U.S. v. Rosario

In prosecution on firearm and transportation of stolen goods charges, Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s motion to suppress cell-site location information that police had obtained pursuant to Stored Communications Act, under circumstances, where: (1) store was robbed shortly after it had closed for day; (2) during investigation, police discovered that private caller, using *67 code, had placed multiple calls to store shortly after it had closed for day; (3) officers made exigent request to store’s telephone service provider for private caller’s phone number; (4) after telephone service provider voluntarily disclosed number, police discovered that Sprint was telephone service provider for private caller; (5) police made exigent request of Sprint to provide cell-site location of private caller, and Sprint voluntarily provided defendant’s cell-site location information; and (6) police thereafter sought and received court orders for same and more information linking defendant to robbery. Dist. Ct., in applying law as it existed prior to Carpenter, 138 S.Ct. 2206, found that acquisition of cell-site location information from third-party service provider did not constitute 4th Amendment search. While Supreme Court in Carpenter shortly thereafter found that acquisition of cell-location information constituted 4th Amendment search that required police to obtain search warrant supported by probable cause, Dist. Ct. could properly deny defendant’s motion to reconsider his motion to suppress in light of Carpenter, since: (1) police relied in good faith on procedures set forth in Stored Communications Act; and (2) police would have inevitably discovered defendant’s cell-site location information through proper means.