Real Estate Law

Village filed condemnation action against property owner under Eminent Domain Act. Section 10-5-70(a) fee petitioners must be brought within the condemnation action, while trial court retains its general jurisdiction, within 30 days of the entry of the final judgment in that action. Court properly dismissed Defendant's fee petition as untimely. (ZENOFF and BIRKETT, concurring.)

Plaintiff filed complaint against her Condominium Association and its acting President who prohibited her from operating her condominium unit as a short-term rental on Airbnb, on the basis that the Condominium Declarations barred short-term rentals. Plaintiff granted her guests a mere license to use her unit, not a lease. The restrictive covenant in section 7 of the Declarations, which must be strictly construed, does not bar short-term licensing of the units. City of Chicago imposes regulations on short-term rentals similar to those imposed upon a hotel, and imposes taxes on and requires that financial records must be kept for short-term rentals. This is evidence that Plaintiff's short-term rentals constitutes a "business" for purposes of section 11(b) of the Declarations. The more general prohibition in section 11(b) controls to prohibit Plaintiff's short-term Airbnb rental of her unit. (McBRIDE and ELLIS, concurring.)

Plaintiff made a loan to Defendant LLC that was secured by a mortgage against real property owned by Defendant.Plaintiff filed a foreclosure action against several defendants, and court entered a judgment of foreclosure and sale. Plaintiff later bought the mortgaged property at Sheriff's sale. Court properly confirmed the sale. Defendants argued that terms of sale were unconscionable because the $3.5 million sale price was far less than the $5.5 to $6.5 million range which Defendants suggest is the actual value.  The mere inadequacy of price is an insufficient reason to disturb a judicial sale without some other irregularity. Court did not err by confirming sale without an evidentiary hearing. (HYMAN and COGHLAN, concurring.)

Plaintiffs and the individual Defendants own separate parcels of property along the Mazon River. Plaintiffs filed declaratory action seeking order recognizing their right, as riparian owners, to kayak along the entire river. The Mazon River is not navigable in fact, as it is not, in its natural state, an avenue for commerce by customary modes of water transportation. Thus, a public easement does not exist to allow public navigation on the river. Defendants thus own to the center of the bed of the stream abutting their properties, including the water. Thus, each defendant may lawfully bar all trespassers from the segment of the Mazon River that abuts his parcel of property. Both Plaintiffs and Defendants have private property rights as riparian owners that are superior to the interests of the general public. The riparian owner of each parcel situated along the Mazon River may lawfully bar access, within their easily ascertainable property lines, to any person, including their riparian neighbor.  (HOLDRIDGE and LYTTON, concurring.)