Commercial Banking, Collections, and Bankruptcy

Senate Bill 59

Topic: 
Juror fees
(Mulroe, D-Chicago) repeals the recently enacted increase in juror fees if the county board determines that it cannot pay them. It requires the county board to enact new fees not less than the old law of $4, $5, or $10 a day and mileage. Senate Bill 59 doesn’t repeal the recently enacted change in civil cases from a 12-person jury to a six-person jury. Introduced and assigned to the Senate Committee on Assignments.

In re: Sweports, Ltd.

Federal 7th Circuit Court
Civil Court
Attorney Fees
Citation
Case Number: 
No. 14-2423
Decision Date: 
January 9, 2015
Federal District: 
Bankruptcy Ct., N.D. Ill., E. Div.
Holding: 
Reversed and remanded
Bankruptcy Ct. erred in denying on jurisdictional grounds law firm’s request for $780,000 in attorney fees generated while representing Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors during bankruptcy proceeding, even though law firm made such request after bankruptcy proceeding had been dismissed and assets of bankruptcy estate had been returned to debtor. Bankruptcy Ct. had jurisdiction to act on said fee request, since Bankruptcy Ct. had jurisdiction to determine whether law firm had valid claim to services generated during bankruptcy proceeding, and since, regardless of whether debtor had reacquired bankruptcy estate, law firm could subsequently take any favorable ruling to state court to enforce said ruling like any other judgment against debtor. Moreover, law firm was not required to ask Bankruptcy Ct. to “reserve” jurisdiction over said fee request prior to instant dismissal of bankruptcy proceeding.

Stable Investments Partnership v. Vilsack

Federal 7th Circuit Court
Civil Court
Trusts
Citation
Case Number: 
No. 14-1712
Decision Date: 
January 6, 2015
Federal District: 
N.D. Ill., E. Div.
Holding: 
Affirmed
Dist. Ct. did not err in upholding USDA decision to require plaintiff to return $448 in farm subsidies that plaintiff had received based on plaintiff’s claim that, as beneficiary of land trust that held legal title to farmland, it was owner of said farmland, and thus was eligible to receive subsidy under Farm Security and Rural Investment Act. Record showed that trustee of instant land trust held both legal and equitable title to trust property, and under USDA regulations, only trustee, as title holder, was eligible to obtain instant subsidy. Fact that plaintiff, as beneficiary of instant trust, could manage trust assets did not require different result.

In re: Bronk

Federal 7th Circuit Court
Civil Court
Bankruptcy
Citation
Case Number: 
Nos. 13-1123 & 13-1516 Cons.
Decision Date: 
January 5, 2015
Federal District: 
W.D. Wisc.
Holding: 
Affirmed and reversed in part
In bankruptcy proceeding in which Trustee filed objections to debtor claiming exemptions under Wisc. statutes to shield from creditors debtor’s college savings accounts that he set up for his grandchildren, as well as recently-purchased annuity, Bankruptcy Ct. erred in denying exemptions for instant college savings accounts since relevant Wisc. statute clearly allowed debtor to exempt his interest in said accounts. However, Bankruptcy Ct. did not err in finding that debtor’s annuity was fully exempt under Wisc. Statute (section 815.18(3)(j)), where said annuity contained death benefit. Ct. though observed that Trustee had waived any argument that debtor might not have satisfied second requirement for said exemption that called for showing that said annuity complied with certain provisions of Internal Revenue Code.

Public Act 98-1142

Topic: 
Eavesdropping
(Nekritz, D-Buffalo Grove; Raoul, D-Chicago) makes several changes to Illinois’ eavesdropping law after the Illinois Supreme Court struck down the current statute for being too broad. It re-establishes Illinois’ all-party consent statute for the recording of private conversations. Specifically, it does the following. (1) An eavesdropper is someone who uses an eavesdropping device to secretly record a private conversation without the consent of all parties involved in the conversation. A conversation is considered private if at least one of those involved had a reasonable expectation that the conversation is private. (2) An eavesdropper is anyone who uses a device to secretly record electronic communications without the consent of everyone involved. (3) An eavesdropper is someone who discloses the content of a private conversation or private electronic communication without permission. (4) The penalty for eavesdropping on a law enforcement officer, state’s attorney or judge is reduced from a Class 1 felony to a Class 3 felony. The penalty for eavesdropping on a private citizen remains a Class 4 felony and a Class 3 felony for a subsequent conviction. (5) It expands the number of crimes in which law enforcement doesn’t need to get judicial permission to eavesdrop as long as they have the approval—written or verbal—of the local state’s attorney. State’s attorneys must submit reports annually explaining how often this exemption was used. Effective Dec. 30, 2014.

