjust enrichment.Vincent v. Alden-Park Strathmoor
By Karen Kies DeGrand, Donohue Brown Mathewson & Smyth LLC Prior case law allowing punitive damages upon proof of willful and wanton misconduct under the Nursing Home Care Act, 210 ILCS 45/1-101, et seq. (West 2006), plus the Survival Act, 755 ILCS 5/27-6 (West 2006), does not equal a right to the recovery of punitive damages in a Nursing Home Care Act (“Act”) case where the patient is deceased. In a unanimous ruling of the Illinois Supreme Court, it answered “no” to the following question: Does a claim for punitive damages based on allegations of willful and wanton violation of the Nursing Home Care Act [citation] survive the death of the nursing home resident on whose behalf the cause of action was brought? Margery Vincent died while a resident of a long-term care facility. In Count III of his complaint under the Act, for failure to provide Vincent with adequate medical and personal care, her representative alleged willful and wanton misconduct. The circuit court granted the facility’s motion to dismiss Count III, which contained the statement that the plaintiff reserved the right to seek leave to allege a claim for punitive damages. The circuit court also agreed to certify the question above. The supreme court reasoned that because the General Assembly did not include language “expressly authorizing” punitive damages in the Act, no punitive damage claim survived the patient’s death. After the legislature’s elimination of a treble damages provision in the mid-1990s, plaintiffs who seek punitive damages for violation of the Act are limited to the common law punitive remedy. Like the appellate court, the supreme court rejected the notion that equitable considerations might provide an exception to the traditional abatement rule. A finding to the contrary in Raisl v. Elwood Indus., Inc., 134 Ill. App. 3d 170 (1985), resulted from a misreading of Mattyasovszky v. West Towns Bus Co., 61 Ill. 2d 31 (1975).CRIMINAL
People v. Bartelt
By Kerry J. Bryson, Office of the State Appellate Defender An officer observed a truck parked on a sidewalk. Knowing that the truck belonged to defendant, whom the officer had heard used methamphetamine, the officer waited and watched the truck for 90 minutes. He was hoping to conduct a traffic stop and drug sniff and notified the K-9 officer that he was waiting for defendant. When defendant and a man left an apartment building, got into the truck, and drove away, the officer followed. He stopped defendant as she turned into a gas station and told her that she had violated the Illinois Vehicle Code [625 ILCS 5/11-1303(a)(1)(b)] by leaving her truck parked on the sidewalk. The K-9 officer arrived a few minutes later, while the first officer was running defendant’s driver’s license. The K-9 officer told the first officer to set-up for a dog sniff, meaning to have the defendant turn off the engine, turn the key on auxillary, roll up her truck windows, close the doors, and turn the vents on high, blowing out air. The dog alerted on both sides of the vehicle. Defendant and the passenger were removed from the truck. The K-9 officer searched the truck and found a pen casing, a digital scale, and a burnt piece of tinfoil. The appeal presented the narrow issue of whether the officers’ actions in ordering defendant to comply with the “set-up procedure” constituted an unreasonable search under the fourth amendment. There was no challenge to the justification for the initial traffic stop or to the dog sniff itself. The Court concluded that the “set-up procedure” did not intrude on any privacy interest, analogizing it to the luggage “prepping” procedure approved by the federal courts (lightly pressing the outside of a suitcase with the hands and slowly circulating the air to procure a scent from luggage). Thus, the ensuing dog sniff outside of the vehicle, conducted upon completion of the “set-up procedure,” likewise was not an unreasonable search. The dissent focused on whether the officers’ actions in ordering the “set-up procedure” constituted an unreasonable “seizure”, but the majority declined to do so finding that defendant had limited her challenge to one of unreasonable search, both in the briefs and at oral argument. The dissent concluded that there was an unreasonable seizure. It would seem that the door remains open for the “set-up procedure” to be challenged as an unreasonable seizure in a future case, should the situation present itself.People v. Alcozer
