Construction Law

Plaintiff brought suit alleging breach of fiduciary duty, accounting, breach of contract, and conversion against its former partner in a joint venture to perform government construction work. The case proceeded to bench trial where the trial court judge found in favor of the defendant on all claims. Plaintiff appealed arguing that the trial court’s judgment was against the manifest weight of the evidence. The appellate court affirmed, first finding that it had jurisdiction to hear the appeal, and then finding that the evidence and testimony at trial supported the judgment entered by the trial court. (GORDON and McBRIDE, concurring)

Plaintiff sued his neighbor (whose building is 6-8" from Plaintiff's home) and the neighbor's roofing contractor over damage to Plaintiff's roof. Contractor attempted to place a new roof on top of neighbor's existing roof and secure it to Plaintiff's roof, without Plaintiff's consent or knowledge, and caused damage to Plaintiff's roof. Plaintiff sufficiently pleaded vicarious and in-concert liability against the neighbor, based on roofing contractor's actions. Lacking any personal knowledge of any oral or written interactions between Defendant's, Plaintiff could not be any more specific than to allege that neighbor had the right to approve, direct, and control the manner of the contractor's work. Plaintiff should not, at this stage, be required to lay out the evidence supporting these ultimate facts. Complaint adequately alleges that contractor was not an independent contractor, but acted specifically at neighbor's direction in altering Plaintiff's roof and was thus neighbor's agent at least to that extent. Complaint alleges "control" as to direction to attach the new rubber roof to Plaintiff's roof, and thus adequately pleaded claim for vicarious liability. Complaint adequately alleges that neighbor "substantially encouraged" contractor to drill holes in Plaintiff's roof as part of a plan to connnect over its roof and attach it to Plaintiff's roof, and thus sufficiently alleged in-concert liability. (McBRIDE and BURKE, concurring.)

Dispute over alleged latent defects in construction of the common elements of a condominium building, in the design, materials, and construction of the building's plumbing system. Purchaser of a newly constructed condominium unit may not pursue a claim for breach of implied warranty of habitability against a general contractor where there was no privity of contract between the general contractor and the purchaser. (GORDON and LAMPKIN, concurring.)

Defendant LLC borrowed $17 million from  bank to construct a condominium development. LLC defaulted and bank sued to foreclose. Plaintiff purchased the loan from bank and entered settlement agreement with LLC with a contingent precedent requiring all units be sold before Plaintiff could sue LLC on the loan and owner on his guaranties. Many years later, Plaintiff filed complaint alleging that LLC had breached construction note and that its owner had defaulted on his payment and completion guaranties. After bench trial, court entered judgment for Plaintiff and awarded $17.031 million in damages. Court's decision was not against manifest weight of evidence. Court properly exercised its discretion by allowing Plaintiff to admit disbursement statement into evidence, as it was relevant to the key issue and was available to both parties. Court properly held LLC and owner breach their obligations under note and guaranties and then, to calculate damages, permitted Plaintiff to present witnesses and evidence on terms of settlement agreement. Court's finding that testimony and evidence showed that all expenses of LLC were paid pursuant to agreement or not challenged by owner was not against manifest weight of evidence. (WALKER and COGHLAN, concurring.)

Court properly granted Defendant's motion to dismiss Plaintiff's mechanics lien claim and ordered Plaintiff to release its lien pursuant to section 35 of Mechanics Lien Act. Defendant's mortgage lender and bank which had a security interest in leases and rents from property were necessary parties under section 11 of the Act. Both had recorded their interests before Plaintiff filed its complaint. Plaintiff failed to add these necessary parties as defendants within 30 days of Defendant's demand to enforce the lien resulted in forfeiture of its lien. The 30-day time limit, in section 34 of the Act, applies where a property owner issues a written demand to enforce the lien, and is the applicable time period rather than the 2-year time limit of section 9 of the Act.  (CONNORS and ODEN JOHNSON, concurring.)