Insurance Law

Indianapolis Airport Authority v. Travelers Property Casualty Co. of America

Federal 7th Circuit Court
Civil Court
Insurance
Citation
Case Number: 
No. 16-2675
Decision Date: 
February 17, 2017
Federal District: 
S.D. Ind., Indianapolis Div.
Holding: 
Affirmed and reversed in part and remanded

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant-insurance company’s motion for summary judgment in action seeking declaration that policy issued by defendant-insurance company covered losses incurred by plaintiff-insured arising out of accident occurring on plaintiff’s construction site. Defendant was entitled to summary judgment to extent plaintiff sought recovery under “Builder’s Risk” provisions of policy, where said provisions limited coverage to losses arising out of plaintiff’s physical structure, and where plaintiff’s economic and consequential losses concerned expenses associated with delay and loss of use of plaintiff’s airport facility. Also, plaintiff was not entitled to receive benefits under policy’s “soft cost” provisions arising out of delay in completion of construction policy, where: (1) coverage was subject to 90-day “delay” deductible; (2) plaintiff’s airport facility actually opened for business within 90 days of scheduled opening date of said facility; and (3) plaintiff failed to identify any “soft costs” in terms of bond interest payments occurring after facility’s opening date. Dist. Ct. erred, though, in granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment with respect to ERAL provisions of policy that covered losses arising out of plaintiff’s attempts to reduce delay in construction project arising out of accident, where: (1) Dist. Ct. improperly found that plaintiff could not receive such expenses in absence of any compensable soft cost claim; and (2) jury question remained as to whether plaintiff incurred additional costs for re-sequencing and accelerating construction project to minimize delay in construction project.

Senate Bill 889

Topic: 
Jury Act

(Hutchinson, D-Chicago Heights) provides that no person who is qualified and able to serve as a juror may be excluded from jury service in any court of this State on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, ancestry, age, sex, marital status, order of protection status, disability, military status, sexual orientation, pregnancy, or unfavorable discharge from military service. It does not affect any current statutory exemptions. It has just been introduced. 

American Access Casualty Company v. Alcauter

Illinois Appellate Court
Civil Court
Sanctions
Citation
Case Number: 
2016 IL App (1st) 160775
Decision Date: 
Thursday, February 9, 2017
District: 
1st Dist.
Division/County: 
Cook Co., 4th Div.
Holding: 
Affirmed.
Justice: 
ELLIS

Court imposed Rule 137 sanctions against insurer and its coverage counsel. Insurer filed declaratory judgment action, claiming it was not required to provide coverage because its insured willfully failed to cooperate with arbitration hearing. At trial evidence revealed that insured was in jail for unrelated offense at time of arbitration hearing, and thus could not have willfully failed to cooperate with arbitration. Well before scheduled trial, insurer's counsel was informed of possibility that insured had been incarcerated, yet counsel did not serious investigation and failed to bring insured's arrest to trial court's attention. Counsel's conduct was vexatious and unreasonable, which Rule 137 is designed to punish. (HOWSE and BURKE, concurring.)

Smith v. American Heartland Insurance Company

Illinois Appellate Court
Civil Court
Insurance
Citation
Case Number: 
2017 IL App (1st) 161144
Decision Date: 
Monday, February 6, 2017
District: 
1st Dist.
Division/County: 
Cook Co., 1st Div.
Holding: 
Affirmed.
Justice: 
HARRIS

Insurer denied claim of passenger injured in hit-and-run collision, alleging her failure to comply with 120-day notification requirement found in hit-and-run coverage. Court properly denied insurer's motion for summary judgment. Reasonableness factors are suitable guidelines to determine whether a notice provision violates public policy. When applied to facts of this case, 120-day notice provision is a dilution of uninsured motorist statute, and thus violates public policy of Illinois as to uninsured motorist benefits. On day of accident, insurer's policy had not yet been delivered to insured and insured had only an insurance card, which had names of 2 insurers without indicating which was liability/uninsured carrier. (CONNORS and MIKVA, concurring.)

