Insurance Law

Hastings Mutual Insurance Company v. Blinderman Construction Company, Inc.

Illinois Appellate Court
Civil Court
Duty to Defend
Citation
Case Number: 
2017 IL App (1st) 162234
Decision Date: 
Tuesday, October 24, 2017
District: 
1st Dist.
Division/County: 
Cook Co., 2d Div.
Holding: 
Reversed and remanded.
Justice: 
NEVILLE

Estate of injured employee of subcontractor sued the general contractor for negligence, but included no allegations about the acts of subcontractor. The absence of allegations about subcontractor in underlying complaint does not suffice to meet subcontractor's insurer's burden to prove that injury occurred through no fault of subcontractor. Thus, court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of subcontractor's insurer, as that insurer presented no evidence as to subcontractor's conduct. (HYMAN and MASON, concurring.)

BancorpSouth, Inc. v. Federal Ins. Co.

Federal 7th Circuit Court
Civil Court
Insurance
Citation
Case Number: 
No. 17-1425
Decision Date: 
October 12, 2017
Federal District: 
S.D. Ind., Indianapolis Div.
Holding: 
Affirmed

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant-insurance company’s motion to dismiss plaintiff-insured’s action alleging that defendant breached terms of insurance policy by failing to defend or indemnify plaintiff for $24 million settlement of underlying lawsuit alleging that plaintiff had assessed and collected excessive overdraft fees from its bank customers. Dist. Ct. could properly find that provision in policy that excluded coverage for claims “based upon, arising from or in consequence of fees or charges” applied, such that defendant was not required to defend or indemnify plaintiff in underlying lawsuit. Ct. rejected plaintiff’s argument that dismissal was improper because underlying lawsuit asserted injuries that were primarily caused by plaintiff’s policies and practices, since: (1) only harm alleged in underlying lawsuit was plaintiff’s maximization of excessive overdraft fees; and (2) there was no policy or practice alleged that existed independent of plaintiff’s overdraft fee scheme. Ct. further noted that instant exclusion served necessary purpose of avoiding “moral hazard,” where plaintiff would otherwise be free to create another alleged improper fee scheme knowing that defendant would reimburse it if and when said scheme was discovered.

Allstate Fire and Casualty Insurance Company v. Bochenek

Illinois Appellate Court
Civil Court
Insurance
Citation
Case Number: 
2017 IL App (1st) 170277
Decision Date: 
Friday, September 29, 2017
District: 
1st Dist.
Division/County: 
Cook Co., 2d Div.
Holding: 
Affirmed.
Justice: 
HYMAN

(Court opinion corrected 10/10/17.) Insured and his wife and daughter were crossing the street when his wife was struck and seriously injured by a hit and run driver. Wife filed a claim with insurer, which paid her $100,000 limited on her uninsured motorist coverage. Insured filed a claim for post-traumatic stress disorder and its physical manifestations suffered post-accident. Insurer properly denied insured's claim as barred by the requirement of the policy. that there be physical contact to recover under uninsured motorist provision.(NEVILLE and MASON, concurring).

Green4All Energy Solutions, Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.

Illinois Appellate Court
Civil Court
Insurance
Citation
Case Number: 
2017 IL App (1st) 162499
Decision Date: 
Monday, June 19, 2017
District: 
1st Dist.
Division/County: 
Cook Co.
Holding: 
Affirmed.
Justice: 
MIKVA

(Court opinion corrected 9/28/17.) Flow sued Plaintiff alleging patent infringement and false marketing. Plaintiff had an insurance policy with Defendant which provided that Defendant would defend it in any suit arising out of a publication that “disparages a person’s or organization’s goods, products or services.” Plaintiff argued that since the Flow lawsuit included a claim for false marketing, Defendant had a duty to defend it. When Defendant refused, Plaintiff sued alleging that Defendant breached their contract and violated section 155 of the Insurance Code. Court properly granted summary judgment for Defendant. Flow’s false marketing claim was based on Plaintiff’s allegedly falsely assertion that it had a patent pending on a product when it did not, and “patent pending” is a neutral designation that does not qualify as a disparaging statement. Thus, Defendant did not owe Plaintiff a duty to defend in the underlying action, did not breach its insurance contract, and did not violate section 155 of the Insurance Code. (CONNORS and HARRIS, concurring.)

Thounsavath v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Inc. Co.

Illinois Supreme Court PLAs
Civil Court
Insurance
Citation
PLA issue Date: 
September 27, 2017
Docket Number: 
No. 122558
District: 
1st Dist.

This case presents question as to whether trial court properly denied defendant-insurance company’s motion for summary judgment in plaintiff insured’s action alleging that driver exclusion endorsement in policies issued to plaintiff by defendant violated both public policy and Underinsured Motorist Statute, where plaintiff sought underinsured coverage when she sustained injuries as passenger in vehicle driven by individual listed in exclusion endorsement. Appellate Court, in affirming trial court, found that although named driver exclusions are permitted in Illinois, named driver exclusion in plaintiff’s policy that barred underinsured coverage for plaintiff violated Illinois mandatory insurance requirements and Illinois public policy.

