Dist. Ct. erred in granting in remanded matter defendants’ motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-police chief’s section 1983 action, alleging that defendants terminated him from his position without affording him due process, when said termination occurred without notice or opportunity for hearing. During plaintiff’s prior appeal defendants conceded that plaintiff had protected property interest in his police chief position for purposes of his due process claim without making any effort to qualify or limit said concession or reserve their ability to dispute said issue in instant remand. However, record showed that defendants did subsequently dispute plaintiff’s claim that he had protected property interest in his police chief position, and Dist. Ct. based its summary judgment ruling on belief that plaintiff had no property interest in his police chief position. Ct of Appeals, though, in reversing Dist. Ct., found that defendants should be held to their concession that plaintiff had protected property interest in his police chief position, and that they could not contest that issue in instant remand. Moreover, it held that plaintiff was entitled to judgment on issue of liability with respect to his due process claim based on said concession and findings made in prior appeal. Ct. also remanded matter for determination as to whether defendant Mayor of Village was entitled to qualified immunity arising out of her role in termination decision.
Federal 7th Circuit Court
Civil Court
Due Process