Criminal Law

Dist. Ct. erred in denying without evidentiary hearing defendant’s habeas petition as being untimely where: (1) record contained factual dispute as to whether defendant’s placement in disciplinary segregation, that precluded him from obtaining access to legal paperwork, prevented him from filing timely habeas petition; and (2) resolution of said factual dispute was pertinent to defendant’s claim that he was entitled to equitable tolling of applicable one-year limitations period or had valid excuse for any procedural default on issues contained in his habeas petition. Ct. further observed that Dist. Ct. should have recused herself, where she had presided in state court on defendant’s motion to suppress that was at issue in instant habeas petition.

In prosecution on charge of traveling in foreign commerce for purpose of engaging in sex act with minor, prosecutors did not violate Rule of Specialty by prosecuting defendant on instant charge, even though govt. sought defendant’s extradition on different charge, to which Thailand had granted extradition. Thailand’s foreign ministry had waived Rule of Specialty, which in turn allowed prosecution of instant charge. With respect to defendant’s claim that search of ICE agents of defendant’s home in Thailand violated his 4th Amendment rights, Ct. found that 4th Amendment’s warrant requirement and Warrant Clause did not apply to searches outside U.S. Moreover, instant search was reasonable where search was conducted pursuant to valid Thai warrant and took place in defendant’s presence while defendant was not under restraint.

In prosecution on charge of conspiracy to distribute cocaine base, Dist. Ct. abused its discretion in admitting evidence of defendant’s 2004 conviction on charge of possession of cocaine base, even though govt. contended that defendant’s prior conviction was probative of defendant’s knowledge, intent and absence of mistake. Issues regarding defendant knowledge, intent and absence of mistake were not relevant where defendant claimed that he had no knowledge of cocaine base found in his car, such that introduction of his prior conviction improperly suggested to jury that defendant had propensity to commit charged offense. Moreover, error required new trial, even though there was sufficient evidence to support defendant’s conviction, including fact that defendant’s latent fingerprint was on packet of cocaine base, since introduction of defendant’s prior conviction invited jury to decide defendant’s guilt for wrong reason.

Dist. Ct. did not err in imposing 216-month sentence on distribution of child pornography charge, where police uncovered over 190,000 images of child pornography, including images depicting sexual molestation of infants. Defendant was not subjected to unfair sentencing hearing even though prosecutor confirmed with Dist. Ct. that it would not consider inadmissible statements that defendant had made to govt. mental health expert, since there was no indication in record that Dist. Ct. had viewed such statements. Moreover, Dist. Ct. adequately discussed defendant’s diminished capacity argument, and defendant’s above guideline sentence was reasonable given number and nature of pictures found in defendant’s possession.

In prosecution on drug and firearm offenses, Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s motion to suppress arising out of seizure of drugs and firearms from defendant’s home, where defendant alleged that he did not give officer verbal permission to enter his home. Record showed that after officer made request to enter defendant’s home, defendant stepped back and to side and let door open, such that officer could properly view defendant’s actions as giving him implied consent to enter his home.

In prosecution on unlawful possession of firearm charge, Dist. Ct. erred in refusing defendant’s request to give limiting instruction to inform jury that defendant’s prior felony conviction could only be considered for purposes of establishing element of instant unlawful possession charge. Failure to give said limiting instruction improperly allowed jury to believe that convicted felon was more likely to carry firearm than someone without criminal past. Moreover, error was not harmless where there was no evidence directly linking defendant to gun, and where defendant’s contention that gun was planted by police had some support in record.