Defendant was entitled to vacatur of his conviction under 18 USC section 924(c) on charge of possessing firearm in furtherance of crime of violence, i.e., defendant’s conviction on charge of sex trafficking of minor. Sex trafficking of minor was not crime of violence under elements clause of section 924, since said charge did not have as element use, attempted use or threatened use of physical force. Moreover, said offense could not be crime of violence under residual clause set forth in section 924(c)(3)(B), since residual clause was unconstitutionally vague, as determined in Vivas-Ceja, 808 F.3d 719, where Ct. found that similarly-worded residual clause in 18 USC section 16(b) was unconstitutionally vague. Also, Dist. Ct. erred in imposing manager or supervisor enhancement under section 3B1.1 of USSG based on defendant’s sex trafficking conviction, where “victim” in said offense was minor, whose status precluded her from also being “participant” in said offense for purposes of imposing manager enhancement.
Federal 7th Circuit Court
Criminal Court
Firearms