Commercial Banking, Collections, and Bankruptcy

Dist. Ct. did not err in finding in instant ERISA action that two solvent business entities, which were under common control with third insolvent entity, were jointly and severally liable for withdrawal liability generated when insolvent entity ceased operations and stopped paying into union's pension fund. Under MPPAA, all trades or businesses under common control are treated as single employer for purposes of determining withdrawal liability under 29 USC section 1301(b)(1), and Dist. Ct. could properly conclude that solvent entities were qualifying trades or businesses where: (1) one solvent entity leased property to insolvent entity; and (2) second solvent entity earned rental income, paid business management fees and claimed business-related income deductions on tax forms. Moreover, all three entities were under common control for purposes of imposing withdrawal liabilty where each entity, which had originally been controlled by single individual, was included in bankruptcy estate of Chapter 11 proceeding that had been filed by insolvent entity prior to ceasing its operations. Fact that solvent entities were limited liability corporations did not require different result.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants' motion to dismiss on ground of res judicata plaintiffs' action alleging breach of lease, breach of guaranty and fraud arising out of defendants-corporations' cancellation of commercial lease where plaintiffs' similar state-court fraud action against officers of same corporations had been dismissed with prejudice due to failure to state cause of action. State-court dismissal was tantamount to adjudication on merits, and both state-court action and instant lawsuit arose out of same alleged statements made by individual defendants on behalf of instant corporate defendants and concerned same issue as to whether corporate defendants had right to cancel instant lease. Fact that plaintiffs could not have sued instant individual defendants for breach of lease did not require different result or excuse plaintiffs from splitting instant claims where plaintiffs were required to bring into single lawsuit all claims against instant individual defendants and corporations arising out of alleged breach of lease.

Record failed to contain sufficient evidence to support jury's $65,998,411 award in action alleging that defendant failed to abide by contract calling for defendant to divide equally between plaintiff and another aircraft carrier military flight business when defendant diverted certain flight assignments to different aircraft carrier. Record showed that purported contract lacked required details concerning standard price terms and/or formula for calculating price so as to render said contract enforceable. Ct. further found that plaintiff could not obtain alterative recovery under promissory estoppel theory, even though plaintiff alleged that it spent $28 million in additional aircraft in reliance on instant promise to award plaintiff future flight assignments, where record showed that plaintiff's reliance was unreasonable due to fact that several key components of contract had been unresolved at time of plaintiff's expenditure.

Ct. of Appeals dismissed as moot creditor's appeal of Bankruptcy Ct. order denying creditor's claim for percentage of debtor's profits in certain shopping center that comprised sole asset of debtor. Creditor failed to obtain stay of sale of shopping center pending creditor's appeal of Bankruptcy Ct. order, as required under 11 USC section 363(m), and creditor failed to also include in notice of appeal any issue regarding Bankruptcy Ct. order approving liquidation plan that distributed proceeds of shopping center sale. As such, creditor would be unable to obtain any substantive relief even if he could prevail on merits of his appeal, and creditor could not belatedly attack distribution of sale proceeds if no stay had been obtained.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing for failure to state viable cause of action, plaintiff's action alleging that defendant violated Fair Debt Collection Practices Act while attempting to collect on four fines imposed on plaintiff by City of Chicago arising from parcel of real estate that plaintiff no longer owned. Dist. Ct. could properly find that instant fines are not "debts" as that term is defined under FDCPA since instant fines were essentially penalties imposed for breaking law, as opposed to consensual transactions covered by FDCPA.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendant's motion for summary judgment in action alleging that defendant violated provisions of Truth-in-Lending Act by providing plaintiff with only one copy of notice of plaintiff's 3-day right to rescind loan instead of required two copies of said notice. While plaintiff signed sheet acknowledging receipt of both copies, said acknowledgement constituted only rebuttable presumption of delivery, which plaintiff overcame for purposes of summary judgment by alleging that: (1) his stack of materials from loan closing included only one copy of said notice; (2) said stack of materials was undisturbed following loan closing; and (3) his recollection of what occurred at loan closing differed from procedure described by defendant's representative. Fact that plaintiff's stack of loan closing materials contained documents that post-dated instant loan closing did not require different result.

In bankruptcy proceeding in which Trustee moved to rescind voidable payments made to creditor within 90 days of date bankruptcy petition had been filed, Dist. Ct. did not err in allowing creditor to file amended petition one day after original petition had been filed where original petition had been filed without signature of licensed attorney, and where amended petition contained said signature. Bankruptcy Rule 1009(a) permitted instant amendment where debtor had promptly obtained legal counsel and sought to file amended petition, and amended petition related back to date of filing of original petition. Ct. rejected creditor's argument that filing of original petition without signature of licensed counsel deprived Bankruptcy Court of jurisdiction such that Bankruptcy Court could not cure defect through instant amendment.

Bankruptcy Ct. did not err in approving $100,000 settlement of Trustee's promissory estoppel claim on behalf of debtor against third-party, arising out of third-party's alleged promise to transfer broadcasting license. While instant creditor asserted that settlement was unreasonable where Trustee's claim was worth $4.1 million, record showed that claim was more likely valued at $600,000, such that instant settlement was reasonable given percentage chance that Trustee would not have prevailed on claim, as well as litigation costs that would have reduced any favorable judgment.