Insurance Law

In interpleader proceeding filed by insurance company to determine ownership of life insurance proceedings that were contested by wife of deceased insured, as well as by assignee of creditor, who had obtained certain rights to policy from insured, Dist. Ct. did not err in granting summary judgment motion filed by assignee. Dist. Ct. could properly find that assignment of policy from insured to creditor was valid, and that wife was precluded from making claims to said proceeds. Ct. rejected wife’s contention that instant assignment to creditor was without consideration, where wife presented no facts to dispute language in assignment that assignment was made for “valuable consideration.” Moreover, Dist. Ct. did not err in denying wife’s Rule 59(e) motion to modify summary judgment order, where wife’s arguments in support of said motion could have been made while summary judgment motion was under consideration. Also, Dist. Ct. not abuse its discretion in denying wife’s motion to reconsider summary judgment order, even though wife presented new evidence to cast doubt as to whether creditor had supplied any consideration for instant assignment, since reasonable person could still conclude that Dist. Ct.’s entry of summary judgment in favor of assignee was correct.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant-insurance company’s motion for summary judgment in action by plaintiffs-insureds seeking declaration that policy issued by defendant for underinsured-motorist coverage precluded defendant for deducting $200,000 that plaintiffs had received from at-fault third-party’s insurance company from $1 million in under-insured motorist proceeds provided in defendant’s policy, where plaintiff’s total losses exceeded $2.2 million. While plaintiff’s argued that instant $200,000 should have been applied to their total losses before determining any deduction from instant $1 million cap, language of instant policy required that $200,000 be deducted from $1 million cap on applicable under-insured motorist coverage.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting plaintiff-insurance company’s motion for summary judgment in action seeking declaration that it owed no duty to defend under general commercial liability policy four construction companies, which were sued for personal injuries incurred by individual who was demonstrating certain caulking skills at construction site shortly before individual’s employer signed contract with general contractor to provide said caulking services at work site. While Dist. Ct. found that “contractor” exclusion to coverage applied because injured individual was employee of subcontractor at time of accident, Ct. of Appeals found exclusion did not apply since language in exclusion was ambiguous where phrase “providing materials or services of any kind” could be interpreted as triggering exclusion only when injury occurred at time compensated services were being done.