By Kerry J. Bryson, Office of the State Appellate Defender Upon summarily dismissing Alcozer’s pro se post-conviction petition as frivolous and patently without merit, the circuit court assessed fees and costs pursuant to 735 ILCS 5/22-105 (providing such remedy where a prisoner files a “frivolous” pleading). Alcozer appealed only the fees and costs order, arguing that the statute violated due process and equal protection guarantees. Alcozer argued in the alternative that the Court need not reach his constitutional claims if it determined that “frivolous” for purposes of section 22-105 did not mean the same thing as “frivolous” in the Post-Conviction Hearing Act [725 ILCS 5/122-2.1]. The Court rejected the alternative argument, concluding that “frivolous or *** patently without merit” as used in section 122-2.1 is included in the definition of “frivolous” under section 22-105. The Court went on to find that section 22-105 does not violate due process because it does not restrict a prisoner’s meaningful access to the court, but rather affects only the “right” to file frivolous documents without being responsible for the associated costs. Alcozer’s equal protection challenge was based on the fact that the statute applies only to prisoners and not to non-incarcerated persons who file frivolous pleadings. Because “prisoners” are not a suspect class, rational basis review was applied. The Court found no equal protection violation because the costs and fees provision was rationally related to the legitimate goal of stemming the number of frivolous filings by prisoners. While I do not know how many courts are presently imposing fees and costs under section 22-105, the number is bound to increase in the wake of this decision. Whether it ultimately has any impact on the number of frivolous filings remains to be seen.People v. Phillips
By Kerry J. Bryson, Office of the State Appellate Defender Defendant challenged his in absentia sentencing on the basis that he had not been given in absentia admonishments by the court. The State argued that the signed bond slip, containing several provisions relating to the possible consequences of defendant’s failure to appear in court (including the possibility of sentencing in absentia), constituted a valid waiver of defendant’s right to receive those admonishments from the court. Noting that the in absentia statute [725 ILCS 5/113-4(e)] requires that the court give the admonishments at the time of arraignment or any later court date on which defendant is present, the appellate court found the bond slip insufficient to comply with that statute. The Supreme Court affirmed, noting that the statute “unambiguously requires the trial court to admonish a defendant in open court.” The Supreme Court went on to overrule Condon, 272 Ill. App. 3d 437 (1995), to the extent it could be interpreted to permit in absentia warnings given only in writing, even if given by the court. Oral admonishments were intended by the legislature and are required to comply with the statute. Justice Thomas dissented, concluding that the purposes of the statute were satisfied by the signed bond slip because it informed defendant of the consequence of failing to appear and put defendant on notice that his failure to appear would constitute a waiver of his right to confrontation. In this decision, the Court expressed its preference for giving in absentia warnings at arraignment because defendant is also being informed of other significant protections at that time, including his rights to counsel and to a jury trial. This does not, however, prevent the giving of in absentia admonishments at some later court date. As long as the warnings are given either at or after arraignment, in open court, it seems that compliance with the statute will be found.People v. Almore
By Jay Wiegman, Office of the State Appellate Defender A defendant convicted of involuntary manslaughter ordinarily faces a sentencing range of between two and five years. The penalty increases to that of a Class 2 felony, however, where the victim was a family or household member, as defined by 725 ILCS 5/112A-3, which provides that "family or household members" includes "spouses, former spouses, parents, children, stepchildren and other persons related by blood or by present or prior marriage, persons who share or formerly shared a common dwelling, persons who have or allegedly have a child in common, persons who share or allegedly share a blood relationship through a child, persons who have or have had a dating or engagement relationship, persons with disabilities and their personal assistants, and caregivers." In People v. Almore, after the defendant was convicted of the involuntary manslaughter of the two-year-old child of a woman defendant had dated for 18 months, the question arose whether defendant was subject to an extended term sentence. The trial court found that he was. The Appellate Court affirmed defendant's involuntary manslaughter conviction, but vacated the extended sentence, determining that for defendant and the child to be "family or household members," the evidence had to show they "shared a common dwelling," meaning that they must have stayed together "on an extended, indefinite, or regular basis, according to People v. Young, 362 Ill. App. 3d 843 (2005), in which the common dwelling shared by that defendant and victim, who were not in a dating relationship, was a homeless shelter, where the two had stayed only briefly. The Supreme Court reversed the Appellate Court. The Supreme Court determined that the broad language of Section 112A-3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure demonstrated that the Legislature sought to "capture all of the myriad types of 'familial' relationships, both past and present, as well as various situations of cohabitation and shared living arrangements." Unlike in Young, the defendant, his girlfriend and her child were members of each other’s "household" by virtue of the fact that they shared a common dwelling, even though the “dwelling” was usually the home of either a relative of the defendant or a relative of his girlfriend. Almore does not really break any new ground, but demonstrates the extremely broad range of the definition of "household or family member" which is generally found to include even short relationships or those distant in time. In this case, while the "family" relationship was not at issue, as there was no question that defendant was not the child's father, the fact that the three formed something of a family unit while bouncing from the home of one family member to the next clearly shaped the Court's determination that whatever dwelling they shared constituted a household.People v. Madrigal
