ISBA Statehouse Review for the week of September 27

ISBA Director of Legislative Affairs Jim Covington reviews bills in Springfield of interest to ISBA members. In this episode he provides an overview of how to determine the application date for pending legislation. More information is available below the video.



Illinois Bill Drafting Manual of the Legislative Reference Bureau, pages 136-137

http://www.ilga.gov/commission/lrb_home.html



SECTION 35-50.  APPLICABILITY: RETROACTIVE  OR PROSPECTIVE.

(a) GENERAL  RULE; CAVENEY  V. BOWER.   A law's effective date may not resolve all questions about its applicability.   Retroactive application of a law may be unconstitutional under any one of 3 principles.   The U.S. Constitution and the Illinois Constitution prohibit the passage of ex post facto laws and laws impairing the obligation of contracts.   U.S. Const., art. I, sec. 1 0; lll. Const., art. I, sec. 16.  Retroactive application of a law also is prohibited if it interferes with a person's rights under the due process clause of the Illinois Constitution (art. I, sec. 2).

Throughout the years, Illinois courts have adopted several different approaches to determine whether a change to the law should be applied retroactively.  The most recent approach adopted the Illinois Supreme  Court is found   in Caveney v. Bower, 207  Ill.  2d  82  (2002).  (See also Allegis Realty Investors v. Novak, 223 Ill. 2d 318 (2006)).  Under this approach, a court should ascertain whether the General Assembly has clearly indicated the temporal reach of the change of the law.  If the General Assembly has done so, then, absent a constitutional prohibition, the court must give effect to that expression of legislative intent.  Caveney, 207 Ill. 2d at 94.
      
This means that if the General Assembly intends to have a change to the law apply retroactively and expressly prescribes that intent, then the court will give effect to that intent unless it unconstitutionally interfers with a person’s rights under the due process clause.  Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Will County Collector, 196  Ill.  2d 27, 38 (2001). There is however,  no clear  answer  as to when  retroactive  application  of a change  to the law unconstitutionally interferes with a  person's  rights under the due process clause.   The Illinois Supreme Court has    noted       that    in   determining    whether    a   retroactive    tax   measure    is unconstitutional, courts  have considered  such  factors  as  the  legislative  purpose behind changing  the law, the length of time of the retroactivity,  whether a person reasonably and detrimentally  relied on the law as it existed before the change, and whether a person had adequate notice of the change.   Commonwealth Edison, 196 IIl.2d at 43-44.   Stating  that an amendatory  change  is declaratory  of existing  law does not in itself mean that the change is enforceable  retroactively.  See Northern Kane Educational Corp. v. Cambridge Lakes Educational Association, IEA-NEA, 394 Ill.App.3d 755 (4th Dist. 2009).

If the General  Assembly  has not expressly  indicated  the temporal  reach of the change to the law, then a court will default to the General Assembly's  intent as found in Section 4 of the Statute on Statutes (the general savings clause), which the  Illinois  Supreme  Court  says  prohibits  retroactive  application  of substantive changes to statutes.   Caveney, 207 Ill. 2d at 95.  Under this judicial default rule, a court must determine whether the change to the law is procedural or substantive in nature.  Caveney, 207 Ill. 2d at 95.   If the change is procedural, it may be applied retroactively; if the change is substantive, it may not.

The bottom line for drafting purposes is this: If it is important whether a bill applies only prospectively or also applies  to  pending cases, then the bill should expressly state its applicability.

When a court decides that applying a change to the law would be unconstitutional, it may declare the entire Act to be unconstitutional or it may declare the Act to be unconstitutional only as to the specific facts in the case it then has before it. In order to ensure that the court considers holding the Act unconstitutional  only as to the specific facts in the case at hand, you  should probably include a  severability clause, as set forth in subsection (a) of Section 20-50 of this Manual, as a safeguard.
 

Posted on September 27, 2012 by Chris Bonjean
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