Articles From Hon. Daniel T. Gillespie

Serving a dissolved company: Isfan v. Longwood Tower By Hon. Daniel T. Gillespie & Daniel Burley Civil Practice and Procedure, September 2016 How does a party serve a dissolved entity? It depends on whether the company is a limited liability entity or a corporation. The distinction is important, as improperly serving a dissolved entity can scuttle a case.
McVey v. M.L.K. Enterprises: Proper calculation of the hospital lien By Hon. Daniel T. Gillespie & Jonathan P. Kuhn Civil Practice and Procedure, August 2015 In McVey v. M.L.K. Enterprises the Illinois Supreme Court overruled Stanton v. Rea and found, unequivocally, that the plain text of the Healthcare Services Lien Act requires that neither attorney’s fees nor costs be deducted before calculating the statutory maximum lien on plaintiff’s award.
They can comment, but they cannot hide—The Illinois Supreme Court’s ruling on Rule 224 in Hadley v. Doe By Hon. Daniel T. Gillespie & Schuyler R. Ufkes Civil Practice and Procedure, August 2015 What Hadley v. Doe means for Illinois attorneys.
Navigating the choppy waters of foreign trade—Chraca v. U.S. Battery Manufacturing Company By Hon. Daniel T. Gillespie & Aaron McKerry Civil Practice and Procedure, March 2015 In this recent case, the appellate court held that, under section 2-621, subsection (b)(3) of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-621(b)(3)), a plaintiff is entitled to reinstate an action against a product distributor where he can show the product manufacturer is not subject to the personal jurisdiction of the court.
The distraction exception explained: Virginia Bruns v. the City of Centralia By Hon. Daniel T. Gillespie & Greg Conner Civil Practice and Procedure, October 2014 The Illinois Supreme Court clarified when the distraction exception applies to the open and obvious rule in slip and fall cases in Bruns v. City of Centralia.
All that snow: Barber v. G.J. Partners, Inc. By Hon. Daniel T. Gillespie & Rachel Fugett Civil Practice and Procedure, September 2013 Premise liability for a fall with injuries after snow was shoveled was at the heart of the case of Barber v. G.J. Partners, Inc.
Frezados v. Ingalls Memorial Hospital: A clear case of apparent agency By Hon. Daniel T. Gillespie & Emily Laskowski Civil Practice and Procedure, August 2013 One area of frequent litigation in medical malpractice cases, particularly at the summary judgment stage, is the question of whether or not a physician can be considered the apparent agent of the hospital at which he or she is authorized to practice.
Stanton v. Rea: The intersection of the common fund doctrine with attorneys’ liens and medical providers’ liens By Hon. Daniel T. Gillespie & Rachel Fugett Civil Practice and Procedure, July 2013 Black’s Law Dictionary lists 62 separate liens. Stanton v. Rea discusses two of them.
Hanks v. Cotler: An example of the “apogee of disingenuousness” By Hon. Daniel T. Gillespie & Daniel J. Bishop Bench and Bar, June 2012 Justice Terry Lavin’s opinion in Hanks v. Cotler constitutes an excellent play-by-play analysis of the intersection of the statutes of limitations and the statutes of repose with the common-law discovery rule. 
Hanks v. Cotler: An example of the “apogee of disingenuousness” By Hon. Daniel T. Gillespie & Daniel J. Bishop Civil Practice and Procedure, May 2012 Justice Terry Lavin’s opinion in Hanks v. Cotler constitutes an excellent play-by-play analysis of the intersection of the statutes of limitations and the statutes of repose with the common-law discovery rule. 
E-discovery: Not as easy as it may sound By Hon. Daniel T. Gillespie Civil Practice and Procedure, August 2011 What exactly is electronic discovery? Can this help attorneys and their clients? What if the attorney or party makes a mistake and sends out confidential information inadvertently? Can that be retrieved?
Brookbank v. Olson: Can a judge excuse a party from signing requests to admit? By Hon. Daniel T. Gillespie Bench and Bar, May 2011 The courts are divided on the question of whether a trial judge can allow a party’s attorney to sign and verify a response to a Supreme Court Rule 216 request to admit facts when the attorney cannot locate his client.
Brookbank v. Olson: Can a Judge excuse a party from signing requests to admit? By Hon. Daniel T. Gillespie Civil Practice and Procedure, March 2011 The Third District Appellate Court recently ruled that a party’s attorney may not sign and verify a response to a Supreme Court Rule 216 request to admit facts when the attorney cannot locate his client.
Stapleton v. Moore: Cross-examination of a medical expert with a learned treatise By Hon. Daniel T. Gillespie Civil Practice and Procedure, October 2010 In Stapleton, the trial judge allowed defense counsel to cross-examine plaintiff’s expert with a medical article that was not disclosed in discovery. The appellate court affirmed.
