(Drury, D-Highwood) allows an association to add to a unit owner’s part of the common expense for default of some duty (as required by statute, ordinance, or condominium instruments) but only if a court first awards the association its attorney fees. Repeals current law that automatically allows the association to add these fees in the unit owner’s share of the common expense. Introduced and referred to House Rules Committee.
(Drury, D-Highwood) makes a number of changes to this Act, which are as follows. (1) Contains a statement of public policy that a unit owner has the right to fairness in litigation or other legal action regardless whether the unit owner instigates it or the association does. (2) Allows a unit owner to bring a legal action against the association or its board of managers to enforce individual or common-interest community rights without being required to sue other homeowners or otherwise name them as defendants. Any cost to provide a notice to unit owners is to be paid by the association and may not be assessed against the unit owner bringing the action. (3) Voids as a matter of public policy any provision of any condominium instrument or any rule or regulation seeking to limit a unit owner’s right to commence litigation against an association or its board of managers or to limit the liability of an association or its board of managers for a breach of duty. (4) Provides that a unit owner’s compliance with an association’s demand does not waive the unit owner’s right or ability to challenge the demand in a legal action commenced later. (5) Requires a unit owner to be awarded reasonable attorney’s fees to enforce this Act (a) to the extent the unit owner prevails as a plaintiff; or (b) the unit owner as defendant prevails on any affirmative defense or counterclaim for a breach by the association or its board of managers for an obligation under this Act, condominium instruments, rules and regulations, or another applicable statute or ordinance. (6) Requires the association be awarded its reasonable attorney’s fees to enforce this Act but that the court may reduce the award or in part or entirely if: (a) the court finds that the legal action benefited the association by clarifying its duties; or (b) based on other equitable considerations. (7) Bars the association from recovering any attorney’s fees and costs in a claim brought under the Forcible Entry and Detainer Article of the Code of Civil Procedure if the unit owner prevails based on a breach of duty by the association or by any member of its board of managers. (8) Provides that in litigation, the association is required to represent the best interests of all unit owners and the association without regard to the wishes of the board of managers. (9) Provides that the association may not be represented in litigation by counsel who also represents the association’s board of managers either individually or collectively. Introduced and referred to House Rules Committee.
Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment in plaintiff’s action alleging that defendant violated Computer Fraud and Abuse Act by improperly downloading county land records provided through plaintiff’s computer system. Record showed that defendant had paid officials from 82 counties for ability to have unlimited access to said counties’ land records, and defendant had designed its own “web-harvester” that was able to download said records without disrupting plaintiff’s services to other users seeking access to said land records or altering any content on plaintiff’s computer system. As such, plaintiff failed to show that defendant acted with intent to defraud, where it paid for unlimited access to said county land records, or that it had damaged plaintiff’s software/computers. Also, certain characteristics of plaintiff’s services suggested that downloading records through another program, like defendant’s web-harvester, was permissible.
Dist. Ct. did not err in finding that attorney’s fee provision in plaintiff’s trailing invoices was not part of parties’ contracts to purchase frozen potatoes after Dist. Ct. applied terms of United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (Convention). Under terms of Convention, attorney’s fees provision was not part of instant contracts, where: (1) “loss” resulting from breach of contract did not itself include attorney’s fees; (2) instant contracts were formed at moment plaintiff accepted defendant’s offer to purchase potatoes at specified price; and (3) attorney’s fees provision was not included in defendant’s purchase order or in plaintiff’s email confirmation and only appeared in trailing invoices sent to defendant after plaintiff’s delivery of potatoes. Plaintiff also failed to show that defendant had ever made statement indicating its acceptance of attorney’s fee provision.