In re: Ruben

Federal 7th Circuit Court
Civil Court
Bankruptcy
Citation
Case Number: 
No. 14-1475
Decision Date: 
December 23, 2014
Federal District: 
N.D. Ill., E. Div.
Holding: 
Affirmed
Dist. Ct. did not err in granting creditor’s motion for summary judgment in appeal of creditor's adversary claim in Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding to have debtor-lawyer pay $174,504.54 in costs of arbitration that arbitrators awarded to creditor in resolving her underlying claim that debtor fraudulently mismanaged her trust. Dist. Ct. did not err in denying debtor’s request for discharge of said debt where: (1) Bankruptcy Ct. had previously refused to discharge creditor’s underlying fraud-based claim; and (2) even though arbitration panel did not award creditor any damages because creditor had been fully compensated in her claim by other parties, panel’s award of costs to creditor carried inference that panel had determined that debtor had actually committed said fraud. Moreover, Ct., in noting that debtor’s conduct with respect to his handling of creditor’s trust was criticized in recent findings by Hearing Board of ARDC, also rejected debtor’s contention that instant costs, which were incurred as result of resolving pre-petition debt, should have been treated as pre-petition debt that was dischargeable.

Avanti Medical Group, LLC v. BMO Harris Bank, N.A.

Illinois Appellate Court
Civil Court
Banking
Citation
Case Number: 
2014 IL App (2d) 140401
Decision Date: 
Tuesday, December 23, 2014
District: 
2d Dist.
Division/County: 
Du Page Co.
Holding: 
Affirmed.
Justice: 
BIRKETT
Court properly dismissed complaint against bank for breach of credit agreement, as Plaintiffs failed to allege that agreement met signature requirement in section 2 of the Credit Agreements Act. Most obvious noncompliance was lack of mutual signatures on "Amended Terms" document. Section 2 requires that “the relevant terms and conditions” of loan be discernible from documents bearing signatures of both creditor and debtor. (McLAREN and HUDSON, concurring.)

Public Act 98-1132

Topic: 
Jury size and pay
(Burke, D-Evergreen Park; Mulroe, D-Chicago) makes the following changes for juror pay: (1) Requires counties to pay jurors $25 for the first day of service and thereafter $50 for each day of service. (2) Deletes the current requirement to pay for jurors’ travel expenses. (3) Requires all trials by jury in civil cases to be six jurors but still requires that the verdict be unanimous. If alternate jurors are requested, an additional fee established by the county must be charged for each alternate juror requested. Effective date is June 1, 2015.

Druckzentrum Harry GmbH & KG v. Motorola Mobility LLC

Federal 7th Circuit Court
Civil Court
Contracts
Citation
Case Number: 
No. 12-3057
Decision Date: 
December 18, 2014
Federal District: 
N.D. Ill., E. Div.
Holding: 
Affirmed
Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment in action alleging that defendant breached supply contract that called for defendant to make good-faith effort to purchase 2% of its global cell phone user-manual needs from plaintiff, where, after year into instant two-year contract, defendant notified plaintiff that it was shifting its operation to different country and purchasing its print products from third-party. Contrary to plaintiff’s argument, parties’ written contract contained no promise of exclusive right to all of defendant’s printing business in Europe, Middle East and Asia, and contract terms allowed defendant to purchase less than 2% of its global cell-phone needs, where, as here, defendant had experienced significant downturn in business in said geographic areas. Moreover, Dist. Ct. properly rejected plaintiff’s attempt to use parol evidence to establish existence of defendant’s alleged oral promise to exclusivity purchase plaintiff’s printing products, since contract language was fully integrated and unambiguous with respect to defendant’s purchasing options.