(Sims, D-Chicago; Ann Williams, D-Chicago) creates the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act to join 48 other states if enacted. It replaces the Electronic Commerce Security Act of 1999. Passed both chambers. Effective immediately on the Governor's signature.
(Holmes, D-Aurora; Kifowit, D-Aurora) amends the Illinois Notary Public Act providing requirements authorizing electronic and remote notarization and electronic notaries public. Passed both chambers. Effective on the later of: (1) January 1, 2022; or (2) the date on which the Secretary of State files with its Index Department a notice of its adoption of rules necessary to implement this Act.
(Harmon, D-Oak Park; Tarver, D-Chicago creates the Judicial Districts Act of 2021 to create new appellate and supreme court districts outside of Cook County. The judicial circuits are left intact but may be moved to a new judicial district. The appellate courthouses remain where they currently sit to continue to act as the appellate courthouse for that district.
(Harmon, D-Oak Park; Tarver, D-Chicago creates the Judicial Districts Act of 2021 to create new appellate and supreme court districts outside of Cook County. The judicial circuits are left intact but may be moved to a new judicial district. The appellate courthouses remain where they currently sit to continue to act as the appellate courthouse for that district.
(Manley, D-Romeoville) creates the Mandatory Dementia-Specific Training Act. Provides that emergency medical technicians, probate judges, paid conservators, and protective services employees must receive dementia-specific training, including, but not limited to, training in Alzheimer's disease and dementia symptoms and care. Provides that the personnel must receive a refresher training course at least once every three years. Provides that the Department of Public Health shall implement and conduct the training program, set standards and determine the hours and frequency of necessary training, and adopt any rules necessary to implement the Act. Just introduced.
(Bennett, R-Pontiac) amends the Guardians For Adults With Disabilities Article of the Probate Act of 1975. Provides that a guardian must consider the ward's current preferences to the extent the ward has the ability to participate in decision making when those preferences are known or reasonably ascertainable by the guardian. Provides that decisions by the guardian must conform to the ward's current preferences unless the guardian reasonably believes that doing so would result in substantial harm to the ward's welfare or personal or financial interests. Provides that if the guardian is unable to ascertain the ward's preferences, then the decisions may be made by conforming as closely as possible to what the ward would have done or intended under the circumstances. Scheduled for hearing next Tuesday in House Judiciary Committee.
(Bennett, R-Pontiac) amends the Guardians For Adults with Disabilities Article of the Probate Act of 1975. It provides that a petition for the appointment of a temporary guardian for an alleged person with a disability shall be filed at the time of or subsequent to the filing of a petition for adjudication of disability and appointment of a guardian. Provides that the petition for the appointment of a temporary guardian must state specified facts. Provides that notice of the time and place of the hearing on a petition for the appointment of a temporary guardian or petition to revoke the appointment of a temporary guardian must be given not less than three days before the hearing. Senate Bill 527 is an identical bill in the Senate. House Bill 263 is scheduled for hearing next Tuesday in House Judiciary Committee.
(Crowe, D-Maryville) provides that an electronic will shall be executed by the testator or by some person in the testator's presence and at the testator's direction, and attested to in the testator's presence by two or more credible witnesses. Provides for the revocation of an electronic will. Provides that an electronic will is a digital asset and any person or business in possession of an electronic will is a custodian.
Provides that a person may witness any document, other than a will, using audio-video communication between the individual's signing the document and the witness. Provides for remote attestation for a will and methods for determining a signer's or testator's identity.
Provides for the verification of an electronic will when a petition to have an electronic will admitted to probate is filed. Provides for: admission of a paper copy of an electronic will; admission of a will attested to by a witness who is physically present; admission of a will attested to by a remote witness; and admission of a will signed under the Electronic Commerce Security Act.
Provides that nothing prohibits any party from introducing evidence of fraud, forgery, compulsion, or other improper conduct which in the opinion of the court is deemed sufficient to invalidate the will when being admitted. Provides for: formal proof of a will with a remote witness; formal proof of an electronic will; and formal proof of a will witnessed under the Electronic Commerce Security Act.
Senate Bill 72 has just been introduced.
(Barickman, R-Bloomington ) amends the Real Property Transfer on Death Instrument Act to make numerous changes since its enactment in 2012 to reflect practitioners' experience with the original Act. It has just been introduced. The changes are as follows:
(1) The definition of owner is revised to reflect that only individuals acting in their own personal capacity can execute a TODI.
(2) The term “residential real estate” is replaced throughout the text with the term “real property.” Illinois is the only state to date that limits the availability of a TODI to residential real estate.
(3) Clarifies that a TODI can transfer the real property to the beneficiary in any form of ownership recognized and valid under state law.
(4) Clarifies that a TODI can designate the trustee of a trust that may be amended, modified, revoked or terminated after the date the TODI is executed, and a trustee under a will of another individual who has predeceased the owner.
(5) Clarifies that a TODI may not be admitted to probate as the will of the owner or as a codicil to the owner’s will.
(6) Clarifies that a TODI witnessed by only one witness, even if notarized, is not a valid TODI. It also clarifies that the attestation clause language and formalities to be followed in executing the TODI require only “substantial compliance.”
(7) Clarifies that the owner may transfer the real property at any time without regard to the fact a TODI is filed. A transfer of the real property effectively revokes the TODI, not by means of a revocation, but by the doctrine of extinction by ademption.
(8) Regarding the default rules that govern when two or more beneficiaries are designated, Illinois law presumes when property is deeded or transferred to two or more parties, the parties take equal shares as tenants in common and not as joint tenants unless otherwise indicated. Stating the default rule, though perhaps not legally necessary, will avoid a possible ambiguity and clarify the default rule governing lapses and concurrent ownership.
(9) Clarifies that unless waived by the surviving spouse, a TODI is subject to renunciation by the surviving spouse and provides the procedure by which the rights are to be exercised.
(10) Clarifies the currently vague language on the rights of creditors with more specific language borrowed from the Uniform Law Commission but consistent with long-standing Illinois law.
Plaintiffs sued a private "provider agency" and 2 of its social workers, working under contract with Illinois Department on Aging, for their alleged negligent investigation of an allegation of elder abuse. Defendants' alleged misconduct were actions of the State, in providing care, and thus protected by sovereign immunity. As Plaintiffs do not seek to enjoin Defendants' future conduct, the "officer suit exception" to sovereign immunity, for State officers who exceed their authority, does not apply. Sovereign immunity is a matter of subject-matter jurisdiction, but the specific immunity provision in section 4(b) of the Adult Protective Services Act is not, and is instead an immunity defense which a defendant may assert before the Court of Claims. (HOWSE and McBRIDE, concurring.)