Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of 1st degree murder of one person and the attempted 1st degree murder of another person. Court properly granted State's 2nd-stage motion to dismiss Defendant's postconviction petition. No ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for failing to argue that court violated Defendant's constitutional right of presence by responding, in Defendant's absence, to a jury note requesting clarification about the meaning of a defendant's "unreasonable" belief in the need for deadly force. Defendant failed to make a substantial showing that there is a reasonable probability that appellate court would have found that the State could not show, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Defendant could not show, by preponderance of evidence, his own actual and subjective though unreasonable belief in the need for deadly force. Evidence of Defendant's guilt was overwhelming. (LAMPKIN and REYES, concurring.)
Illinois Appellate Court
Criminal Court
Jury Deliberations