Our panel of leading appellate attorneys review Thursday's Illinois Supreme Court opinions in the civil cases Bridgeview Health Care Center, Ltd. v. State Farm Fire and In re of Marriage of Donald B. and the criminal cases In re Brandon P., People v. Stahl and People v. Stoecker. The court also released In re Commitment of Fields, In re Rita P., People v. Bingham, WISAM 1, Inc. v. Illinois Liquor Control Commission and Nelson v. The County of Kendall.

CIVIL

Bridgeview Health Care Center, Ltd. v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Company

By Alyssa M. Reiter, Williams, Montgomery & John Ltd.

The Supreme Court has held in prior cases that a choice-of-law analysis is required only when a difference in the law would make a difference in the outcome.  This case holds that federal district court decisions “predicting” that another state would resolve a legal issue in a way different from Illinois law cannot, in itself, establish a conflict between the laws of that state and Illinois.

Here, Bridgeview, an Illinois corporation, sued Clark, an Illinois resident who operated a sole proprietorship in Indiana, for claims arising out of Clark’s unsolicited business faxes.  Bridgeview filed a declaratory judgment action against State Farm, Clark’s insurer, seeking a declaration that State Farm had a duty to defend and indemnify Clark.

State Farm acknowledged that it owed a defense under Illinois law.  It argued, however, that Indiana law conflicted.  While there was no Indiana state court cases, two unreported federal decisions from the Southern District of Indiana predicted that the Indiana Supreme Court would hold there is no coverage for the claims asserted in the Bridgeview suit.  State Farm further contended that Indiana law applied because it had the most significant contacts with the dispute.

The Supreme Court held that the federal district court decisions alone could not be “the source of an outcome determinative conflict so as to trigger a choice-of-law analysis.”  The district court’s “predictive judgment” is not, in fact, state law.  The Court noted, however, that the circuit court considering whether a conflicts analysis is necessary may consider the other state’s intermediate appellate court holdings.  The Court further clarified that a mere possibility of a conflict of laws is insufficient to require a choice-of-law analysis.

In re Marriage of Donald B.

By Alyssa M. Reiter, Williams, Montgomery & John Ltd.

This case originally raised an issue regarding the constitutionality of a provision of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act prohibiting a noncustodial parent convicted of a sex offense involving a minor from obtaining court-ordered visitation with his children while serving sentence and until completing a “treatment program.”  The Supreme Court never reached the constitutionality issue, however, as it dismissed this appeal as moot.  By the time the case reached the Supreme Court, the father had completed his sentence and no treatment had been recommended following evaluation.  

The Court first determined the “threshold” issue that events occurring subsequent to filing the appeal rendered the appeal moot.  The father’s current compliance with the statutory provision rendered the issue of its constitutionality moot.

The Court also analyzed the “public interest exception” to the mootness doctrine.  That exception allows a court to consider an otherwise moot issue when (1) the question is of a substantial public nature; (2) there is a need for an authoritative determination for future guidance of public officers; and (3) the question’s future recurrence is likely.  The Court agreed with the Attorney General that the case did not meet those “rigid standards.”

CRIMINAL

In re Brandon P.

By Kerry J. Bryson, Office of the State Appellate Defender

The minor, Brandon P., was charged with aggravated criminal sexual abuse based upon an allegation made by his three-year-old cousin, M.J.  Prior to the dispositional hearing, the State gave notice of its intent to introduce statements M.J. made to her mother and to a detective.  A hearing was held, and the trial court concluded that M.J.’s statements were reliable and would be admissible at trial pursuant to 725 ILCS 5/115-10.

At the dispositional hearing, M.J. was called by the State.  During preliminary questioning by the prosecutor, M.J. could not point out the minor, was confused about whether she remembered going to the hospital, and shrugged her shoulders when asked whether she wanted to talk to the parties and the court.  Essentially, she “froze up.”  The prosecutor did not ask any additional questions, and defense counsel declined to question M.J.

The detective testified that he interviewed M.J., and she told him that the minor “stuck his finger in her pee pee” and pointed in between her legs.  M.J. told the detective that her clothes were on.  M.J.’s mother testified that M.J. had told her that the minor “put spit in her pee-pee” with his hand.

Other evidence at trial was that M.J.’s brother had been with the minor, M.J., and another sibling that day, and had seen M.J. laying on the floor with her pants off.  A sexual assault evidence kit was collected from M.J.  A sample from M.J.’s underwear contained a mixture of male and female DNA.  The female profile matched M.J.  The male profile was only “partial,” but the minor could not be excluded from that partial profile.

The minor’s counsel challenged the admission of M.J.’s statements to the detective because they were testimonial, there was no prior opportunity to cross-examine her, and M.J. was unavailable as a witness.  The trial court agreed M.J. was unavailable, but found her statements were not testimonial.  The appellate court agreed M.J.’s statements to the detective were reliable and concluded that M.J. was available for cross-examination at trial (despite the State’s earlier concession that she was unavailable  – a concession the State had withdrawn by the time of oral argument in the appellate court).

In the Supreme Court, the State returned to its concession that the minor was unavailable.  The State also conceded that M.J.’s statement was testimonial.  The Supreme Court accepted those concessions.  The only issue for the Supreme Court, then, was whether admission of M.J.’s statement to the detective was harmless error.  The error was found to be harmless in light of the admissibility of M.J.’s statements to her mother, M.J.’s brother’s testimony that he saw her with her pants off, and the DNA evidence which could not exclude the minor as the male contributor to DNA from M.J.’s underpants.  In reaching this conclusion, the Court engaged in a detailed review of three prior cases addressing harmless error in a similar context – In re Rolandis G., In re T.T., and People v. Stechly.

