Quick takes on Thursday's Illinois Supreme Court criminal opinions
Our panel of leading appellate attorneys review Thursday's Illinois Supreme Court opinions in the criminal cases People v. Hammond, People v. Gutman, People v. Villa, People v. Snyder and People v. Johnson. Click here to read about Thursday's Illinois Supreme Court opinions in the civil cases Forest Preserve District v. First National Bank, In re Haley D., Crossroads Ford Truck Sales, Inc. v. Sterling Truck Corp., Nowak v. City of Country Club Hills and Reliable Fire Equipment Co. v. Arredondo.
People v. Hammond
By Kerry J. Bryson, Office of the State Appellate Defender
Hammondinvolves consolidated cases dealing with the power and authority of probation officers. Two particular issues were considered: (1) whether a probation officer has the authority to file a petition charging a violation of probation, and (2) whether a State’s Attorney may overrule a probation officer’s decision to offer intermediate sanctions for a technical violation of probation pursuant to 730 ILCS 5/5-6-4(i).
The Court concluded that a probation officer’s filing of a petition charging a violation of probation was proper and did not violation separation of powers principles. The State still bears the burden of proving the violation, and the court must still impose an appropriate sanction for the violation, if proved.
Likewise, the State’s Attorney does not have “veto”power over a decision to offer intermediate sanctions for technical violations of probation, so long as the offer complies with procedural requirements established by the Chief Judge of the circuit (pursuant to section 5-6-1) and so long as the sanctions are immediately accepted by the probationer. There is no separation of powers violation.
The Court’s decision affirms that probation officers are charged with oversight and management of probationers and are vested with some discretion in how they go about that oversight and management. Significantly, with regard to the second issue considered by the Court, that discretion may prove beneficial to probationers who might otherwise find themselves subject to probation revocation for a technical violation if the probation officer determines that the matter is more appropriately handled via an intermediate sanction.
People v. Gutman
By Kerry J. Bryson, Office of the State Appellate Defender
Here, the Court was faced with the question of whether “proceeds”as used in the Illinois Money Laundering [720 ILCS 5/29B-1] statute refers to “profits”or “gross receipts.” The appellate court concluded that it meant “profits,”but the Supreme Court held that the appellate court’s finding was “based largely on a misreading”of a US Supreme Court case, U.S. v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507 (2008). Santos involved a plurality opinion, and a close review of the decisions demonstrates that there was no clear determination as to whether “proceeds”was meant to refer to “profits”or “receipts. The federal statute at issue in Santos was subsequently amended to define “proceeds”as “receipts.”
The Illinois Supreme Court found that “proceeds,”a term which is not defined in the Illinois statute, is ambiguous. Rather than immediately resorting to the rule of lenity as the appellate court did, however, the Court concluded that it could adequately determine legislative intent from other sources. For instance, the primary definition of “proceeds”in Black’s Law Dictionary refers to the “total amount brought in from a transaction.” Black’s uses “net proceeds”when referring to “profits”
Further, the Court cited to various other statutes where Illinois uses the term “proceeds”as meaning something distinct from “profits.” The Court also noted that use of “profits”would frustrate the purpose of the statute –prohibiting the use of “dirty”money to support lavish lifestyles –because it would permit money laundering where the underlying activity was otherwise unprofitable.
In a money laundering case, then, a defendant may be found guilty regardless of whether the underlying activity turns a profit. Further, it will be the amount of the total receipts which determines the class of the felony (which can range from Class 3 to Class X based on monetary amounts and other factors).
People v. Snyder
By Kerry J. Bryson, Office of the State Appellate Defender
Here, the Court was faced with the question of whether a court may impose restitution as part of a defendant’s sentence where the defendant pled guilty and was not advised of the possibility of restitution at the plea hearing. The Court ruled that restitution was proper under the circumstances of this case, where the defendant’s plea was not entered in exchange for a specific sentence, but rather was in exchange for the State’s agreement to dismiss certain charges (which it did). Accordingly, the defendant could not make a “benefit of the bargain”claim as was made in Whitfield (reducing a defendant’s sentence by the MSR term where the defendant was not advised of MSR at the time he entered his fully-negotiated plea).
The Court held that the appropriate remedy in this case would be to allow the defendant the opportunity to withdraw her plea. Because the defendant made it clear that she did not wish to withdraw her plea here, the Court did not go on to consider whether vacating the plea would be warranted here.
