Insurance Law

Atlantic Casualty Ins. Co. v. Pazko Masonry, Inc.

Federal 7th Circuit Court
Civil Court
Insurance
Citation
Case Number: 
Nos. 12-2405 & 12-2485 Cons.
Decision Date: 
June 7, 2013
Federal District: 
N.D. Ill., E. Div.
Holding: 
Reversed and remanded
Dist. Ct. erred in granting plaintiff-insurance company’s motion for summary judgment in action seeking declaration that it owed no duty to defend under general commercial liability policy four construction companies, which were sued for personal injuries incurred by individual who was demonstrating certain caulking skills at construction site shortly before individual’s employer signed contract with general contractor to provide said caulking services at work site. While Dist. Ct. found that “contractor” exclusion to coverage applied because injured individual was employee of subcontractor at time of accident, Ct. of Appeals found exclusion did not apply since language in exclusion was ambiguous where phrase “providing materials or services of any kind” could be interpreted as triggering exclusion only when injury occurred at time compensated services were being done.

Indiana Insurance Company v. Royce Realty and Management, Inc.

Illinois Appellate Court
Civil Court
Insurance
Citation
Case Number: 
2013 IL App (2d) 121184
Decision Date: 
Thursday, May 30, 2013
District: 
2d Dist.
Division/County: 
Lake Co.
Holding: 
Affirmed.
Justice: 
SCHOSTOK
Declaratory action filed by insurer of realty and management company as to insurance coverage for severe injuries sustained by Plaintiff when a tree fell on her as she was walking on a golf course manged by realty and management company. Court construed policy Endorsement as encompassing accidents arising out of realty/management company's use of premises to conduct its property management activities, even though accident arose away from those premises. Insurer knew that company was in business of providing property management services to various properties, including golf courses, and the type of accident here was a risk likely to be inherent in that business. As language of Endorsement was ambiguous, court correctly resolved ambiguity in favor of coverage. (HUDSON and BIRKETT, concurring.)

Senate Bill 2306

Topic: 
Privacy and the workplace
(Radogno, R-Lemont; Mautino, D-Spring Valley) clarifies that an employer may request the password or gain access to the social-networking website of an employee or prospective employee if necessary to screen employees or applicants before hiring or to monitor or retain employee communications as required under Illinois insurance laws, federal law, or by a self-regulatory organization as defined in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Passed both chambers.

Brown v. Stonebridge Life Insurance Company

Illinois Appellate Court
Civil Court
Insurance
Citation
Case Number: 
2013 IL App (3d) 120295
Decision Date: 
Thursday, May 30, 2013
District: 
3rd Dist.
Division/County: 
LaSalle Co.
Holding: 
Affirmed.
Justice: 
WRIGHT
Plaintiffs filed declaratory relief action, seeking declaration that two insurers were to pay benefits to them under accidental death insurance policies issued to their mother, but insurers sought summary judgment based on medical treatment exclusion. Mother had been treated for chronic back pain and died of fentanyl intoxication from prescription for fentanyl patch. Medical treatment exclusion unambiguously excluded accidental death from use of prescribed narcotics from ongoing medical treatment for chronic back pain resulting from medical disease or sickness. (McDADE and O'BRIEN, concurring.)

Progressive Premier Insurance Company of Illinois v. Emiljanowicz

Illinois Appellate Court
Civil Court
Insurance
Citation
Case Number: 
2013 IL App (1st) 113664
Decision Date: 
Tuesday, May 28, 2013
District: 
1st Dist.
Division/County: 
Cook Co., 2d Div.
Holding: 
Affirmed.
Justice: 
HARRIS
Court properly granted summary judgment for insurer of freightliner driver, sued for car accident , finding that freight company's policy provided coverage for underlying claims for loss of consortium claim of plaintiff's husband. Company had exclusive possession, control, responsibility and use of freightliner at time of accident, even though at time of accident driver was en route to pick up a friend so he could drop off his freightliner inspected by a mechanic, as company instructed him. (QUINN and CONNORS, concurring.)

House Bill 2327

Topic: 
Filing fee increase
(Riley, D-Hazel Crest; Hutchinson, D-Chicago Heights) authorizes county boards to increase the court automation fee and the court document fee from $15 to $25. These fees are currently being paid by civil litigants and convicted defendants.The ceiling for defendants will be $15 for the court automation fee. Passed the House and awaiting a Senate Revenue Committee vote in the Senate.