Given the State’s concessions, this case is of limited significance to other cases involving questions of availability of a witness and the testimonial nature of statements.  Both of those subjects were reviewed by the Supreme Court, briefly, but the bulk of the Court’s analysis was focused on the question of harmless error.  The Court’s in-depth discussion of harmless error should prove useful to practitioners faced with similar situations as it provides a thorough overview of factors courts consider in analyzing whether an error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

People v. Stahl

By Kerry J. Bryson, Office of the State Appellate Defender

Terris Stahl broke into his estranged wife’s home, resulting in charges of home invasion and aggravated unlawful restraint.  At the conclusion of the incident in question, Stahl shot himself in the face with a gun.

During proceedings on the criminal charges, Stahl’s counsel filed a motion challenging his fitness for trial because Stahl’s gunshot wound caused him to be unable to recall anything that happened in the 48 hours preceding the injury.  Expert testimony showed that Stahl suffered short-term memory problems, as well.  Stahl was found unfit with no substantial probability that he would attain fitness within a year.

A discharge hearing was held, and Stahl was found “not not guilty” of the charged offenses and was remanded to a DHS facility.  A subsequent status report from DHS indicated that Stahl had attained fitness.  At a fitness restoration hearing, the State presented a DHS doctor who testified that with certain accommodations to compensate for Stahl’s short-term memory deficits, he was fit to stand trial.  Criminal defense attorney John O’Gara testified as an expert for the defense and described how Stahl’s amnesia as to the relevant events could negatively impact his ability to assist defense counsel, including that Stahl could not provide counsel with his version of events or state of mind at the time which would be critical to determining possible defenses, Stahl could not testify in his own defense, and Stahl could not make an intelligent decision how to plead because he did not even know whether he committed the charged acts.  The trial court agreed that Stahl was unfit and unlikely to become fit.  

The State appealed, arguing that the defendant’s amnesia related to the events surrounding the charges against him was not sufficient to support a finding of unfitness.  The appellate court disagreed, as did the Supreme Court.  

The Supreme Court clarified that amnesia as to the events surrounding a crime will not per se render a defendant unfit.  Instead, fitness is to be determined based on the totality of the circumstances.  Here, Stahl not only suffered amnesia but also could not cooperate with counsel because his short-term memory impairment made it impossible for him to follow what was happening.

People v. Stoecker

By Kerry J. Bryson, Office of the State Appellate Defender

In a motion filed in 2009, Ronald Stoecker sought post-conviction DNA testing pursuant to 725 ILCS 5/116-3.  Stoecker had been convicted in 1998 of first degree murder and sexual assault.  Evidence at trial included that Stoecker  resided near the location of the attack, Stoecker drove a car similar to that described by the victim before she died, Stoecker’s brother’s were observed tearing apart and burning the interior of a red car, Stoecker bought a plane ticket to Costa Rica with cash on the day after the incident and left the country, a small amount of sperm was recovered from the victim’s clothing, it was determined that defendant could be included as a possible male contributor to the semen stain, and PCR DNA testing revealed a match to defendant’s DNA profile at 10 markers, which would be expected to occur in approximately 1 in 1.1 trillion Caucasians.

Stoecker’s DNA motion sought to subject the evidence to new DNA testing methods, including mtDNA testing and Y-STR DNA testing.  The trial court denied the motion, but the appellate court found that Y-STR testing should be allowed as it had the potential to produce new, non-cumulative  evidence materially relevant to defendant’s actual innocence claim because Y-STR testing had the potential to exclude defendant as a contributor. The dissenting justice concluded that defendant had not indicated how Y-STR testimony would produce a more probative result than the previous PCR DNA testing where both have the possibility to include or exclude.

The Supreme Court agreed with the dissenting justice.  The Court found that the 2007 amendment to Section 116-3 imposes a more stringent obligation on a defendant seeking re-testing of evidence in that the defendant must show that the requested test was not scientifically available at the time of trial and that it provides a reasonable likelihood of more probative results.  Thus, the respective probative values of the two tests must be compared.  Further, assessment of whether the results of new testing would materially advance a claim of actual innocence requires the court to evaluate the evidence introduced at trial.

The Supreme Court concluded that Stoecker had not pled that the testing had the potential to produce more probative results as required in the amended version of Section 116-3.  Stoecker’s assertion that Y-STR testing allowed resolution of a mixed sample of male and female DNA did not equate to an allegation that Y-STR is better at separating male and female DNA than the process used previously.  Defendant also did not allege that Y-STR had a greater potential to exclude an individual over the PCR testing that was done before trial.

The Court also concluded that Stoecker’s motion did not show that Y-STR had the potential to produce new, non-cumulative evidence materially relevant to actual innocence in light of the evidence that was introduced at trial.  The trial evidence was “overwhelming,” and his present challenges to the accuracy and value of the prior DNA testimony had not been asserted until now.

This decision is useful to the narrow group of cases involving requests for post-trial DNA testing, as it clarifies the framework for establishing entitlement to such testing and discusses factors that courts consider in evaluating such requests.  The Court’s opinion resolves the question of whether a defendant who seeks re-testing of evidence must meet a higher burden: he must.