Dist. Ct. erred in denying defendants’ habeas petitions challenging their enhanced sentences that were imposed upon finding that defendants were career offenders under residual clause contained in section 4B1.2(a)(2) of USSG based on their prior convictions qualifying as crimes of violence. Record showed that defendants’ sentences were imposed at time prior to holding in Booker when sentencing guidelines were deemed mandatory, and thus defendants were entitled to new sentencing hearing, where: (1) Court in Johnson, 135 S.Ct. 2551, found that identical language in residual clause contained in Armed Career Criminal Act was unconstitutionally vague because it inadequately defined covered convictions; and (2) reasoning in Johnson supported finding that residual clause that defined career offender under section 4B1.2(a)(2) was also unconstitutionally vague insofar as it determined mandatory sentencing ranges for pre-Booker defendants. Also, defendants filed timely habeas petitions, where they were filed within one year of Johnson decision that constituted substantial change in law, and that elimination of residual clause under section 4B1.2(a)(2) qualified as retroactive substantive rule.
Federal 7th Circuit Court
Criminal Court
Sentencing