Senate Bill 584

Topic: 
Administrative Procedure Act

(Barickman, R-Bloomington) provides a means for correcting inadvertent failures to name necessary parties in actions for administrative review.

(1) It amends the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) to mandate that final administrative orders list all of the parties of record together with their last known address of record. The final order must also include whether there are any agency rules requiring a motion for reconsideration as a part of obtaining a reviewable final administrative decision and, if so, the rules citation. 

(2) It also amends the APA to allow service by electronic mail if agreed to by the parties in contested cases.  

(3) It amends the Administrative Review Law (ARL) in the Code of Civil Procedure to state that this Article is to be liberally construed in the interests of justice to grant an orderly method of judicial review of administrative agency decisions.

(4) It amends the ARL to prohibit an action for administrative review to be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction based on the misnomer of any agency that is properly served with summons issued in the action within the applicable time limits. It also prohibits dismissal for failure to perfectly name an agent if a timely action of administrative review has been filed that identifies the final administrative decision under review and makes a good faith effort to properly name the administrative agency.

(5) It amends the ARL to allow a court to correct misnomers for an erroneous identification of the administrative agency.

Senate Bill 584 was just introduced.

 

Senate Bill 9

Topic: 
Business Opportunity Tax Act

(Hutchinson, D-Chicago Heights) creates the Business Opportunity Tax that imposes a tax on all entities that issue a Form W-2 or a Form 1099 to a resident of Illinois. It imposes a sliding scale of taxation based on the employer’s total Illinois payroll as follows. (1) if the taxpayer’s total Illinois payroll for the taxable year is less than $100,000, then the annual tax is $225; (2) if the taxpayer’s total Illinois payroll for the taxable year is $100,000 or more but less than $250,000, then the annual tax is $750; (3) if the taxpayer’s total Illinois payroll for the taxable year is $250,000 or more but less than $500,000, then the annual tax is $3,750; (4) if the taxpayer’s total Illinois payroll for the taxable year is $500,000 or more but less than $1,500,000, then the annual tax is $7,500; and (5) if the taxpayer’s total Illinois payroll for the taxable year is $1,500,000 or more, then the annual tax is $15,000.

The following are exempt from taxation under this Act: (1) governmental employers described in Section 707 of the Illinois Income Tax Act; and (2) not-for-profit corporations that are exempt from taxation under Sections 501(c) or 501(d) of the Internal Revenue Code or organized under the General Not For Profit Corporation Act of 1986. Senate Amendment No. 2 becomes the bill and was just filed. It is part of the “grand bargain” being attempted by Senate leaders.

 

Pekin Insurance Company v. St. Paul Lutheran Church

Illinois Appellate Court
Civil Court
Insurance
Citation
Case Number: 
2016 IL App (4th) 150966
Decision Date: 
Friday, October 14, 2016
District: 
4th Dist.
Division/County: 
Ford Co.
Holding: 
Appeal dismissed in part and affirmed in part.
Justice: 
APPLETON

(Modified upon denial of rehearing 1/4/17.) Declaratory judgment action filed by insurer of church which was sued in tort action for wrongful death, alleging that church employee, while using his personally-owned car for church business, negligently collided with another car, resulting in death of driver. Declaratory judgment complaint (Count I) fails to show that controversy is ripe, and thus court properly dismissed it. Court properly dismissed Count II as moot, as it presents no actual controversy. Court properly denied permission to file proposed 2nd amended complaint, as it was identical to prior complaint except for adding allegation that church employee was driving to his other job at time of accident. Dismissal with prejudice was proper, as Plaintiff cannot show a present ability to allege facts showing ripeness. Court properly denied church's motion for sanctions. (HOLDER WHITE and STEIGMANN, concurring.)

M.G. Skinner and Associates Insurance Agency, Inc. v. Norman-Spencer Agency, Inc.

