Plaintiff filed instant action under 18 USC section 925A, alleging that federal felon-in-possession statute (18 USC section 922(g)(1)) violated his Second Amendment rights, where record showed that: (1) plaintiff had entered into 1998 guilty plea on felony mail fraud charge; (2) plaintiff had maintained otherwise clean record for 24 years; and (3) plaintiff wished to possess firearm, but section 922(g)(1) prevents him from possessing firearm due to his status as felon. Plaintiff also asserted that: (1) section 922(g)(1) violated Second Amendment because history supports disarming only dangerous persons with prior convictions for violent felonies, and his mail fraud conviction did not qualify as violent felony; and alternatively (2) history required individual assessment of danger that he posed before banning his possession of firearm. In its remand order, Ct. of Appeals noted that Dist. Ct., which dismissed plaintiff complaint, based its dismissal on “means-end” inquiry as set forth in Barr, 919 F.3d 437 and did not evaluate plaintiff’s claim under new standard set forth in Bruen, 142 S.Ct. 2111, which required Dist. Ct. to examine exclusively Second Amendment text and pertinent history of firearms regulations, when determining whether government satisfied its burden of affirmatively proving that its firearm regulation/statute was part of historical tradition that delineates outer bounds of right to keep and bear arms. Accordingly, Ct. of Appeals directed that Dist. Ct,. examine plaintiff’s claim under new standard. (Dissent filed.)
Federal 7th Circuit Court
Civil Court
Firearms