Employee Benefits

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing for failure to state cause of action plaintiff’s ERISA action alleging that defendant’s 2012 change in pension formula that resulted in plaintiff receiving less pension benefits as of date of said charge violated anti-cutback provisions of ERISA, as well as ADEA. While plaintiff argued that 2012 amendment to pension plan, which treated salaries as increasing at only 1.5 percent per year, instead of 5 percent as asserted by plaintiff, constituted decrease in his accrued benefit, plaintiff’s expectation of future salary increases was not accrued benefit, since plaintiff’s hopes as to what may happen in future had not accrued in past. Also, plaintiff could not establish viable ADEA action, since: (1) terms of instant plan, as whole, and its 2012 amendment, is age-neutral, where pension eligibility is distinct from age; and (2) instant pension plan complied with section 623(i) of ADEA, where plaintiff’s benefits depended on number of years of credited service and plaintiff’s salary, not his age. Fact that salary generally rises with age and extra year of credited service goes with extra year of age did not require different result, since said criteria differed from age discrimination.

In ERISA action by plaintiff-union pension fund seeking withdrawal liability from defendant-purchaser of assets from third-party which had previously withdrawn from plaintiff’s pension fund, Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment based on Dist. Ct.’s perception that although defendant was aware that third-party had contingent withdrawal liability at time of asset purchase, plaintiff had not sufficiently shown continuity of business operations between third-party and defendant to support imposition of successor liability. Totality of relevant circumstances indicated that defendant’s use of third-party’s intangible assets, including its name, goodwill, trademarks, supplier and customer data, trade secrets, telephone number and websites, and its retention of third-party’s principals to promote defendant to third-party's existing and potential customers sufficiently established requisite continuity of business operations to support imposition of successor liability on defendant. Fact that defendant did not offer industrial refrigeration construction services prior to said asset purchase that had been offered by third-party, that 13 of third-party’s employees who joined defendant after asset purchase represented only small fraction of defendant’s employees, and that less than 2 percent of defendant’s projects and revenues came from third-party’s customers after asset purchase did not require different result.

In instant interpleader action seeking determination of ownership of union pension fund’s death benefits, Dist. Ct. did not err in finding that wife of deceased union member could not receive said benefits under circumstances where wife was found not guilty by reason of insanity in murder of union member. Illinois slayer statute precludes person who “intentionally and unjustifiably causes death of another” from recovering property by reason of said person’s death, and court in Doughtery, 934 N.E.2d 16, found that said statute applied to individuals who were found to be criminally insane, but nevertheless were cognizant that he or she was killing person. Moreover, wife of union member fit Doughtery holding, since trial judge in wife’s criminal case made explicit finding that wife intended to murder union member without justification despite concluding that wife was not guilty of murder by reason of insanity. Ct. also rejected wife’s claim that slayer statute was preempted by ERISA.

Dist. Ct. did not err in confirming arbitrator’s award in favor of defendant-employer in ERISA action filed by plaintiff-pension fund seeking to collect more than $600,000 in withdrawal liability arising out of defendant ceasing to contribute to multiemployer pension plan once it stopped hiring members of Laborer’s Union for work performed under collective bargaining agreement. While plaintiff argued that arbitrator misinterpreted section 1383(b)(2)(B)(i) of ERISA when finding that defendant was exempt from withdrawal liability, plaintiff actually waived said issue by failing to raise issue regarding meaning of section 1383(b)(2)(B)(i) with arbitrator and by parties acknowledging in arbitration proceeding that liability would turn on arbitrator’s reading of collective-bargaining agreement. Also, aside from waiver, arbitrator could properly find that pension fund contributions were only required for employees who worked as laborers, and that instant pension fund historically did not require pension payments where, as here, defendant had made pension payments to another pension fund on behalf of other employees arguably doing covered work.