Criminal Law

People v. McWhite

Illinois Appellate Court
Criminal Court
Hearsay
Sentencing
Citation
Case Number: 
No. 1-08-2753
Decision Date: 
Tuesday, March 30, 2010
District: 
1st Dist.
Division/County: 
Cook Co., 2nd Div.
Holding: 
Reversed and remanded.
Justice: 
THEIS
Defendant convicted of possession of heroin with intent to deliver. Court improperly admitted out-of-court statements of police officer from preliminary hearing and from arrest reports, as defense presented no evidence nor inference that officer had recently fabricated his testimony or had motive to lie; and mere introduction of contradictory evidence does not constitute an implied charge of fabrication or motive to lie. Court's remark, at end of bench trial, about "inference of recent fabrication" indicates that verdict may have been different had hearsay evidence not been admitted.

U.S. v. Leija-Sanchez

Federal 7th Circuit Court
Criminal Court
Jurisdiction
Citation
Case Number: 
No. 09-2672
Decision Date: 
April 8, 2010
Federal District: 
N.D. Ill., E. Div.
Holding: 
Reversed
Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing charge under 18 USC section 1959, alleging that defendant arranged and paid for murder of Mexican citizen that took place in Mexico, after finding that section 1959 did not apply to crimes occurring outside of U.S. Dismissal was improper where instant murder was designed to facilitate operation of criminal enterprise located in U.S.

House Bill 5966

Topic: 
Rights of Crime Victims and Witnesses Act
(Rose, R-Mahomet; Righter, R-Mattoon) removes the court’s discretion in determining the number of oral victim-impact statements that may be presented at a sentencing hearing. It also removes the court’s discretion to refuse family members the opportunity to orally address the court at a sentencing hearing. Scheduled for hearing in Senate Judiciary Committee on Wednesday. It has already passed the House.

People v. Abernathy

Illinois Appellate Court
Criminal Court
Right to Counsel
Citation
Case Number: 
No. 2-08-0430
Decision Date: 
Wednesday, March 31, 2010
District: 
2d Dist.
Division/County: 
Lake Co.
Holding: 
Reversed and remanded.
Justice: 
HUDSON
Defendant, age 19, was convicted of aggravated battery with firearm, and sentenced to 16 years incarceration. During posttrial proceedings, court denied request of Defendant, who stated he was indigent, to discharge his privately retained attorney and to appoint PD for him. Court denied Defendant right to counsel as it failed to conduct inquiry into his financial circumstances. Even though Defendant's family may have fully paid his private counsel before Defendant asked that he be removed, indigent person's right to counsel is fundamental, and no financial disadvantage to public in Defendant making first request for appointed counsel at this stage, as he would have been entitled to PD from start of case, if he were shown to be indigent.

U.S. v. Milbourn

Federal 7th Circuit Court
Criminal Court
Reasonable Doubt
Citation
Case Number: 
No. 08-2525
Decision Date: 
April 7, 2010
Federal District: 
S.D. Ind., Indianapolis Div.
Holding: 
Affirmed
Record contained sufficient evidence to support defendant's conviction on charges of conspiracy to intimidate or interfere with third-parties' use of their home on account of their race by burning cross on front lawn of said individuals' home. While defendant argued that evidence failed to establish that he was motivated by bi-racial makeup of occupants of home, record showed that defendant had uttered to others that he had "burned a cross on a nigger's yard." Moreover, jury could properly have viewed burning cross as evidence of racism and as threatening act of intimidation.

U.S. v. Jones

Federal 7th Circuit Court
Criminal Court
Evidence
Citation
Case Number: 
No. 09-1740 et al. Cons.
Decision Date: 
April 7, 2010
Federal District: 
S.D. Ind., Evansville Div.
Holding: 
Affirmed and vacated in part and remanded
Defendant was entitled to new trial on drug conspiracy charge where police officer was allowed to identify defendant's voice on recorded conversation where said identification was based in part on officer's claim that he had overheard conversation between defendant and his counsel prior to court hearing. Admission of officer's testimony precluded defendant's counsel from conveying to jury in any meaningful way fact that defendant had disputed officer's claim that conversation with defendant's counsel had occurred, and officer's other basis for making said identification was limited to brief statements defendant had made in-court. Moreover, Dist. Ct. should have explored conflict of interest arising out of advocate witness rule before denying defendant's motion for mistrial.

People v. Jones

Illinois Appellate Court
Criminal Court
Postconviction Petitions
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Citation
Case Number: 
No. 1-07-1190
Decision Date: 
Friday, March 5, 2010
District: 
1st Dist.
Division/County: 
Cook Co., 5th Div.
Holding: 
Affirmed.
Justice: 
TOOMIN
(Court opinion corrected 3/29/10.) Court's summary dismissal of Defendant's pro se postconviction petition, alleging claims of actual innocence of first-degree murder charge and ineffective assistance of counsel, comported with Hodges standard as lacking arguable basis in law or in fact. State did not withhold exculpatory statements of two persons, as statements were given 45 days after trial concluded, and prosecutor first learned of content of these statements, via phone call and re-interview, after trial had concluded. Defense counsel made strategic decisions on what witnesses to call, not to be second-guessed in competency determination. Attachments to petition were not sworn or notarized, contradicted by record, and lacking in specific detail, thus would not have affected the verdict.

People v. Washington

Illinois Appellate Court
Criminal Court
Jury Instructions
Citation
Case Number: 
No. 1-08-1966
Decision Date: 
Wednesday, March 24, 2010
District: 
1st Dist.
Division/County: 
Cook Co., 3rd Div.
Holding: 
Reversed and remanded.
Justice: 
MURPHY
Defendant convicted of first degree murder and aggravated battery with firearm, for shooting two men during altercation after crowd gathered at scene of minor car accident. Evidence showed Defendant acted in self-defense or unreasonably believed that he was justified in using force in self-defense; thus, trial court erred in refused to give instruction for second degree murder, as it should have allowed jury to determine whether Defendant had subjective belief in need for force, and whether that belief was reasonable.

U.S. v. Billian

Federal 7th Circuit Court
Criminal Court
Search and Seizure
Citation
Case Number: 
No. 09-3385
Decision Date: 
April 5, 2010
Federal District: 
N.D. Ind., Ft. Wayne Div.
Holding: 
Affirmed and remanded
In prosecution on drug and firearm offenses, Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant's motion to suppress evidence seized from his home pursuant to search warrant issued by state court judge. While affidavit supporting issuance of warrant contained some factual inaccuracies and stale statements from tipster, Dist. Ct. could properly find that any errors in affidavit were result of negligence, rather than intentional deceit, and that affidavit was still sufficient to support issuance of warrant even if inaccurate statements were removed. Moreover, Dist. Ct. could properly reject defendant's claim that police violated his 4th Amendment rights by searching his trash can (containing corroborative evidence of drug activity) when it credited police testimony that can had been placed on curb (so as to permit lawful search), as opposed to near defendant's garage.

U.S. v. Krumwiede

Federal 7th Circuit Court
Criminal Court
Sentencing
Citation
Case Number: 
No. 08-4081
Decision Date: 
March 31, 2010
Federal District: 
W.D. Wisc.
Holding: 
Affirmed
Dist. Ct. did not err in sentencing defendant to 140-month term of incarceration on charges of theft of firearms and unlawful possession of firearm where said sentence was based, in part, on four-level enhancement provided in section 2K2.1(b)(6) of USSG. Said enhancement was proper under Application Note 14(b) where, as here, defendant's theft of firearms occurred during course of burglary.