Real Estate Law

Court properly granted summary judgment for Plaintiff in mortgage foreclosure action. Loan was subject to an adjustable interest rate. No question of fact exists as to interest rate and per diem. Affidavit was signed and sworn before a notary in Florida, and Rule 191 does not require administration of an oath. As affidavit complies with Illinois law, court properly relied on it when granting summary judgment.(DELORT and CUNNINGHAM, concurring.)

Court entered order approving sale of foreclosed property. Court properly denied Defendant's petition to vacate that order. Defendant retroactively waived her objection to jurisdiction. Defendant failed to file her petition within 60 days of first participating in a hearing without filing an appearance, or of first filing official appearance, and did not seek extension of 60-day deadline. Thus, Section 15-1505.6 of Mortgage Foreclosure Law barred her from filing her challenge to the court's personal jurisdiction over her. (HOWSE and COBBS, concurring.)

Court, in mortgage foreclosure proceeding, properly granted petition for turnover of surplus funds filed by holder of a junior mortgage. When a party seeks to establish a lien for purpose of distributing surplus proceeds, it is not required that amount of lien be proved up or adjudicated prior to distributing the proceeds. A valid junior lien may be satisfied under Illinois foreclosure law. (CUNNINGHAM and CONNORS, concurring.)

Court issued a tax deed for commercial property in Aurora to Petitioner, over objections of Respondent, who had leased one of the units at the property to Petitioner and his wife. Petitioner had no interest that would prevent issuance of tax deed to him. Lease did not obligate Petitioner to pay property taxes, and thus his status as a lessee did not prevent him from obtaining a tax deed. Petitioner submitted evidence of Respondent's anticipatory repudiation of contract to purchase, which were definite and unequivocal manifestations of its intent not to perform under the agreement.Judicial estoppel is not applicable, as Petitioner did not take factually inconsistent positions. (HUDSON and JORGENSEN, concurring.)

After bench trial, court properly entered judgment in favor of Plaintiff real estate brokerage firm on its quantum meruit claim that Defendant failed to compensate it for brokerage services it provided to Defendant in the purchase of commercial real estate. Defendant purchased off-market real estate based on information provided to him by Plaintiff's broker and for which Plaintiff was not compensated. Plaintiff's broker introduced property to Defendant and acted as his agent throughout negotiations until Defendant decided he would structure deal in a different manner through suggestions of seller, without Plaintiff's knowledge and permission.Plaintiff's recovery was limited to the reasonable amount by which trial court found Defendant was unjustly enriched at Plaintiff's expense.(McBRIDE and BURKE, concurring.)

Plaintiffs filed negligence suit against Village and developer of subdivision where their home, which they alleged sustained structural damage due to drainage problems. Court properly dismissed suit against developers, as Plaintiffs lacked standing to sue under annexation agreement either as successor owners or as 3rd-party beneficiaries. Court properly granted summary judgment to Village, as it was immune from suit under Tort Immunity Act, as to actions in determining policy when acting in exercise of discretion. Remedial measures by Village work crews were discretionary in nature, and workers decided their actions were sufficient to fill in sinkhole and in other steps in repair process. (PUCINSKI and HYMAN, concurring.)

In order to fall within the narrow exception to the general rule that a nonparty has no standing to file a Section 2-1401 petition, the nonparty must be injured by the judgment at the time of its entry. A nonparty to a tax deed proceeding that has such an interest in the property that it would be entitled to redeem the property would fit an exception to the general rule that a nonparty may not file a Section 2-1401 petition. As other Petitioner no longer had any interest in the property when he filed his Section 2-1401 petition, the principle os standing preclude him from bringing the petition. (GOLDENHERSH and OVERSTREET, concurring.)

Plaintiff filed breach of contract action arising out of Defendant's error in publishing a notice with wrong hearing date for Plaintiff's application for a tax deed. Plaintiff alleged that error caused court to deny its tax deed application in a separate proceeding. Jury verdict for Defendant, finding that Plaintiff failed to perform all its obligations under the contract. Court properly denied Plaintiff's motion for directed verdict. Court properly gave Defendant's non-IPI instruction as to previous course of dealing, which created mutual obligations on the parties. (HALL and LAMPKIN, concurring.)