By Jay Wiegman, Office of the State Appellate Defender In People v. Madrigal, was indicted in the circuit court of Kane County on one count of identity theft in violation of section 16G–15(a)(7) of the Identity Theft Law, which provides that “[a] person commits the offense of identity theft when he or she knowingly . . . uses any personal identification information or personal identification document of another for the purpose of gaining access to any record of the actions taken, communications made or received, or other activities or transactions of that person, without the prior express permission of that person.” The trial court dismissed the indictment as unconstitutional on its face and the State appealed directly to the Illinois Supreme Court. The Supreme Court first determined, as the parties agreed, that the purpose of the identity theft statute is to protect the economy and people of Illinois. The Court found that the statute was not rationally related to this goal because it does not represent a reasonable method of preventing the targeted conduct. The fundamental problem with the statute is that it lacks a culpable mental state, as it does not require a criminal purpose for a person to be convicted of a felony. The Court noted that the statute as currently written "would criminalize such innocuous conduct as someone using the internet to look up how their neighbor did in the Chicago Marathon." Thus, the Court determined that the statute is not a rational way of dealing with the problem of identity theft, because it potentially punishes a significant amount of wholly innocent conduct not related to its purpose. Because the Illinois Supreme Court said I can, I checked the Chicago Marathon website, and it does not appear that any of the justices ran in the 2010 Chicago Marathon.Hill v. Walker
By Kerry J. Bryson, Office of the State Appellate Defender In 1981, Hill was sentenced to 30-to-90-years of imprisonment for two murders committed in 1974 and 1975. Sentencing laws in existence at that time made him eligible for parole beginning in 1983. He was denied parole at annual hearings from 1983 to 1988. In 1988, the law was changed to allow for parole hearings to be held as much as three years apart, providing it was not reasonably likely that the board would grant parole during that time. Hill continued to have parole hearings, with varying periods between one and three years passing between each hearing. Hill’s present appeal is from the denial of his pro se complaint for declaratory and mandamus relief claiming various defects in the parole process. In affirming the denial of Hill’s complaint, the Supreme Court concluded that there was no due process violation in the Illinois Prison Review Board’s consideration of certain information (specifically, Hill’s previous sentence of death which was vacated in earlier proceedings and his prison disciplinary history) in its decision to deny parole because there is “no constitutional or inherent right of a convicted person to be conditionally released from confinement prior to the expiration of a valid sentence.” The Board’s decision whether to grant parole is discretionary, and “the Illinois parole statute does not create a legitimate expectation of parole that rises to the level of a liberty interest protected by procedural due process.” Hill also claimed ex post facto violations based on the extension of the parole hearing requirement from every year to every three years and the Board’s more-stringent exercise of its discretion in granting parole in recent years. The Court held that a change in the way the Board exercises its discretion is not a retroactive change in a parole statute or rule, and thus is not subject to an ex post facto challenge. Further, the extension of the time between required parole hearings was not an ex post facto violation because it did not “create a significant risk of increasing Hill’s incarceration,” especially because parole hearings may be held sooner than every three years if there is a likelihood of release or a change in facts or circumstances. This decision does not really break any new ground. It does serve to clarify the fact that parole is a “matter of grace and executive clemency,” not an entitlement, and the Board’s decisions regarding parole are discretionary. The impact of this decision is limited by virtue of the relatively low number of persons still serving indeterminate sentences in Illinois.Filed under: