Ethics Question of the Week: Can I contact former clients to tell them I've left firm?
Q. Can I contact former clients with whom I had an attorney-client relationship and tell them I left my firm?
A. Comment 4 to IRPC 7.3 does not prohibit an attorney from directly contacting former clients to inform them of the attorney’s departure or to solicit their employment.
Any individual planning to leave a firm should review the case of Dowd & Dowd, LTD. V. Gleason, 352 Ill. App. 3d 365 (1st Dist. 2004) which covers many aspects such as contacting prospective clients before one has actually left their firm and other fiduciary duties For more information, see ISBA Advisory Opinion 12-14.
ISBA members can browse past ISBA Ethics Opinions, access our Ethics Hotline, and other resources on the ISBA Ethics Page.
[Disclaimer. These questions are representative of calls received on the ISBA’s ethics hotline. The information provided below is meant as an educational tool to highlight potentially applicable Illinois RPC or other ethics resources that might help the lawyer answer the question posed. The information provided isn’t legal advice. Because every situation is different, often complex, and the law is constantly evolving, you shouldn’t rely upon this general information without conducting your own research.]
Member Comments (1)
I believe that it could be an ethical breach not to inform clients that you have left a specific firm and that you have a new address. When I struck out on my own people that I had represented prior to my leaving reportedly told me that when they called looking for me they were told that "Mark is not in the office, can I take a message" which deceptively caused the clients to believe that I was still with that firm.
The key issue is how you notify the clients that you are no longer handling their case because you have left the firm for the issue of tortious interference to arise.
"[A] plaintiff must show not merely that the defendant has succeeded in ending the relationship or interfering with the expectancy, but `purposeful interference'—that the defendant has committed some impropriety in doing so"); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 766B, Comment a, at 20 (1979) ("In order for the actor to be held liable, this Section requires that his interference be improper"); see also Soderlund Brothers, Inc., 278 Ill.App.3d at 616, 215 Ill.Dec. 251, 663 N.E.2d at 8 ("Acts of competition which are never privileged include fraud, deceit, intimidation, or deliberate disparagement"). "
In Dowd the exiting attorneys acted improperly:
"On remand, the trial court made several findings of fact as to defendants' breach of fiduciary duty to Dowd. Some of those findings included: failing to disclose certain facts that threatened the economic existence of Dowd, such as obtaining a $400,000 line of credit and $100,000 checking account from Harris Bank using Dowd's confidential information; paying down more than $186,000 of Dowd's line of credit to American National Bank without authorization, in order to present a better financial statement for themselves when obtaining a line of credit for GMS; soliciting Allstate's business prior to resigning from Dowd; arranging for a mass exodus of firm employees prior to December 31, 1990; downloading Allstate case service lists and mailing labels for substitution of counsel; and using of confidential information." Dowd and Dowd, Ltd. v. Gleason, 352 Ill.App.3d 365, 287 Ill.Dec. 787, 816 N.E.2d 754 (Ill. App., 2004)