Criminal Law

Record contained sufficient evidence to support defendant’s conviction under 18 USC section 1014 that prohibits individuals from making false statements for purposes of influencing in any way action of FDIC or mortgage lending businesses. Instant prosecution arose out of statements defendant made to FDIC representatives regarding the status and amounts of defendant’s loans that he owed to bank under circumstances where FDIC had become receiver of said bank. Jury could properly find that defendant grossly understated amount he actually owed to bank, where defendant claimed to only have borrowed $110,000, while record showed that he actually owed over $200,000 in bank loans at time he made said claim. Ct of Appeals rejected defendant’s contention that he made no false statement because he never stated that he owed “only” $110,000. However, record showed that defendant made misleading statements to FDIC representatives, and under Freed, 921 F.3d 716, section 1014 criminalizes misleading representations. And in this case, defendant’s statements implied that he owed no more than $110,000, which was untrue and sufficient to establish his guilt under section 1014. Dist. Ct. also had authority to impose $50,128.58 restitution order that reflected lost interest income arising out of his loans, even though defendant and FDIC had entered into settlement that reflected no interest repayment.

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s habeas petition that had challenged his murder conviction, on ground that state court had violated his Fifth Amendment rights by admitting inculptory statements that defendant had made during third police interrogation, where defendant had invoked right to remain silent during first interrogation, and where defendant claimed that he had unambiguously invoked right to remain silent during third interrogation that occurred during next day. Record showed that: (1) defendant had been given Miranda warnings prior to third interrogation and made following statements, i.e., “ Ain’t nothing to talk about, doe,” “I ain’t got shit to say about no homicide,” “Can I go back to my cell now;” (2) later during same interrogation, defendant made incriminating statements about charged murder; and (3) state court denied defendant’s motion to suppress said statements. Ct. of Appeals rejected defendant’s claim that state court erred in denying his motion to suppress, where: (1) there was sufficient lapse in time between first interrogation when defendant initially invoked right to remain silent and third interrogation; (2) defendant was given Miranda warnings prior to third interrogation; and (3) defendant’s statements at start of third interrogation  did not unambiguously invoke right to remain silent, where they could reasonably have been interpreted as being exculpatory statements about charged murder.

In prosecution on charge of unlawful possession of firearm by felon, Dist. Ct. erred in precluding two key government witnesses from testifying that they saw firearm in question have red laser sight when defendant possessed and brandished said firearm. While Dist. Ct. held belief, in instant pretrial ruling, that any evidence regarding said laser sight would cause unfair prejudice to defendant, Ct. of Appeals found that Dist. Ct. both understated probative value of identifying laser sight evidence and overstated risk of unfair prejudice to defendant. Ct. of Appeals further noted that government’s proposal to allow witnesses to make references to observing “glowing red light” on firearm would have been sufficient to avoid any unfair prejudice.

In prosecution on charge of unlawful possession of firearm, Dist. Ct. did not err in failing to conduct hearing to determine whether defendant had entered into proffer agreement regarding use of statements made during unsuccessful plea negotiations, or by allowing witness to testify about course of police investigation that led to his arrest, where police discovered gun underneath him during struggle. While defendant asserted that he did not knowingly sign Proffer Letter that contained waiver of his rights not to use of said statements, and that evidentiary hearing was required to resolve his claim, Dist. Ct. did not abuse its discretion in failing to conduct evidentiary hearing, since defendant provided Dist. Ct. with only conclusory statements that he did not sign Proffer Letter knowingly or voluntarily, and he failed to contend that he was coerced into signing Proffer Letter. Also, any error was harmless, where government had never sought to use at trial inculpatory statements covered by Proffer Letter. With respect to Dist. Ct. allowing government to have witness testify as to reason why police were conducting investigation of defendant at time of his arrest, government was initially precluded from letting jury know that third-party had alerted them to domestic violence incident involving defendant’s threat of use of gun, and that they were attempting to question defendant about said complaint at time of his arrest. However, defendant’s counsel questioned during opening statements police's reasons for stopping defendant and police use of force when arresting defendant, and thus Dist. Ct. could properly allow government to present evidence as to their statement of mind, which included recent knowledge of the domestic violence complaint that involved threat of gun violence, to explain circumstances of his arrest, especially where jury was given appropriate limiting instruction as to jury’s consideration of said testimony.

Defendant was entitled to new sentencing hearing on his unlawful possession of firearm conviction, where defendant had received 15-year mandatory minimum sentence under Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), based, in part, on his 2002 Indiana arson conviction that Dist. Ct. found was “crime of violence” under ACCA. Ct. of Appeals found that 2002 Indiana arson statute was not crime of violence for purposes of ACCA, because it criminalized too broad of range of conduct for generic federal arson offense. This is so, it concluded, because, unlike federal generic arson offense, 2002 Indiana arson statute allowed for conviction, without proof of burning or fire-related damage.