American Family Mutual Ins. Co. v. Krop

Illinois Supreme Court PLAs
Civil Court
Insurance
Citation
PLA issue Date: 
September 27, 2017
Docket Number: 
No. 122556
District: 
1st Dist.

This case presents question as to whether trial court properly dismissed as time-barred defendants-insureds’ counterclaim against plaintiffs-insurance company and its agent, alleging that plaintiffs failed to procure level of insurance that they had previously requested, and that such failure subjected them to liability in underlying lawsuit. While plaintiffs argued that relevant 2-year limitations period began on date that policy was issued to defendants (because defendants are chargeable for knowing contents of policy), Appellate Court, in reversing trial court, found that limitations period did not begin until date that plaintiff-insurance company denied coverage, since it was not until date of denial that defendants knew or reasonably should have known of their injury.

Founders Insurance Company v. Sheikh

Illinois Appellate Court
Civil Court
Insurance
Citation
Case Number: 
2017 IL App (1st) 170176
Decision Date: 
Monday, September 25, 2017
District: 
1st Dist.
Division/County: 
Cook Co., 1st Div.
Holding: 
Reversed and remanded.
Justice: 
HARRIS

Auto insurance policyholder asked his son, age 15 and who held a valid Illinois driver’s permit, to move the family’s van to another parking space on the street, while policyholder observed him parking from across the street. Son accidentally hit gas pedal rather than brake, and hit car in front of him, which then moved forward injured a person standing in front of that car. Whether son had a reasonable belief he was entitled to drive the van involves a question of fact, as the term “reasonable belief” in policy is ambiguous. A factfinder could determine that son, as a valid permit-holder, reasonably believed he was allowed to practice parallel parking while his father supervised him from outside the vehicle.  (SIMON and MIKVA, concurring.)

 

The Debate Over Insurance Coverage for Alleged ‘Blast Fax’ Violations

By Richard J. Vanswol
October
2017
Article
, Page 40
A look at theories under which courts have required insurers to cover alleged Telephone Consumer Protection Act violations and the evolving legacy of those cases in coverage law and beyond.

Roppo v. Travelers Commercial Ins. Co.

Federal 7th Circuit Court
Civil Court
Insurance
Citation
Case Number: 
No. 15-3171
Decision Date: 
August 28, 2017
Federal District: 
N.D. Ill., E. Div.
Holding: 
Affirmed

In action alleging fraudulent and negligent misrepresentation, as well as negligence arising out of defendant-counsel for insurance company’s failure to disclose during discovery existence of $1 million umbrella policy that covered plaintiff’s car accident with insured, Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing all three claims, since neither plaintiff nor her counsel had relied on any misrepresentation regarding existence of umbrella policy where plaintiff pleaded in complaint that her counsel “repeatedly expressed uncertainty” about lack of umbrella policy at time defendant had only stated that insured had automobile insurance policy that applied to accident. Also, said defendant did not owe plaintiff duty of care to reveal existence of umbrella policy, since: (1) said attorney only owed such duty to his client; and (2) client did not hire said attorney for benefit of plaintiff, who otherwise was in adversarial relationship with client. Too, plaintiff had no valid claim under 215 ILCS 5/143.24(b) that required disclosure of policy limits under certain circumstances, where: (1) plaintiff had failed to disclose description of her injuries or medical records as required by said statute when requesting such policy limits; and (2) defendants’ disclosure of insured’s automobile liability insurance policy satisfied requirements of said statute. Finally, allegations in instant complaint were sufficient to provide Dist. Ct. with jurisdiction to hear said case under class action provisions under CAFA, since (1) plaintiff alleged that defendant insurance company had failed to disclose existence of umbrella policies to at least 500 others; (2) subject umbrella policies concerned at least $1 million each, so as to satisfy $5 million amount in controversy requirement for CAFA treatment; and (3) local controversy exception to class action treatment under CAFA did not apply since, although instant claim was filed in state where certain defendants were located, defendant insurance company was primary defendant that was located in different state.

Public Act 100-212

Topic: 
Illinois Administrative Procedure Act

(Barickman, R-Bloomington; Andersson, R-Geneva) ensures that the appeals by citizens in administrative review actions are not thrown out of court for a scrivener's error that is called a "misnomer."

(1) It requires that final administrative orders list all of the parties of record together with their last known address of record. The final order must also include whether there are any agency rules requiring a motion for reconsideration as a part of obtaining a reviewable final administrative decision and, if so, the citation to the rule.

(2) It prohibits an action for administrative review to be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction based on the misnomer of any agency that is properly served with summons issued in the action within the applicable time limits. It also prohibits dismissal for failure to perfectly name an agent if a timely action of administrative review has been filed that identifies the final administrative decision under review and makes a good faith effort to properly name the administrative agency.

(3) It allows a court to correct misnomers for an erroneous identification of the administrative agency that was made in good faith.

Effective August 18, 2017.