The defendant also raised an issue on cross-appeal, arguing that her 10-year maximum extended-term sentence was excessive. The Court adhered to the long-standing principle that deference is to be afforded to the decision of the sentencing judge. Finding no abuse of discretion here, the Court affirmed the prison sentence.
Left open is the narrow question of whether a restitution order would have to be vacated under Whitfield principles in the case of a fully-negotiated plea for a specific sentence where the defendant is not told about the possibility of restitution at the time the plea is entered.
People v. Johnson
By Kerry J. Bryson, Office of the State Appellate Defender
The Supreme Court resolved a conflict between the districts of the appellate court concerning whether the $200 DNA Identification System analysis charge (which is imposed on defendants who are required to submit a DNA sample for indexing in the State’s DNA database) is subject to offset by a defendant’s statutory $5-per-day presentence incarceration credit.
The Court concluded that the charge is a fee, not a fine, and is therefore not subject to the credit. As support for its holding, the Court noted that the charge is used to compensate the State for the cost of collecting and cataloging the DNA samples. The Court also concluded that the fact that a DNA charge may only be assessed a single time against any one individual suggests that it is not punitive and is therefore not a fine.
So, while an individual may only be assessed the $200 DNA charge one time, he or she may not offset that charge with the statutory $5 per day monetary credit for presentence incarceration.
People v. Villa
By Jay Weigman, Office of the State Appellate Defender
In People v. Villa, the defendant was convicted by a Boone County jury of
aggravated battery with a firearm and aggravated discharge of a firearm
under an accountability theory and was sentenced to concurrent terms of
imprisonment of 14 years and five years, respectively. At trial, defendant
attempted to recant two statements he had given to the police by explaining
that he had "never been in a situation like this before . . . I've never
been in prison or nothing like that." The State used these comments as
justification for impeaching defendant with a juvenile adjudication for
burglary. The appellate court affirmed the trial court. The Supreme Court
reversed and remanded for a new trial, holding that: 1) a juvenile
adjudication is typically not admissible against a testifying defendant; 2)
defendant did not “open the door” to admission of his juvenile
adjudication, and; 3) the erroneous admission of defendant’s juvenile
adjudication was not harmless.
Writing for the majority of this deeply divided Court, Justice Theis first
traced the histories of, and relationship between, the landmark decision of
People v. Montgomery, 47 Ill.2d 510 (1971), and section 5-150(1)(c) of the
Juvenile Court Act of 1987, both of which speak to the admissibility of
juvenile adjudications in criminal proceedings. The Court noted that the
Juvenile Court Act evolved from explicitly prohibiting the admission of a
juvenile adjudication against a defendant to explicitly allowing the
admission of juvenile adjudications for impeachment of the defendant
"pursuant to the rules of evidence for criminal trials.” In dissent,
Justice Thomas, joined by Justices Karmeier and Garman, opined that the
Legislative history of the Juvenile Court Act does not represent an
evolution that is limited by Montgomery, but instead marks a radical
departure from Montgomery, and that, as a result of the legislature’s 1998
overhaul of the Juvenile Court Act, prior adjudications became admissible
in criminal proceedings against “anyone *** including the minor or
defendant if he or she testifies and then “only for purposes of impeachment
and pursuant to the rules of evidence.” The majority, however, views this
reference to "the rules of evidence" for criminal trials as a direct
reference to Montgomery, which has been interpreted as prohibiting the use
of juvenile adjudications for impeachment of a defendant.
The Court next considered whether defendant had opened the door to the
admission of his juvenile history by saying that he had "never been in a
situation like this before . . . I've never been in prison or nothing like
that." The Court concluded that defendant had not attempted to mislead the
jury: the second remark of the recantation testimony was true, and the
first did not speak to criminal history, but only to the issue of whether
the defendant was experienced with police questioning. It did not open the
door to impeachment with a juvenile adjudication and, therefore, the
admission was erroneous. Nor were the comments harmless, given that the
only evidence implicating defendant were the statements he sought to
recant. His conviction was therefore reversed and the cause was remanded
for a new trial.
The struggle between the majority and the dissent symbolizes the tension
that has long been evident in the Juvenile Court Act. A process that was
originally born of a desire to enhance efforts to rehabilitate juvenile
delinquents eventually came to look more criminal in nature with the
dramatic changes made by the 1998 amendments. Recent changes in juvenile
law seem to reflect a step back from the 1998 amendments. Whether juvenile
law continues to evolve in this way will likely be determined by whether
this case is followed by any attempts to amend section 5-1501(1)(c).