Local Government Law

Plaintiff filed a class action complaint against defendant challenging the constitutionality of defendant’s impoundment ordinance, which requires violators to pay an administrative processing fee when their vehicle is used in the commission of certain offenses. The trial court granted defendant’s motion to dismiss and to strike plaintiff’s third amended complaint and plaintiff appealed. On appeal, plaintiff argued that the trial court erred in dismissing the complaint because the defendant’s administrative fee was not rationally related to a legislative purpose, that the ordinance violated his substantive due process rights, and that the voluntary payment doctrine did not bar him from seeking a refund of the fees he paid. The appellate court found plaintiff’s arguments unpersuasive and affirmed, explaining in part that plaintiff failed to establish that the ordinance implicated a fundamental right because the challenge involved only the deprivation of property interests. (MOORE and SHOLAR, concurring)

Defendant appealed from two orders of the circuit court entering summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff. The trial court ordered that the board of the defendant, an Illinois airport authority, be increased from seven to eight commissioners with the additional commissioner to be appointed by the plaintiff, an Illinois municipal corporation. Defendant argued on appeal that the ruling violated the language of the Airport Authorities Act, which it argued required the municipality to be located “wholly within” the authority to be entitled to appoint a commissioner. The appellate court agreed and reversed and remanded. (STEIGMANN and LANNERD, concurring)

Plaintiff, as executor of an estate, appealed from a trial court order granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment on the plaintiff’s claims that the City’s enactment of an ordinance designating a property as a Chicago landmark violated plaintiff's substantive due process and equal protection rights. The appellate court affirmed, finding that the city was entitled to judgment as a matter of law where the testimony clearly demonstrated that a reasonable relationship existed between the city’s action and the city’s interest in the preservation and protection of areas with historical and architectural significance. (LAVIN and COBBS, concurring)

The Illinois Supreme Court considered the trial court’s jurisdiction to determine a sales tax misallocation claim between two municipalities. The court held that the Illinois Department of Revenue had exclusive jurisdiction over the tax matter. It reversed an appellate court opinion to the contrary and affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. (THEIS, NEVILLE, OVERSTREET, HOLDER WHITE, CUNNINGHAM, and ROCHFORD, concurring)

Plaintiffs, a group of organizations and companies involved in video gaming activities, filed a lawsuit challenging an ordinance enacted by the City of Waukegan imposing a one penny per push tax on players of video gaming terminals. The trial court dismissed two counts of the complaint and granted summary judgment for the defendant on two remaining counts. Plaintiffs appealed arguing, among other things, that the push tax was an unauthorized occupation tax and that the city exceeded its home rule powers. The appellate court affirmed, finding that the trial court did not err in dismissing two of plaintiffs' counts for failure to state a claim and for granting summary judgment on the remaining claims. (McLAREN and MULLEN, concurring)

Objectors to a group of candidates for the spring consolidated election appealed from a circuit court reversal of a decision by the Municipal Officers Electoral Board for the Village of Tinley Park. The electoral board decision had invalidated the candidates’ nomination petitions and removed their names from the ballot. On appeal, the objectors argued that the candidates’ names should be removed from the ballot due to the inclusion of six American flags in the banner at the top of the nomination petitions. The appellate court reversed the electoral board’s decision invalidating the candidates’ nomination petitions and removing them from the ballot and affirmed the circuit court. The appellate court explained that there is nothing in the language of the Election Code that suggests that images are not allowed to appear in the heading of a petition. (MIKVA and MITCHELL, concurring)