In bankruptcy proceeding in which debtors sought to set aside as fraudulent transfer under 11 USC section 548(a)(1)(B) tax sale of debtors’ home, Dist. Ct. erred in reversing Bankruptcy Ct. determination that that instant tax sale was not for “reasonably equivalent value” where: (1) purchase price of property at tax sale is generally nothing more that sum of delinquent taxes; (2) Illinois’s tax sale method has no correlation between sale price and value of property; and (3) instant tax sale was for $4,046.26, while debtors’ home was worth between $50,000 and $110,000. Ct. further found that: (1) debtors had standing to bring instant action since debtors had filed Chapter 13 petition; (2) Bankruptcy Ct. properly limited debtors’ recovery to $15,000, which corresponded to amount debtors were entitled to under homestead exemption; (3) purchaser of tax deed, as “initial transferee,” was liable to debtors for said exemption amount; and (4) subsequent purchaser of debtors’ home was not liable for any amount where Bankruptcy Ct. found that subsequent purchaser bought debtors’ home from initial transferee in good faith and without knowledge that initial transfer of debtors’ home via tax sale was for less than its reasonably equivalent value.
(Radogno, R-Lemont) amends the Code of Civil Procedure to make the following changes. (1) Deletes a provision authorizing an action to be commenced in any county when all defendants are nonresidents of this State. (2) Under current law, corporations and partnerships are considered to be residents of any county in which they are doing business. Senate Bill 2153 limits this provision only if on due inquiry no office can be found in Illinois. (3) Deletes residency for a partnership on the basis that any partner resides in that county. (4) Deletes residency of any insurance company for any county in which a plaintiff or one of the plaintiffs resides. (5) Provides that in actions in which no party is a resident of this State and over which another forum has jurisdiction, the court shall, upon motion, dismiss the action unless the cause of action primarily arise in Illinois or the interests of justice require that the action proceed here. (6) Provides that joint and several liability attaches if a defendant is found to be 50%, rather than 25%, at fault. (7) Limits amounts recovered for medical care, treatment, or services and caretaking expenses to the amounts actually paid for those expenses regardless of the amounts initially billed. Referred to Senate Assignments Committee.
(Sandack, R-Downers Grove) deletes language requiring the court to instruct the jury in writing that the defendant must be found not liable if the jury finds that the contributory fault of the plaintiff is more than 50% of the proximate cause of the injury or damage for which recovery is sought. It replaces it with language providing that the court may not instruct the jury of the consequence of any findings of fault of any plaintiff or defendant under Sections 2-1116 and 2-1117 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It deletes the current language of Section 2-1117 on joint liability and replaces it with language providing that any defendant whose fault is less than 25% of the proximate cause of the injury or damage for which recovery is sought by the plaintiff is severally liable for non-medical damages; and any defendant whose fault is 25% or greater of the proximate cause of the injury or damage for which recovery is sought by the plaintiff is jointly and severally liable for non-medical damages. Just introduced.
(Bellock, R-Westmont) provides that a parent or legal custodian of a child may execute a power of attorney delegating to another person certain powers regarding the care and custody of the child for a period not to exceed one year or a longer period in the case of a service member. It creates a new power-of-attorney form and new statute for this. Just introduced.
(Drury, D-Highwood) makes it perjury if a person knowingly under oath makes contradictory statements to the degree that one of them is necessarily false in the same or in different proceedings in which an oath or affirmation is required if: (1) each statement was material to the issue or point in question; and (2) each statement was made within the period of the statute of limitations for the offense charged. Makes it a defense if the defendant at the time he or she made each declaration believed the declaration to be true. Just introduced.
Dist. Ct. erred in finding that defendant-bank was not on "inquiry notice" of debtor’s wrongful pledging of its customers’ assets that debtor used to secure loans from defendant so as to defeat Trustee’s attempt to strip defendant of its secured creditor status under 11 USC section 548(a)(1)(A) after debtor filed for bankruptcy. While Dist. Ct. found that defendant lacked knowledge that debtor had actually pledged its customers’ assets without their permission, inquiry notice requires only knowledge that would lead reasonable person to inquire further for possible wrongdoing. Moreover, email from one of defendant’s Directors, who questioned amount of debtor’s proposed collateral when compared to its significantly lower amount of capital, was sufficient to place defendant on notice so as to require further inquiry on source of collateral. As such, Trustee’s request should have been granted so as to render defendant as unsecured creditor with respect to repayment of loan proceeds. Doctrine of equitable subordination did not apply so as to reduce defendant’s priority with respect to other creditors since defendant was only negligent with respect to its failure to uncover true status of debtor’s proposed collateral.