Federal 7th Circuit Court
Civil Court
Insurance
Citation
Case Number: 
No. 15-2290
Decision Date: 
January 4, 2017
Federal District: 
N.D. Ill., E. Div.
Holding: 
Affirmed

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment in action by plaintiffs alleging that defendant breached duty of reasonable care under Ill. Insurance Procurement Liability Act to procure insurance on behalf of plaintiffs, where defendant failed to point out obvious signs that ultimate provider of said insurance was dishonest and that insurance eventually procured for plaintiffs turned out to be complete fraud. Record showed that neither plaintiffs nor any insurance broker in procurement chain ever requested defendant’s assistance with placement of said insurance, and that while defendant wanted to obtain commissions with respect to said insurance, defendant did not receive any commissions from fraudulent insurer. Ct. also rejected plaintiffs’ claim that defendant owed them duty under common law negligence principles, where Ct. found that defendant had made no affirmative undertaking to procure said insurance. Fact that defendant had performed on behalf of owner of company that provided fraudulent insurance certain administrative tasks on policies that were issued to other insureds did not require different result.

Frye v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co.

Federal 7th Circuit Court
Civil Court
Insurance
Citation
Case Number: 
No. 16-1677
Decision Date: 
January 3, 2017
Federal District: 
N.D. Ind., South Bend Div.
Holding: 
Reversed and remanded

Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendant-insurance company’s motion for summary judgment in plaintiff’s action seeking additional payments from defendant pursuant to under-insured (UIM) provisions of defendant's $1 million commercial automobile policy, as well as defendant’s $5 million commercial umbrella policy that had been issued to plaintiff’s employer, where plaintiff sought said proceeds for injuries sustained in automobile accident incurred during plaintiff’s employment. While defendant paid plaintiff $900,000 under commercial automobile policy and $382,314.21 under umbrella policy (i.e. $1 million in UIM coverage less $617,685.79 that plaintiff had received in net workers’ compensation benefits), plaintiff was entitled to seek more insurance proceeds from umbrella policy, since Indiana statute required defendant to provide in its umbrella policy UIM coverage in amount equal to policy’s general liability limit of $5 million and not some lesser amount, where, as here, defendant had provided UIM coverage in umbrella policy. Fact that defendant was not required by statute to provide any UIM benefits in its umbrella policy did not require different result. Moreover, defendant was not entitled to subtract plaintiff’s receipt of workers’ compensation benefits from proceeds of umbrella policy since terms of said policy only required offset of workers’ compensation benefits received by plaintiff that were in excess of $1 million “retained limit.”

Selective Ins. Co. of South Carolina v. Target Corp.

Federal 7th Circuit Court
Civil Court
Insurance
Citation
Case Number: 
No. 16-1669
Decision Date: 
December 29, 2016
Federal District: 
N.D. Ill., E. Div.
Holding: 
Affirmed

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment in action by plaintiff-insurance company seeking declaration that it had no duty to defend or indemnify defendant in underlying action alleging that defendant’s customer incurred personal injuries from fitting room door supplied by insured, where defendant asserted that it was additional insured under terms of policy issued by plaintiff due to supplier agreement between defendant and insured. Supplier agreement required insured to name defendant as additional insured in commercial general liability policy, and that plaintiff’s policy promised to pay for bodily damages arising out of said fitting doors. Moreover, while language in customer’s personal injury action focused on defendant’s alleged negligence, allegations in said complaint fell within policy’s coverage where: (1) customer asserted bodily injuries arising out of insured’s door; and (2) defendant’s third-party action alleging that defendant was negligence with respect to door’s design and materials used in door fell within policy’s coverage. Also, plaintiff was responsible for entire settlement amount that defendant had negotiated with customer, where, although there was no evidence indicating allocation of settlement between covered and uncovered claims, defendant made settlement of otherwise covered loss in reasonable anticipation of liability in customer’s lawsuit.