Dist. Ct. erred in denying defendant’s habeas petition that challenged his murder and kidnapping convictions on ground that trial court improperly denied his request to proceed pro se and to have standby counsel. Record showed that: (1) trial court originally granted defendant’s motion to proceed pro se after public defender had been appointed to represent him; (2) defendant subsequently agreed at pretrial conference to have public defender reappointed to represent him; (3) defendant subsequently filed motion to proceed pro se and for standby counsel; (4) trial court denied defendant’s motion after noting that defendant had only 8th grade education and lacked “necessary experience or abilities” to represent himself; and (5) Ill. Appellate Ct. found no error in said denial because defendant had not unequivocally invoked his right to self-representation. Ct. of Appeals, though, found that defendant’s habeas petition should have been granted, since: (1) trial court’s rationale for denial of his motion to proceed pro se, i.e., that defendant lacked education or legal abilities, was unreasonable application of Faretta, 422 U.S. 806; and (2) Ill. Appellate Ct.’s rational that defendant made equivocal request to proceed pro se was contrary to Faretta and to record. Fact that defendant had made concurrent request for standby counsel or that he expressed dissatisfaction with public defender did not make his request equivocal.
Federal 7th Circuit Court
Criminal Court
Sixth Amendment