Local Government Law

Police officer for city which was non-home-rule municipality was injured while exiting his police car, and was awarded line-of-duty pension benefits due to injury. Court erred by deciding officer's eligibility based on his complaint for declaratory relief instead of allowing City to determine eligibility under its procedural scheme. Section 10-4-1 of Municipal Code granted City authority to enact the Ordinance which established procedural process to fulfill substantive requirements of Safety Benefits Act. (HARRIS and KNECHT, concurring.)

Candidate for village present in the April 2017 election appeals from circuit court order confirming village elction board decision sustaining objections to his nomination papers. Sections 10-3 and 10-4 of Election Code do not explicitly require that nominating papers of an independent candidate state the candidate's independent status. Board erroneously determined that Plaintiff was required to indicate his independent status on his nominating petitions. (HOWSE and ROCHFORD, concurring.)

(Court opinion corrected 4/6/17.) Court properly denied Defendant's motion to enforce protective order previously entered between parties, as documents in question do not fall within FOIA exemptions. Section 7(1)(a) of FOIA does not exempt documents from inspection and copying via section k of Chicago Municipal Code. For disclosure exemption under Section 7(1)(g) of FOIA to apply, document must meet threshold requirements as to need for confidentiality. Defendant failed to assert why disclosure of alleged confidential information would cause it competitive harm. (GORDON, concurring; LAMPKIN, specially concurring.)

Village Board of Trustees passed ordinance allowing trustees to hire outside counsel to assist with drafting legislation and other legislative services. Nothing prohibits Trustees from getting legal advise elsewhere. Plaintiff failed to provide legal basis to find ordinance unconstitutional or otherwise unlawful.(CONNORS and HARRIS, concurring.)

Village filed complaint against church to require it to repair a building, built in 1849, which church owned, had become uninhabitable and unsafe; church had asked Village for permission to demolish it to allow for additional parking. Court erred in dismissing church's counterclaim that Village's refusal to authorize demolition of building imposed substantial burden on church in violation of federal Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act. Exhaustion of remedies does not apply as court proceedings were instituted by local authorities. Court erred in dismissing church's counterclaim on grounds of Section 2-615, as is sufficiently stated several claims and was not barred on failure-to-exhaust grounds. (BURKE and BIRKETT, concurring.)

Plaintiff, as alderman and member of city council, has substantial interest in quo warranto action seeking removal of another elected alderman, based on his ineligibility to hold office of alderman. Thus, Plaintiff has standing to bring quo warranto action seeking removal of alderman from his office. (HOFFMAN and CUNNINGHAM, concurring.)

(Court opinion corrected 2/9/17.) City filed complaint for equitable and other relief against church, alleging that its church steeple was in imminent danger of collapse and needed to be removed because it was leaning toward city street. Court granted City's petition for appointment of limited receiver, and appointed receiver with directions to take certain actions to remove steeple. After evidentiary hearing, court entered order granting in part and denying in part receiver's motion for approval of accounting. Remanded for court to specify bases for court's reduction to receiver's fees, and for court to apply the burden-shifting framework to determine reasonableness of fees sought in receiver's motion for final accounting. (ELLIS and McBRIDE, concurring.)