Local Government Law

Senate Bill 16

Topic: 
Fast-track mortgage forecosure
(Collins, D-Chicago; Lyons, D-Chicago) creates an expedited judgment and sale procedure for abandoned residential property. An additional filing fee will be imposed on plaintiffs in a tiered system in which the fees increase in proportion to the number of foreclosures a plaintiff prosecutes. The fees will also pay for "housing counseling" for residents who are going through the foreclosure process in effort to help them save their homes. Clarifies that a portion of the Conveyances Act is permissive instead of mandatory to prevent that portion of the Act from affecting the validity of a properly recorded mortgage by a trustee in bankruptcy. House Amendment 8 becomes the bill and is positioned to move during this veto session.
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Newport Township Road District v. Pavelich

Newport Township Road District v. Pavelich
Illinois Appellate Court
Civil Court
Attorney's Fees
Citation
Case Number: 
2012 IL App (2d) 111317
Decision Date: 
Monday, November 19, 2012
District: 
2d Dist.
Division/County: 
Lake Co.
Holding: 
Affirmed.
Justice: 
McLAREN
(Court opinion corrected 11/29/12.) Plaintiffs filed action to compel Defendants to pass Road District's budget and to process Highway Commissioner's warrants for funds from budge to pay attorney's fees for this case and for case Township filed in 2009 against Commissioner. As parties' interests were aligned directly against each other in same litigation, a clear concurrent conflict existed, and Commissioner had authority to hire independent counsel. As Commissioner was sued in his official capacity, payment of attorney's fees would properly come from Road District funds, and court properly ordered Township Board to allocate Road District funds to pay Plaintiffs' legal fees for both suits. (SCHOSTOK and BIRKETT, concurring.)

Guth v. Tazewell County

Federal 7th Circuit Court
Guth v. Tazewell County
Civil Court
Zoning
Citation
Case Number: 
No. 11-3452
Decision Date: 
October 17, 2012
Federal District: 
C.D. Ill.
Holding: 
Affirmed
Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-County officials’ motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action alleging that defendants violated plaintiff’s constitutional rights by failing to promptly re-zone plaintiff’s property pursuant to terms of settlement agreement between plaintiff and County Bd. committee. Defendants could only re-zone subject property in accordance with specific procedures that had not been met until two years after settlement had been entered, and plaintiff could not establish successful equal protection claim where proposed parcels allegedly receiving more favorable treatment were not comparable to plaintiff’s land. Moreover, plaintiff could not establish any damages stemming from any delay in re-zoning where downturn in housing market, as opposed to defendants’ conduct, was cause for any reduction in property value.

Sage Information Services v. Humm

Sage Information Services v. Humm
Illinois Appellate Court
Civil Court
FOIA
Citation
Case Number: 
2012 IL App (5th) 110580
Decision Date: 
Friday, October 5, 2012
District: 
5th Dist.
Division/County: 
Franklin Co.
Holding: 
Affirmed in part and reversed in part; remanded.
Justice: 
WELCH
Plaintiff filed actions per Section 11 of FOIA, to compel release of a copy, on CD or similar electronic media, of current real property assessment record file for entire county. Section 6 of FOIA does not allow a fee in excess of the cost of the electronic medium for reproduction of electronic records, unless another statute expressly provides that fees to produce paper records also apply to electronic copies, and Section 9-20 of Property Tax Code does not so provide. Although County Treasurer, to whom FOIA request was directed, testified that he routinely accesses the electronic database which contained requested information, he testified that he could not generate the records sought in the electronic format requested, and Plaintiff never requested records in paper form. Thus, court properly denied request for order compelling Treasurer to release information. (SPOMER and WEXSTTEN, concurring.)

People v. Bertrand

People v. Bertrand
Illinois Appellate Court
Civil Court
Citizen Participation Act
Citation
Case Number: 
2012 IL App (1st) 111419
Decision Date: 
Friday, September 28, 2012
District: 
1st Dist.
Division/County: 
Cook Co.,6th Div.
Holding: 
Affirmed.
Justice: 
HALL
Settlement agreement, to which Defendant School Board member was a party, was not properly approved by School Board, because although there was a quorum of two Board members present, Defendant abstained from voting, and one vote out of quorum of two persons is not a majority, and thus agreement was void for lack of valid majority vote. Defendant's abstention cannot be counted as a "yea" vote, as he had a financial interest in agreement and was required to abstain per Public Officer Prohibited Activities Act. Citizen Participation Act is inapplicable, as its text and purpose do not support claimed right to be paid public funds without proper authorization of disbursing body. (GARCIA and LAMPKIN, concurring.)

Bond Kildeer Marketplace v. CBS Outdoor

Bond Kildeer Marketplace v. CBS Outdoor
Illinois Appellate Court
Civil Court
Leases
Citation
Case Number: 
2012 IL App (2d) 111292
Decision Date: 
Tuesday, September 25, 2012
District: 
2d Dist.
Division/County: 
Lake Co.
Holding: 
Affirmed.
Justice: 
BURKE
Billboard on federal highway was illegal per Highway Ad Act, as permit had not been renewed with IDOT. Because billboard was unlawful prior to 2008 passage of Village annexation ordinance, the lease for billboard was rendered unenforceable, as its purpose had been rendered illegal. (ZENOFF and HUDSON, concurring.)

