Criminal Law

Defendant was convicted of first degree murder, attempted first degree murder, and home invasion, for attempting to kill his former girlfriend and for killing her current boyfriend, after breaking into their home while they were sleeping. Defense counsel's omission of DNA evidence from blood splatters at crime scene was a strategic trial decision, thus not ineffective assistance of counsel, and did not prejudice Defendant. Admission of other crimes evidence was proper as proximate in time and factually similar to charged conduct, and was not unduly prejudicial. Defendant received pretrial notice of sentencing enhancement, as indictment for first degree murder included alleged fact used as basis for enhancement. (PUCINSKI and MASON, concurring.)

Defended pled guilty to aggravated assault with a gun, but then appealed trial court's striking of his postplea "notification of motions". Trial court failed to properly admonish Defendant of his postplea rights, as court failed to address subsections (c)(4) and (c)(6) of Rule 605 addressing postplea rights; and admonishments were brief and at times unclear. Although Defendant failed to file a motion, his "notification" and comments to trial judge were sufficient to manifest an interest in appealing from judgment, which triggered court's affirmative duty to ascertain whether he wished for counsel to be appointed. (PALMER and McBRIDE, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of first degree murder, attempted first degree murder, and aggravated battery with a firearm in shooting that killed one person and injured another. Court within its discretion in admitting proof of other crimes as they were part of continuing narrative of crime charged. Defendant failed to show that State knowingly used perjured testimony or that State's closing rebuttal argument resulted in reversible error. Defendant's right to confrontation was not violated when State presented testimony from medical examiner who did not perform autopsy of victim, as autopsy report was prepared in normal course of business. Appellate court refuses to department from Illinois precedent addressing doctrine of transferred intent, which is applicable to attempted murder cases where unintended victim is injured. (DELORT and CONNORS, concurring.)

Court erred in dismissing charges of aggravated DUI on basis that charges placed Defendant in double jeopardy. State and trial court realized, during initial plea hearing, that offense was felony DUI rather than misdemeanor which which Defendant had been charged. Jeopardy had not attached at the point when State nol-prossed the misdemeanor charges. Judge had never finally or unconditionally accepted the plea, as would be required for true acceptance of plea, and judge's intention and ruling were clear that he would not accept guilty plea. (ZENOFF, specially concurring; HUDSON, dissenting.)

Court sentenced Defendant to 58 months imprisonment for failure to register as a sex offender. Sentence was not an abuse of discretion, as court considered his criminal history, including 14 convictions for driving while license suspended revealing a contemptuous attitude toward the law, and his failure to attend court-ordered sex offender risk assessment. (KNECHT, concurring; APPLETON, concurring in part and dissenting in part.)

Inmate filed pro se mandamus petition against warden and director of DOC, alleging they were not in compliance with statutory requirements for sanitary food preparation. Trial court must follow procedural framework in Code of Civil Procedure and mandamus statute, and cannot dismiss sua sponte a petition for mandamus relief, unless relief sought was cognizable in a postconviction petition, even if petitioner did not proceed under Post-Conviction Hearing Act. Relief sought in this mandamus petition was not an issue that could be addressed in a postconviction petition, and thus trial court erred in dismissing petition without allowing it to be served on Defendants. (SCHMIDT and O'BRIEN, concurring.)