Criminal Law

Respondent, age 14 at time of offense, was prosecuted, convicted, and sentenced under Extended Jurisdiction Juvenile (EJJ) Prosecutions statute for first-degree murder, and sentenced to maximum juvenile sentence until age 21, then a stayed adult sentence of 20 years. Court considered all enumerated statutory factors, including finding that offense was committed in an aggressive and premeditated manner. EJJ prosecution statute does not violate U.S. Supreme Court's Apprendi or Blakely principles, and is not unconstitutionally vague either on its face or as applied to Respondent. (LAMPKIN and PALMER, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted of escape under Electronic Home Detention Law, for failure to appear at county sheriff's day reporting center. Court erred in instructing jury that a failure to appear at day reporting program constituted escape under Electronic Home Detention Law. Court should have instructed jury on a contested issue which was a question of fact for jury: whether day reporting program was condition of electronic monitoring program and whether Defendant violated that condition. As State presented insufficient evidence for conviction at trial, double jeopardy bars retrial. (HARRIS, concurring; QUINN, dissenting.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of first degree murder in shooting death. Court failed to ask whether potential jurors understood and accepted Zehr principles, instead asking whether they "had any problem" with principles. Forfeiture rule applies, as Defendant failed to object at trial, court did not overstep its authority in presence of jury; and case was not closely balanced. State had legitimate need to impeach witnesses' credibility, and their prior inconsistent statements were properly admissible for that purpose. Court did not err in allowing State to introduce both grand jury testimony and handwritten statement of witnesses. Court properly admitted evidence necessary to establish ongoing gang war and Defendant's motive for shooting resulting in victim's death. (CUNNINGHAM and HARRIS, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted of first degree murder, aggravated criminal sexual assault, and home invasion, and sentenced to natural life. Court properly considered appropriate sentencing factors; judge's comments indicating his personal belief about politics and death penalty, though ill-advised, do not justify remand for resentencing. Although Defendant's IQ score shows he is between mentally defective and low-average range of functioning, there is no indication he did not understand his Miranda rights; he had previous experience with criminal justice system, and his videotaped statement was voluntary. As Defendant's statement included details of a prior burglary he had committed on same victim, this other crimes evidence was relevant to corroborate statement and establish its accuracy. (QUINN and CUNNINGHAM, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of first degree murder, aggravated battery with a firearm as to other victim, and aggravated discharge of a firearm. Evidence was sufficient to support guilty verdict; jury found witness more credible than Defendant and two other witnesses. Defendant was erroneously impeached with his juvenile adjudication, but Defendant was impeached as to other matters, thus erroneous impeachment was cumulative of overall impeachment of defense witnesses. (McBRIDE, concurring; R. GORDON, dissenting.)

Defendant was convicted of aggravated battery; charge was brought 41 days after incident when he allegedly pushed police officer in intervening to try to prevent his mother from being arrested for objecting to officer's effort to arrest a person at outdoor barbeque party. Evidence was not overwhelming, and was a credibility dispute between officer and Defendant. Court's errors in precluding Defendant from fully challenging officer's credibility, and State's reference, in closing argument, to instruction having negative credibility implications and not requested by Defendant, cumulatively deprived Defendant of a fair trial. (McLAREN and SCHOSTOK, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of predatory criminal sexual assault of his girlfriend's niece. As court properly instructed jury on correct definition of "penetration", and as evidence was not closely balanced, State's improper description of definition were not plain error. Victim's age (8) and developmental disability were relevant to issues at trial. Age was a component of offense, and disability was relevant to ability to testify and communicate in court; thus, no error in referencing them in closing argument. (QUINN and CONNORS, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of first degree murder and aggravated battery with a firearm. No ineffective assistance of counsel, as trial counsel ably advocated on behalf of Defendant; he filed motions to suppress identification and vehemently argued motions, cross-examined State's witnesses and questioned reliability of witnesses. Court's finding that photo array procedure was proper was not against manifest weight of evidence. Lineup was not unduly suggestive by Defendant being the only person in lineup wearing sleeveless t-shirt, which witness identified offender as wearing. Fact that Defendant was the only person in both photo array and lineup does not render lineup suggestive. (QUINN and CUNNINGHAM, concurring.)