Forum non Conveniens clarified: Glass v. DOT Transportation, Inc. By Hon. Daniel T. Gillespie & Matthew Friedlander Civil Practice and Procedure, February 2010 For many judges and lawyers in Illinois, the doctrine of forum non conveniens appears to be a convoluted discretionary tool. Unlike a motion to transfer venue, which is a purely procedural matter, the doctrine offorum non conveniens allows the judge to transfer a case if he or she decides that hearing a case in the plaintiff’s choice of forum is unfair to the defendant or the public. The doctrine itself applies on an interstate and intrastate basis so long as venue is proper in both forums.
When is a credit card agreement an oral contract? Portfolio Acquisitions LLC v. Feltman By Hon. Daniel T. Gillespie & Kathilynne Grotelueschen Civil Practice and Procedure, November 2009  In Illinois, where the statute of limitations is ten years for a written contract and five years for an oral contract, one might well think that a credit card agreement would qualify as a written contract because credit cards are generally issued pursuant to a written card member agreement.
Book review By Hon. E. Kenneth Wright, Jr. & Hon. Daniel T. Gillespie Bench and Bar, June 2009 Lincoln scholar Douglas L. Wilson has penned a fascinating account of our sixteenth President’s extraordinary ability to communicate with the written word.
Relation-back doctrine: Stevanovic v. City of Chicago By Hon. Daniel T. Gillespie Civil Practice and Procedure, April 2009 The relation-back doctrine is one interesting legal principle that most attorneys do not come across very often.
Czarnik v. Wendover: An application of collateral estoppel to arbitration By Hon. Daniel T. Gillespie Civil Practice and Procedure, June 2008 The Restatement (Second) of the Law of Judgments refers to res judicata and collateral estoppel as former adjudication.
Can an unlicensed law firm recover in a suit for attorney fees? By Hon. Daniel T. Gillespie Civil Practice and Procedure, May 2007 One interesting aspect of contract law is that, if a contracting party is not properly licensed, the party may not be able to recover in a contract action for nonpayment of fees earned.
Can an unlicensed law firm recover in a suit for attorney fees? By Hon. Daniel T. Gillespie Civil Practice and Procedure, January 2007 One interesting aspect of contract law is that, if a contracting party is not properly licensed, the party may not be able to recover in a contract action for nonpayment of fees earned.
Ruminations on Rule 216 and considerations of substantial justice By Hon. Daniel T. Gillespie Civil Practice and Procedure, October 2006 This rule is to be liberally construed to do substantial justice between or among the parties. —Illinois Supreme Court Rule 213(k) on written interrogatories.
The Exclusionary Clause is the focus of the policyholder’s ire in USAA v. Dare: “It depends on what you mean by ‘maintenance’” By Hon. Daniel T. Gillespie Civil Practice and Procedure, February 2006 Can a party ever appeal a denial of a motion for summary judgment?
Some deadlines really are final By Daniel T. Gillespie Civil Practice and Procedure, May 2004 As Justice Smith wrote in this unanimous In re Estate of Lucy J. Kunsch opinion, "Rule 216 is not a suggestion, but rather a rule that must be strictly obeyed and enforced." Some deadlines must be met. Some final dates really are final.
First National Bank v. Guerine: Illinois Supreme Court sets the standard for intrastate forum non conveniens transfers By Hon. Daniel T. Gillespie Bench and Bar, June 2003 In First National Bank v. Guerine, the Illinois Supreme Court set forth the standards for deciding whether to transfer a case to another county in Illinois for forum non conveniens
First National Bank v. Guerine: Restating the standard for in-state forum non conveniens transfers By Hon. Daniel T. Gillespie Civil Practice and Procedure, February 2003 In First National Bank v. Guerine, the Illinois Supreme Court restated the standard that governs the resolution of motions to transfer a case to another county in Illinois for forum non conveniens
People v. Reggie Smith: The proper foundation for admission of a videotape By Daniel T. Gillespie Traffic Laws and Courts, December 2002 In People v. Reggie Smith, 321 Ill. App. 3d 669, 749 N. E. 2d 986, 255 Ill. Dec. 504 (1st Dist. 2001), the appellate court set forth the proper foundation requirements for the introduction of a videotape.
What is the proper standard for a motion for a directed finding? People v. Connolly By Daniel T. Gillespie Traffic Laws and Courts, February 2002 In People v. Connolly, 322 Ill. App. 3d 905, 751 N.E. 2d 1219 (2d Dist. 2001), the Illinois Appellate Court articulated the proper standard for ruling on what has, among trial practitioners, been commonly known as a motion for a directed finding at the close of the State's case.
People v. Jung: constitutionality of 11-501.4-1 upheld By Daniel T. Gillespie Traffic Laws and Courts, January 2001 Does the provision of the Illinois Motor Vehicle Code which allows the results of physician-ordered blood or urine tests conducted in the course of emergency treatment for injuries resulting from a motor vehicle accident to be reported to state or local law enforcement officials violate a patient's right to privacy in his medical records under the Illinois Constitution?
In the absence of probable cause, can police search a vehicle after a traffic stop? By Daniel T. Gillespie Traffic Laws and Courts, July 2000 Assume that a police officer on routine patrol has stopped a motorist for a traffic violation. Absent probable cause, can the officer search the vehicle? The United States Supreme Court decided that question in Knowles v. Iowa, 119 S. Ct 484 (1998).

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