Commercial Banking, Collections, and Bankruptcy

Luxury Tax: Collecting from High-Income Judgment Debtors

By Andrew N. Plasz
June
2014
Article
, Page 294
The author argues that wages used for investments or to purchase luxuries should be subject to collection by a judgment creditor.

JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. East-West Logistics, L.L.C.

Illinois Appellate Court
Civil Court
Evidence
Citation
Case Number: 
2014 IL App (1st) 121111
Decision Date: 
Monday, March 31, 2014
District: 
1st Dist.
Division/County: 
Cook Co., 6th Div.
Holding: 
Affirmed.
Justice: 
HALL
(Court opinion corrected 5/19/14.) Bank sued for non-payment of $1.6 million on commercial loan, and sought to enforce personal guaranty of individual, who later died, and his Estate was substituted in. Court properly dismissed Estate's affirmative defenses and counterclaims and entered summary judgment for Bank, and properly ordered Estate to pay discovery costs to Bank, balancing need for discovery against expense of electronic production. Bank employees' affidavits, as qualified witnesses as to bank records, satisfied Rule 803(6) to establish foundation. (ROCHFORD and LAMPKIN, concurring.)

House Bill 5395

Topic: 
Evictions
(Monique Davis, D-Chicago) amends the Forcible Entry and Detainer section of the Code of Civil Procedure to do three things. (1) Limits the number of motions a tenant may file to stay the enforcement of an order for possession to two unless good cause is shown by written motion. (2) Allows a "peace officer" to execute an order for possession. (3) Also allows service of an order of possession by an off-duty peace officer who is employed on a part-time basis by a licensee under the Private Detective, Private Alarm, Private Security, Fingerprint Vendor, and Locksmith Act of 2004. In the House on third reading.

Hanover Ins. Co. v. Northern Building Co.

Federal 7th Circuit Court
Civil Court
Indemnity
Citation
Case Number: 
No. 13-2675
Decision Date: 
May 8, 2014
Federal District: 
N.D. Ill., E. Div.
Holding: 
Affirmed
Dist. Ct. did not err in granting plaintiff-insurance company’s motion for summary judgment in action alleging that defendant breached indemnity agreement by failing to pay plaintiff for losses where: (1) plaintiff settled claims made by subcontractors against surety bonds that plaintiff had issued on behalf of defendant regarding defendant’s performance on construction project; and (2) plaintiff completed construction project after said project had been delayed due to plaintiff’s non-payment for work on project performed by subcontractors. Terms of indemnity agreement allowed plaintiff to make payments to subcontractors and to step into shoes of defendant to complete construction project and obtain remaining proceeds from third-party for plaintiff’s work on project, where project had been delayed by defendant. Ct. rejected defendant’s argument that plaintiff’s authority to settle subcontractors’ claims on surety bonds could not be triggered prior to any finding that defendant was actually liable for breach of instant surety bonds.

In re: C.P. Hall Co.

Federal 7th Circuit Court
Civil Court
Bankruptcy
Citation
Case Number: 
No. 13-1306
Decision Date: 
April 24, 2014
Federal District: 
N.D. Ill., E. Div.
Holding: 
Affirmed
Bankruptcy Ct. did not err in denying motion by debtor’s excess insurer to intervene in debtor’s bankruptcy case for purposes of opposing proposed $4.125 million settlement of debtor’s claim against its primary insurer to provide coverage for $10 million in asbestos claims filed against debtor. Excess insurer failed to establish any certainty that it would benefit from any rejection of proposed settlement and further failed to show that its status as non-creditor qualified as “party in interest” under Bankruptcy Code. As such, fact that excess insurer could face collateral damage from ruling on proposed settlement was insufficient to afford it standing to oppose settlement.

Bankruptcy and the Series LLC: Can Creditors Pierce the Veil?

By John T. Wagener & Kenneth D. Peters
May
2014
Article
, Page 236
The Series LLC gives sweeping liability protection to those who use it. But will it shield an umbrella entity in bankruptcy and under UCC Article 9 from liability incurred by debtor subunits?
1 comment (Most recent January 29, 2015)

Senate Bill 1098

Topic: 
Business Corporation Act
(Harmon, D-Oak Park) provides that the dissolution of a corporation does not impair a civil remedy available to or against the corporation for any liability accrued or incurred (rather than incurred) either before, at the time of, or after (rather than before) the dissolution. Provides that this provision does not extend any applicable statute of limitations. Awaiting passage in the Senate.

Senate Bill 1048

Topic: 
Presumptively void transfers in probate
(Harmon, D-Oak Park) creates a new section in the Probate Act entitled “presumptively void transfers.” It applies to caregivers who, either as a result of family relationship, voluntarily, or in exchange for compensation, have assumed responsibility for all or a portion of the care of another person who needs assistance with activities of daily living. It applies to “transfer instruments” that includes a will, trust, deed, form designated as payable on death, contract, or other beneficiary designation form. It presumes, with some exceptions, that a transfer instrument is presumed to be void if the transferee is a caregiver, or a person related to a caregiver, and the fair market value of the transferred property exceeds $20,000. It has some exceptions, which are as follows: (1) if the transferee establishes by clear and convincing evidence that the transfer was not the product of fraud, duress, or undue influence. But it prohibits the court from making that determination solely upon the testimony of the caregiver. (2) If the transfer instrument was reviewed by an “independent attorney” who signs and delivers a statutory certificate of review. (3) If the transferee’s share under the transfer instrument is less than the share the transferee was entitled to under the transferor’s testamentary plan in effect before the transferee became a caregiver. If the caregiver attempts and fails to overcome the presumption under this section, the caregiver must bear the cost of the proceedings, including, without limitation, reasonable attorney’s fees. Assigned to Senate Judiciary Committee.

VLM Food Trading International Inc. v. Ill. Trading Co.

Federal 7th Circuit Court
Civil Court
Contract
Citation
Case Number: 
Nos. 13-1799 & 13-1697 Cons.
Decision Date: 
April 10, 2014
Federal District: 
N.D. Ill., E. Div.
Holding: 
Reversed and remanded
Dist. Ct. erred in applying Illinois law to find that attorney fee provisions contained only in plaintiff’s invoices constituted part of parties’ contract calling for purchase of frozen potatoes, since applicable law that covered instant dispute was United Nations Convention on Contracts for International Sale of Goods, due to defendant’s status as Canadian entity that conducted most of its business in Canada. Fact that defendant had New Jersey office did not require different result. Moreover, provisions of Convention placed into doubt whether instant attorney fee provisions could be enforced upon defendant’s breach of contract, where Article 19 of Convention suggested that attorney fee provisions in plaintiff’s invoices were material provisions that did not automatically become part of contract.

TABFG, LLC v. Pfeil

Federal 7th Circuit Court
Civil Court
Tortious Interference
Citation
Case Number: 
No. 12-3557
Decision Date: 
March 20, 2014
Federal District: 
N.D. Ill., E. Div.
Holding: 
Affirmed
Dist. Ct. did not err in entering judgment in favor of plaintiff in action alleging that defendant tortiously interfered with contract that plaintiff had with third-party limited liability company, where plaintiff alleged that defendant caused third-party to disburse funds to himself and others in contravention with contract that plaintiff had with third-party. While defendant argued that he was entitled to conditional privilege arising out of said distribution, defendant was not entitled to said privilege where defendant was not manager or director of third-party, and where instant distribution essentially benefited defendant and was made in clear contravention to terms of subject contract.