Real Estate Law

Plaintiffs filed class action complaint against property management agent retained by condominium association (HOA), alleging that when they sold their condominium unit in 2016, Defendant charged excessive and unreasonable fees to provide them with documents and other information Plaintiffs were required to provide to prospective buyers. Section 22.1 of the Condominium Property Act provides an implied cause of action in favor of a condominium unit seller against a property manager, as agent of HOA or HOA Board, based on allegations that property manager charged excessive fees for production of information required to be disclosed to a prospective buyer under the statute.  (LAVIN and COBBS, concurring.)

Court granted Defendant's motion to dismiss Plaintiff's 4th foreclosure complaint for violating the single refiling rule of section 13-217 of Code of Civil Procedure. Because Plaintiff's accelerations occurred by the filing of foreclosure actions, Plaintiff's voluntary dismissals of those actions constituted affirmative acts of revocation of those accelerations. Thus, upon revocation the parties returned to their pre-acceleration rights and obligations. Defendants were obligated to make monthly installments, and thus their new payment default gave rise to a separate action. This alleged new default was not part of the core of operative facts of the prior alleged default. As this action and the prior actions were predicated on different operative facts, the single refiling rule did not bar Plaintiff's 2017 foreclosure complaint. (ZENOFF, concurring; HUTCHINSON, dissenting.)

Plaintiff filed foreclosure complaint. Issue of material fact exists as to meaning of 2014 letter send to Plaintiff bank by Defendant's former counsel: whether it was a cease-and-desist letter that exempted Plaintiff bank from the face-to-face meeting requirement which is required, by federal regulations as mortgage was insured by HUD, to occur prior to initiating foreclosure. Court erred in granting summary judgment for Plaintiff bank. (DELORT and CONNORS, concurring.)

Defendant Bank of America obtained summary judgment in mortgage foreclosure case against Plaintiffs. Property was sold at a judicial sale, and order confirming sale was entered. Court entered order of possession against Plaintiffs in forcible entry and detainer suit filed thereafter. During pendency of summary judgment motion, Plaintiffs had attempted to remove case to federal court, which dismissed notice of removal but failed to remand matter to circuit court. Orders of summary judgment and confirmation of sale were held void. Circuit judge's failure to inform sheriff that eviction order was invalid does not fall under "administrative" exception to judicial immunity, as that judge had and never lost subject-matter jurisdiction over the eviction case. Court properly dismissed claims against that judge on basis of judicial immunity. Court properly dismissed "wrongful foreclosure" claim, even if re-styled as a claim for abuse of process or slander of title. Claim for "wrongful eviction" was properly dismissed, as complaint did not seek restoration of possession. Court properly dismissed claim for false imprisonment, as the eviction was carried out by Sheriff pursuant to a lawful court order, and Defendant Bank's role was several steps removed, and complaint does not allege any restraint. (McBRIDE and BURKE, concurring.)

Court dismissed mortgage foreclosure complaint, and denied Defendants' request for Rule 137 sanctions against Plaintiff. Bankruptcy discharge without affirmation means Defendant Rivkah is no longer bound by the mortgage contract, but she also can no longer use the HUD regulations as a defense. Noncompliance with HUD regulations is a defense to foreclosure. Based on default date alleged in the complaint, Plaintiff did not comply with HUD regulation 203.604 in a timely fashion. Appellate court's awarding of attorney fees and costs related to the appeal under section 1510 is discretionary. Remanded for trial court to determine whether such award is warranted.(McLAREN and SCHOSTOK, concurring.)

City filed complaint against owners of Pittsfield Building for building code violations as to the interior and exterior of the building. Court abused its discretion when it denied Defendant LLC’s motion to remove the court-appointed receiver. The receiver could not be impartial or carry out his fiduciary duties due to receiver’s conflict of interest, because of his other business relationship with another party in the case from which the receiver could have earned a substantial profit of $4.5 million and which was not initially disclosed to circuit court.(HARRIS and ODEN JOHNSON, concurring).