Child Law

(Court opinion corrected 5/26/15.) Infant, age 14 months, died of head injuries after being left in company of other children, including Respondent, then age 9.Respondent's counsel moved to suppress statements minor had made to a police detective in two interviews in kitchen of his home with his father present. Motion to suppress properly denied as to first interview, as those statements were voluntary. Court erred in denying Respondent's motion to suppress as to second interview, as lying and trick tactics were employed to induce inculpatory statements, and father's presence in interview was marginalized as detective moved him away from minorofficer, and gave fast 45-second recap of Miranda warnings given two days prior, so that statements were rendedered involuntary. Minor's limited functioning level and young age rendered him far more vulnerable and susceptible to police coercion. (GARMAN, FREEMAN, THOMAS, KILBRIDE, and KARMEIER, concurring; BURKE, specially concurring.)

After bench trial, court adjudicated Respondent minor, age 17 at time of offense, delinquent, finding evidence supported conviction for criminal sexual abuse beyond a reasonable doubt. Respondent must thus register as a sex offender. Evidence was conflicting as to whether victim, then age 15, voluntarily engaged in sexual act. Neither eighth amendment cruel and unusual punishment clause nor proportionate penalties clause apply to Respondent's juvenile adjudication. Juvenile Court Act does not provide juvenile with substantive rights, such as substantive due process. Criminal sexual abuse statute is rationally related to legislative purpose of protecting 13 to 16 year olds from premature sexual experiences. (POPE and KNECHT, concurring.)

After court found Respondent mother's two minor children neglected, court within its discretion in denying Respondent mother's motions to continue, and in proceeding with fitness hearing after discharging her final appointed attorney who had stated he was ready to proceed to fitness hearing, and in conducting best interests hearing in Respondent's absence but with prior notice to her. Respondent fired all four of her court-appointed attorneys, each time expressing her dissatisfaction with their representation, and Respondent stated that she would find private counsel but failed to do so. (McDADE and LYTTON, concurring.)

Court entered order, after adjudicatory hearing and same-day dispositional hearing, finding that father of minor, then age 6, was fit, wiling, and able to parent minor, and returned minor home to him under order of protective supervision. Finding was against manifest weight of evidence, as court concluded that minor was abused due to excessive corporal punishment and substantial risk of physical injury caused by father, based on physician's opinion that her injuries were nonaccidental and her bruising was inconsistent with father's explanation for injuries. Father made insufficient progress in therapy to parent minor.(PALMER and GORDON, concurring.)

Minors were placed in relative foster care, and court held DCFS and its agent, LSSI, in contempt for not having immediately removed minors from foster home after grandfather had positive drug test. Court Record fails to reflect existence of a clear order upon which juvenile court could base its contempt finding against Respondents. Even assuming that court order existed requiring Respondents to remove minors from their foster placement, removal was completed prior to date court issued its rule to show cause and before it held Respondents in civil contempt, and thus there was not action for court to coerce at time contempt proceedings began. Court's order improperly punished Respondents for actions which they could not undo, and due process requirements for indirect criminal contempt were not met. (KNECHT and APPLETON, concurring.)

Court's order terminating Respondent's parental rights to her four-year-old daughter, and finding that termination was in best interest of minor, was not against manifest weight of evidence. Respondent was not denied a fair hearing because court properly informed maternal grandmother, with whom minor was placed, as to the law when cautioning her that adoption was favored over guardianship. Court was not acting as advocate by asking four questions of maternal grandmother during best interest hearing. Respondent was not entitled to hearing on her fitness to stand trial prior to termination proceedings. (McBRIDE and REYES, concurring.)

(Court opinion corrected 4/10/15.) Defendant minor was found guilty of one count of theft by deception and placed on supervision for one year, per new provision of Juvenile Court Act which allows court to enter order of continuance under supervision even after a finding of delinquency. Juvenile supervision order is interlocutory and appellate court lacks jurisdiction to review it. (McBRIDE and REYES, concurring.)