Dist. Ct. abused its discretion in vacating default judgment that had been entered in plaintiff's Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) against defendant-entity, where Dist. Ct. had previously granted summary judgment on merits to defendant-chief operating officer (CEO) of defendant-entity, and where Dist. Ct. held erroneous belief that there was legal inconsistency in granting plaintiff's default judgment against defendant-entity and granting defendant-CEO's motion for summary judgment. Dist. Ct. could properly grant defendant-CEO's motion for summary judgment, since he did not fit within definition of "sender" under TCPA, because: (1) he did not personally send any unsolicited faxes; (2) faxes were sent on behalf of defendant-entity; (3) any advertisements in faxes pertained to defendant-entity products; and (4) plaintiff could not base liability only on defendant-CEO's knowledge that defendant-entity was sending faxes. Also. Dist. Ct. had properly entered default judgment against defendant-entity based on entity's failure to obtain appearance from substitute counsel, and record did not show existence of any good cause to support vacatur of default judgment. Too, where, as here, plaintiff alleged joint and several liability against both defendants, entry of default judgment against one defendant and not against another was not precluded, and theories of liability under TCPA did not require uniformity of judgments.
Federal 7th Circuit Court
Civil Court
Default Judgment