Local Government Law

Plaintiff filed complaint for writ of mandamus, and sought to become write-in candidate for Commissioner of Water Reclamation District in Democratic primary election on 3/20/18. To satisfy requirements of Section 17-16.1 of Election Code to allow Board to count his write-in votes, Plaintiff was required to file a notarized declaration of intent to be a write-in candidate with the Chicago Board of Election Commissioners because Board is an election authority for the office Plaintiff seeks. Because Plaintiff failed to file such statement with the Board, Board is not authorized to count any votes for Plaintiff. (COBBS and FITZGERALD SMITH, concurring).

Plaintiffs filed complaint for mandamus, seeking to compel Defendant (Secretary of Transportation) to file eminent domain action as to certain real property allegedly owned by Plaintiffs and taken by Defendant for a road-widening project. After bench trial on mandamus complaint, court properly ruled in favor of Defendant, as Plaintiffs failed to show that they had a clear right to mandamus relief. Evidence at trial showed that Plaintiffs' ownership of disputed area and area of additional taking was not clear. As case was difficult, with unusual facts, court's denial of Defendant's motion for sanctions was not unreasonable. Court properly awarded Defendant only its filing fee and summons costs, as costs statutes must be narrowly construed. (LYTTON and O'BRIEN, concurring.)

Court denied request of Illinois Gaming Board to dismiss counts against them, and granted summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff on declaratory judgment action. Court erred in finding that it had jurisdiction to rule on validity of the Disassociation Order under the facial-challenge exception. Court erred in concluding that there were no relevant facts in dispute and no occasion for the Gaming Board to apply its expertise.Resolution of criminal charges against one Plaintiff is a relevant undetermined fact. Issues of whether disassociation is necessary to uphold goals of Video Gaming Act and, if so, proper scope of that disassociation are mixed questions of fact and law that must be addressed first by the Gaming Board, which are properly addressed first through administrative proceedings. Court erred in making determinations of fact, or mixed fact and law. Once court resolved legal challenges properly presented in requests for declaratory judgment, it had no jurisdiction to proceed further. (HUTCHINSON and BIRKETT, concurring.)

City Department of Administrative Hearings denied Plaintiff's motion to vacate a 2013 default judgment. City Department lacked jurisdiction to consider motion to vacate. Section 2-14-108(a) of Chicago Municipal Code required Plaintiff to seek review of default judgment entered against it within 21 days, which constitutes a limited on the City Department's jurisdiction.(CONNORS and DELORT, concurring.)

Dispute between 2 villages about annexation of unincorporated territory. Court properly denied Petitioners' motion for substitution of judge as of right, because a hearing and a substantive ruling had occurred, giving Petitions opportunity to "test the waters". Court properly granted summary judgment for Objectors, as Objectors engaged in sustained and consistent action to advance the 2015 voluntary petitions. Petitioners do not dispute facts that Objectors rely on for summary judgment. Objectors did not abandon their petition, and Objectors' earlier-filed voluntary annexation petitions had priority over Petitioner's involuntary annexation petition.(COBBS and HOWE, concurring.)

In November 2016, voters in City voted in favor of referendum providing for term limit for office of mayor, as a result of which Plaintiff became ineligible to run for mayor. Mayoral election was held without Plaintiff’s name on the ballot, office was filled, and results were certified. Plaintiff appeals court’s entry of summary judgment for Defendants on his complaint seeking declaratory judgment that referendum was unconstitutional, and TRO and injunction enjoining city from implementing results of referendum.  City had legitimate interest in providing term limit for office of mayor, to encourage persons who were not long-serving politicians in city council to run for that office.  Referendum did not run afoul of free and equal clause, and was not unconstitutionally ambiguous, as its meaning is sufficiently clear. Referendum only provided term limits for candidates in future elections, and thus had no retroactive impact and did not violate prohibition on ex post facto laws. (REYES and LAMPKIN, concurring.)

Plaintiff filed suit for declaratory and injunctive relief against 2 sections of an ordinance passed by City which pertain to operation of mobile food vehicles within Chicago. Plaintiff failed to show that provision prohibiting food trucks from locating within 200 feet of principal customer entrance of a street-level restaurant is arbitrary and unreasonable as having no relation to City’s authority to promote its general welfare. Provision requiring that food trucks must be equipped with GPS that sends real-time data to any service with a publicly accessible application programming interface is not a warrantless search in violation of Illinois Constitution or 4^th amendment to U.S. Constitution, because City did not physically trespass on Plaintiff’s property. (PIERCE and MIKVA, concurring.)

City issued citation to Plaintiff company for violation of city ordinance violation prohibiting the depositing of refuse in a trash container so that it cannot be closed. Plaintiff filed appeal challenging practice of City Department of Administrative Hearings. Claim that City engaged in unauthorized practice of law is not valid, as Plaintiff failed to allege that an actual person acting on behalf of City engaged in unauthorized practice of law.Claim of denial of due process, alleging that ALJ acts as both prosecutor and judge, is not valid. ALJ's conduct, stating that minimum fine would be assessed only upon pleading liable to citation, was constitutionally permissible plea bargaining, not a denial of due process. (HOFFMAN and CONNORS, concurring.)

Village successfully prosecuted Defendant for an ordinance violation, on basis that farm, a 2 ½ acre parcel with single-family residence located thereon, and which Defendant co-owned with her husband, had allegedly become a nuisance because of its nascent cattle operation. Trial court found that Defendant’s farm satisfies requirements of Farm Nuisance Act.  Enforcement of village ordinance was preempted by plain language of the Act. (HUDSON and SPENCE, concurring.)