Real Estate Law

Senate Bill 1766

Topic: 
Lessees and criminal activity
(Wilhelmi, D-Joliet; DeLuca, D-Crete) makes two changes to leases and evictions. (1) Requires written leases to notify lessees that if the they use or permit activity that is a felony or Class A misdemeanor, they can be evicted. (Failure to do so doesn’t impair the lessor’s right to evict because of criminal activity.) (2) Allows a municipality’s corporation counsel to evict under this statute as well. Passed both chambers.
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House Bill 141

Topic: 
Illinois Radon Awareness Act
(Reitz, D-Sparta; Haine, D-Alton) changes the disclosure requirements under this Act and also expands it to leased property. If a lessee notifies a lessor that a radon test indicates a radon hazard in the dwelling unit, then the lessor must disclose that risk to any prospective lessee of that unit unless a later test indicates that it no longer exists. But if a lessor’s test indicates a radon hazard, then the lessor must notify current and prospective tenants of that unit. This Act does not apply to dwelling units located on the third floor or higher story or if the lessor has undertaken mitigation activities and a later test indicates that a radon hazard no longer exists. Passed both chambers.
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House Bill 1960

Topic: 
Mortgage foreclosure
(Coladipietro, R-Bloomingdale; Dillard, R-Westmont) makes a deadline for filing a motion to dismiss or to quash service that objects to the court's jurisdiction over the person, unless extended by the court for good cause shown, is 60 days after the earlier of the following: (1) the date that the moving party filed an appearance; or (2) the date that the moving party participated in a hearing without filing an appearance.If the objecting party files a responsive pleading or a motion before filing a motion objecting to personal jurisdiction, that party waives all objections to the court's jurisdiction over the party's person.Passed both chambers.
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Samuel C. Johnson 1988 Trust v. Bayfield County, Wisc.

Federal 7th Circuit Court
Samuel C. Johnson 1988 Trust v. Bayfield County, Wisc.
Civil Court
Property
Citation
Case Number: 
Nos. 09-2876 & 09-2879 Cons.
Decision Date: 
June 17, 2011
Federal District: 
W.D. Wisc.
Holding: 
Reversed
Dist. Ct. erred in granting judgment as matter of law in favor of defendant-County in action by plaintiffs to quiet title to their land when defendant sought to build snowmobile trail on abandoned railroad right of way across plaintiffs' lands. While defendant argued that it owned right of way by virtue of 1852 and 1922 federal statutes, record showed that applicable railroad had not complied with 1852 statute, and any abandoned railroad easement reverted back to plaintiffs' predecessors, as opposed to federal govt. Thus, defendant will need to either purchase instant right of way from plaintiffs or acquire it by exercise of its condemnation powers.

Distressed Homeowners Need Lawyers, Not Legislation

By Steven B. Bashaw & Joseph R. Fortunato
January
2011
Column
, Page 44
Those faced with foreclosure need legal advice, not more legislation.

Village of Algonquin v. Lowe

Village of Algonquin v. Lowe
Illinois Appellate Court
Civil Court
Eminent Domain
Citation
Case Number: 
No. 2-10-0603
Decision Date: 
Wednesday, May 11, 2011
District: 
2d Dist.
Division/County: 
McHenry Co.
Holding: 
Affirmed.
Justice: 
HUDSON
(Court opinion modified 6/1/11.) Court properly granted Section 2-1401 petition to vacate judgment in eminent domain condemnation proceeding, which gave Village title to land in Village, including property that Petitioners were using for their driveway. Village had not obtained personal jurisdiction over Petitioners, so that judgment was void as to them. Village did not obtain personal jurisdiction over Petitioners by publication service, as a plaintiff cannot obtain personal jurisdiction over a defendant that it has never sought to identify, and has described only as a class of nonrecord claimants. In an eminent-domain action, a court must have personal jurisdiction over affected persons. No statutory provision giving the effect of in rem judgments to condemnation judgments exists in Illinois. In rem actions bear formal markers of being in rem that are absent in eminent-domain actions. (ZENOFF and SCHOSTOK, concurring.)

House Bill 1153

Topic: 
Transfer on death instrument
(Bradley, D-Marion; Wilhelmi, D-Joliet) creates the Illinois Residential Real Property Transfer on Death Instrument Act. It transfers residential property on the death of the owner. The definition of “residential property” is borrowed from the Disclosure Act and the Mortgage Foreclosure Act. It requires the owner to sign in front of a notary and two credible witnesses. It was modeled after the Uniform Law Commission’s uniform act. It has passed both chambers and will be send to the Governor in the next 30 days. Effective date of Jan. 1, 2012.
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K. Miller: The Supreme Court and the Home Repair and Remodeling Act

By Barbara A. Farrell
June
2011
Article
, Page 302
The Illinois Supreme Court interpreted the old Home Repair and Remodeling Act in light of the newly amended version and rendered a contractor-friendly decision.

How to Be a Good Closer

By Helen W. Gunnarsson
June
2011
Cover Story
, Page 290
In baseball and residential real estate practice alike, it often comes down to the last inning when a lights-out closer can make the difference. Here are tips from veteran lawyers about what you might encounter at a real estate closing and how to handle it.
2 comments (Most recent June 3, 2011)

Tully v. McLean

Tully v. McLean
Illinois Appellate Court
Civil Court
Fraud
Citation
Case Number: 
No. 1-09-2976
Decision Date: 
Tuesday, April 26, 2011
District: 
1st Dist.
Division/County: 
Cook Co., 2d Div.
Holding: 
Affirmed in part and reversed in part; remanded.
Justice: 
KARNEZIS
Trustee filed suit against developer and development companies, alleging fraud and breach of fiduciary duties in management of company. After bench trial, court ordered Defendants to pay compensatory and punitive damages for fraud and breach of fiduciary duty, finding that developer made numerous large transfers of funds to benefit his other enterprises. Court abused its discretion neither in determining the compensatory base nor in awarding the 3:1 ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages. Court properly ordered forfeiture of "loan fees" in finding that they were inappropriate transfers and not actually earned. Court was within its discretion in setting 13% prejudgment interest rate, as reasonable rate for developer having taken "interest-free loans". (CUNNINGHAM and HARRIS, concurring.)