Criminal Law

Defendant was found guilty of first-degree murder and was sentenced to 35 years in prison. On appeal, defendant argued that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, that the trial court erred in the admission of evidence, that there was prosecutorial misconduct, and that there was a jury polling error. The appellate court reversed and remanded for a new trial, finding that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to communicate sufficiently with defendant and by failing to investigate a witness identified by the defendant. (HYMAN and GAMRATH, concurring)

Defendant, who was 17 years old at the time of the offense, was found guilty of first-degree murder and was sentenced to a total of 52 years in prison, including a 25-year enhancement for personally discharging a firearm causing death. On direct appeal, the appellate court affirmed his conviction and sentence but the supreme court exercised its supervisory authority and directed the appellate court to vacate its judgment and consider whether defendant’s sentence constituted a de facto life sentence. The appellate court vacated defendant’s sentence and remanded for resentencing. The trial court re-sentenced defendant to a total of 47 years and defendant appealed, arguing that the sentence violated both the United States and Illinois constitutions because it constituted a de facto life sentence without any meaningful chance for release and that the trial court did not properly consider defendant’s youth and attendant characteristics during sentencing. The appellate court affirmed, finding that defendant is not serving a de facto life sentence without the possibility of parole and that the trial court properly weighed the relevant factors during sentencing. (MITCHELL and TAILOR, concurring)

Defendant was found guilty of aggravated battery with a firearm and was sentenced to 20 years in prison. Defendant filed a series of two motions pursuant to section 2-1401 of the code of civil procedure in which he argued that the sentencing court improperly relied on a void conviction during sentencing. In the appeal of the first motion, the appellate court affirmed its dismissal by finding that defendant’s petition lacked an explanation for his lack of due diligence in raising the claim earlier. Defendant attempted to cure that defect in the second petition and the trial court again dismissed it and defendant appealed. The appellate court affirmed, finding that the law of the case doctrine precluded defendant’s second claim and, even if it did not, defendant’s allegations did not merit an evidentiary hearing regarding due diligence. (MITCHELL and MIKVA, concurring)

Defendant was on pretrial release when he was charged with an unrelated offense, resulting in his release being revoked. The charge was subsequently dismissed, but the trial court found it had the inherent authority to order defendant remain in pretrial detention. Defendant appealed. After filing the notice of appeal, defendant was found not fit to stand trial and was placed in a facility to receive mental health treatment. The State argued that this made the appeal either moot or not yet ripe for review. The appellate court reached the merits and vacated and remanded, explaining that because the order denying pretrial release remained in effect it would subject defendant to unauthorized pretrial detention once he was restored to fitness. (NAVARRO and LYLE, concurring)

Defendant appealed from the trial court’s denial of his motion for leave to file a pro se successive post-conviction petition, arguing that he established the requisite cause and prejudice for leave to file his successive petition because appellate post-conviction counsel failed to appeal three arguable constitutional claims alleged in his initial post-conviction petition. The appellate court affirmed, explaining that post-conviction proceedings are limited to constitutional claims arising from the original trial and that appellate post-conviction counsel's representation is not a constitutional claim. (VAN TINE and D.B. WALKER, concurring)

Defendant was convicted of multiple drug charges related to the possession and intent to deliver substances containing heroin and fentanyl and was sentenced to 20 years in prison. On appeal, defendant argued that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the controlled substances at issue in the case. The appellate court affirmed, finding that defendant’s constitutional rights were not violated when he consented to the search, and that a reasonable person would have realized the search would encompass hiding places that could hold drugs, and that there was no support in the record for defendant’s argument that the officers exceeded the bounds of a reasonable search when they allegedly “broke” parts of defendant’s vehicle. (KENNEDY and JORGENSEN, concurring)