Patrick Engineering v. The City of Naperville

Patrick Engineering v. The City of Naperville
Illinois Supreme Court
Civil Court
Equitable Estoppel
Citation
Case Number: 
2012 IL 113148
Decision Date: 
Thursday, September 20, 2012
District: 
2d Dist.
Division/County: 
Du Page Co.
Holding: 
Appellate court reversed; circuit court affirmed; remanded.
Justice: 
THEIS
Equitable estoppel does not apply against a municipality when a plaintiff has alleged that a municipal official possessed apparent authority, but only when a plaintiff has alleged specific facts to show that a municipal official possessed express authority and that the plaintiff reasonably relied on statements or conduct by the official. (KILBRIDE, FREEMAN, THOMAS, GARMAN, KARMEIER, and BURKE, concurring.)

Thayer v. Chiczewski

Federal 7th Circuit Court
Thayer v. Chiczewski
Civil Court
Qualified Immunity
Citation
Case Number: 
Nos. 10-1974 & 10-2064 Cons.
Decision Date: 
September 18, 2012
Federal District: 
N.D. Ill., E. Div.
Holding: 
Affirmed and dismissed in part
Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-police officer's motion for summary judgment in action alleging that defendants arrested on disorderly conduct charge plaintiffs-protesters on Chicago street in retaliation for asserting their First Amendment rights, and that plaintiffs were subjected to false arrest in violation of their 4th Amendment rights. Defendants were entitled to qualified immunity as to false arrest count where they had arguable probable cause to arrest both plaintiffs where: (1) one plaintiff was arrested after having previously been denied permit to conduct protest on site of arrest and had been arrested while attempting to organize impromptu protest rally that caused potential for disruption of pedestrian and vehicular traffic on Michigan Avenue; and (2) other plaintiff had failed to comply with police direction while attempting to cross police line that had been created to steer crowd to different part of City. Fact that portion of City ordinance that outlawed disorderly conduct had been subsequently found to be unconstitutional did not require different result. Also, both defendants were entitled to qualified immunity with respect to plaintiffs' First Amendment retaliation claim since law is unsettled as to whether existence of probable cause is complete bar to such claim.

House Bill 3636

Topic: 
Mechanics Lien Act
(Burke, D-Evergreen Park; Mulroe, D-Chicago) does three things in response to the LaSalle Bank National Association vs. Cypress Creek opinion. (1) Requires that the owner or interested person’s demand for suit to be commenced or answered within 30 days must contain this language in at least 10-point, boldface type: “Failure to respond to this notice within 30 days after receipt, as required by Section 34 of the Mechanics Lien Act, shall result in the forfeiture of the referenced lien.” (2) Defines a “lien creditor” as someone who does work or furnishes material under this Act. A lien creditor is preferred over other encumbrances except that previous encumbrances are preferred only to the extent of the value of the land at the time the contract was made for the improvements, and each lien creditor is preferred to the value of all later improvements regardless of whether the lien creditor provided those improvements. (3) If the sale proceeds are insufficient to satisfy claims of both prior encumbrances and lien creditors, the sale proceeds are to be distributed as follows. (a) Any previous encumbrance has a paramount lien in the portion of the proceeds attributable to the value of the land at the time of making of the contract for improvements. (b) Any lien creditors have a paramount lien in the portion of the proceeds attributable to all later improvements made to the property. (4) It has an immediate effective date. House Bill 3636 is in the House awaiting concurrence on Senate Amendment No. 2.
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Bell v. Chicago Police Chief Keating

Federal 7th Circuit Court
Bell v. Chicago Police Chief Keating
Civil Court
First Amendment
Citation
Case Number: 
No. 11-2408
Decision Date: 
September 10, 2012
Federal District: 
N.D. Ill., E. Div.
Holding: 
Reversed and remanded
Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing on lack of standing grounds, plaintiff's action alleging that Chicago's ordinance (Chicago Municipal Code, section 8-4-010(d)), which prohibits acts of disorderly conduct when individual knowingly fails to obey lawful police order under circumstances where three or more other persons are committing acts of disorderly conduct in immediate vicinity, and where said acts are likely to cause substantial harm or serious inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, violated plaintiff's First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Plaintiff had standing to bring instant constitutional challenge where he had previously been arrested under said ordinance, and where he alleged that potential for future enforcement of ordinance had chilling effect on his willingness to participate in lawful protests and assemblies. Moreover, Ct. found that ordinance was overbroad and void for vagueness with respect to giving police authority to disburse individuals on basis of "serious inconvenience, annoyance or alarm," since ordinance: (1) substantially encumbered political expression vis-a vis ordinance's legitimate scope; and (2) failed to identify what types of conduct would trigger lawful dispersal order and allowed for arbitrary enforcement.