Day v. U.S.

Dist. Ct. erred in denying without conducting evidentiary hearing defendant’s habeas petition alleging that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by: (1) advising him not to accept govt. offer to plead guilty to wire fraud charge in exchange for probable sentencing range of 51 to 63 months in prison because, in counsel's opinion, defendant was not guilty of any crime; and (2) within two weeks of trial, advising defendant to enter blind guilty plea (shortly after defendant had rejected similar plea deal) because he would lose at trial, which resulted in Dist. Ct. imposing 92-month sentence based on 87 to 108 month sentencing range. While Dist. Ct. found that defendant could not establish prejudice in any ineffective assistance of counsel claim because counsel’s advice constituted reasonable strategic decision and because terms of any plea agreement were not binding on any accepted plea agreement, proper inquiry to establish prejudice in plea-bargaining context is whether it was reasonably probable that Dist. Ct. would have accepted terms of plea agreement and whether resulting sentence would have been less severe than one actually imposed. As such, because govt. conceded counsel rendered ineffective advice, remand was required for hearing to determine whether it was reasonably probable whether defendant would have accepted second plea offer that had same terms as original offer had his counsel advised him to do so, and whether Dist. Ct. would have imposed less severe sentence.