Senate Bill 1912

Topic: 
Tort cases and settlement
(Raoul, D-Chicago) amends the Code of Civil Procedure create an enforcement mechanism for cases that settle but the defendant won’t comply with the settlement. It is limited to cases seeking money damages involving personal injury, wrongful death, or tort action. It requires a settling defendant pay all sums due to the plaintiff within 21 days of tender of all applicable documents required under this new Section. The procedure is as follows: (1) Requires a “settling defendant” to tender a release to the plaintiff within 14 days of written confirmation of the settlement. If the law requires court approval of a settlement, the plaintiff must tender to the defendant a copy of the court order approving the settlement. (2) If there is a known third-party right of recovery or subrogation interest, the plaintiff may protect the third-party’s right of recovery or subrogation interest by tendering to the defendant: (a) A signed release of the attorney’s lien. (b) Any of the following: (i) a signed release of a healthcare-provider lien; (ii) a letter from the plaintiff’s attorney agreeing to hold the full amount of the claimed lien in his or her client-fund account pending final resolution of the lien amount; or (iii) an offer that the defendant hold the full amount of the claimed right of recovery pending final resolution of the amount of the right of recovery. (c) Any of the following: (i) documentation of the agreement between the plaintiff and Medicare, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, the Illinois Department of Healthcare and Family Services, or the private health insurance company as to the amount of the settlement that will be accepted in satisfaction of right of recovery; (ii) a letter from the plaintiff’s attorney agreeing to hold the full amount of the claimed right to recovery in his or her client-fund account pending final resolution of the amount of the right to recovery; or (iii) an offer that the defendant hold the full amount of the claimed right to recovery pending final resolution of the amount of the right of recovery. (3) If the applicable court finds after a hearing that timely payment has not been made under this Section, judgment must be entered against that defendant for the amount in the executed release, costs incurred in obtaining the judgment, and 9% interest from the date of the plaintiff’s tender. (4) Senate Bill 1912 exempts units of local government, the State of Illinois, and state employees. Parties may agree to some other procedure if they wish. It passed the Senate yesterday and is in the House.

Phillips v. The Prudential Ins. Co. of America

Federal 7th Circuit Court
Civil Court
Insurance
Citation
Case Number: 
No. 11-3870
Decision Date: 
May 6, 2013
Federal District: 
S.D. Ill.
Holding: 
Affirmed
Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing for failure to state cause of action plaintiff’s class action alleging that defendant-insurance company’s default payment method and enrollment of plaintiff in defendant’s Alliance Account when paying her claim breached insurance policy and unreasonably delayed payment of insurance benefits in violation of section 155 of Ill. Insurance Code. Terms of policy gave option to plaintiff to chose among several payment options, and plaintiff’s failure to select any payment method triggered defendant’s preferred method of setting up Alliance Account, which gave plaintiff option to withdraw any amount of policy proceeds at any time. Moreover, terms of policy did not guarantee that it would pay beneficiary lump sum of policy's proceeds to exclusion of any other option. Plaintiff’s claim for vexatious delay was properly dismissed where plaintiff failed to allege that defendant had taken excessive amount of time to set up her Alliance Account.

Grinnell Mutual Reinsurance Company v. Hubbs

Illinois Appellate Court
Civil Court
Insurance
Citation
Case Number: 
2013 IL App (3d) 110861
Decision Date: 
Wednesday, April 24, 2013
District: 
3d Dist.
Division/County: 
Henry Co.
Holding: 
Affirmed.
Justice: 
HOLDRIDGE
Policy exclusion is clear and unambiguous, excluding coverage for damages from divergence or obstruction or streams or surface water or property damage from interference with natural drainage to or from others' land. Court did not err in assigning some weight to testimony of two witnesses in ruling on insurer's summary judgment motion. Insurer may either seek a declaratory judgment or defend suit against its insured under reservation of rights. (WRIGHT and LYTTON, concurring.)

Delatorre v. Safeway Insurance Company

Illinois Appellate Court
Civil Court
Duty to Defend
Citation
Case Number: 
2013 IL App (1st) 120852
Decision Date: 
Wednesday, April 17, 2013
District: 
1st Dist.
Division/County: 
Cook Co., 3d Div.
Holding: 
Affirmed and remanded.
Justice: 
HYMAN
Passenger in vehicle of insured was injured in accident, In 1991. Passenger sued driver, whose insurer agreed to defend him under reservation of rights. Insurer breached its duty to defend, as it had nominal, passive, and one-way communication with attorney ostensibly retained to defend insured, and default judgment in excess of policy limits was entered. Entry of default judgment in PI case directly flows from insurer's breach of contract.Insured, who did not learn of default until years later, should not be subjected to judgment as insurer caused judgment to be entered. (NEVILLE, concurring; STERBA, concurring in part and dissenting in part.)